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ABSTRACT
As the commoditization of sensing, actuation and communication hardware increases,
so does the potential for dynamically tasked sense and respond networked systems (i.e.,
Sensor Networks or SNs) to replace existing disjoint and inflexible special-purpose deploy-
ments (closed-circuit security video, anti-theft sensors, etc.). While various solutions have
emerged to many individual SN-centric challenges (e.g., power management, communica-
tion protocols, role assignment), perhaps the largest remaining obstacle to widespread SN
deployment is that those who wish to deploy, utilize, and maintain a programmable Sensor
Network lack the programming and systems expertise to do so.
The contributions of this thesis centers on the design, development and deployment of
the SN Workbench (snBench). snBench embodies an accessible, modular programming
platform coupled with a flexible and extensible run-time system that, together, support
the entire life-cycle of distributed sensory services. As it is impossible to find a one-size-
fits-all programming interface, this work advocates the use of tiered layers of abstraction
that enable a variety of high-level, domain specific languages to be compiled to a common
(thin-waist) tasking language; this common tasking language is statically verified and can be
subsequently re-translated, if needed, for execution on a wide variety of hardware platforms.
snBench provides: (1) a common sensory tasking language (Instruction Set Architec-
ture) powerful enough to express complex SN services, yet simple enough to be executed by
highly constrained resources with soft, real-time constraints, (2) a prototype high-level lan-
guage (and corresponding compiler) to illustrate the utility of the common tasking language
and the tiered programming approach in this domain, (3) an execution environment and a
run-time support infrastructure that abstract a collection of heterogeneous resources into a
single virtual Sensor Network, tasked via this common tasking language, and (4) novel for-
mal methods (i.e., static analysis techniques) that verify safety properties and infer implicit
resource constraints to facilitate resource allocation for new services. This thesis presents
these components in detail, as well as two specific case-studies: the use of snBench to
integrate physical and wireless network security, and the use of snBench as the foundation
for semester-long student projects in a graduate-level Software Engineering course.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Motivation
Traditionally Sensor Networks are thought of as a collection of programmable, yet impov-
erished resources that are tasked to complete relatively simple data acquisition activities
(e.g., passive habitat monitoring). Indeed, Sensor Networks are generally characterized
equally by both their nodes’ ability to observe (sense) their immediate surroundings (e.g.,
light, temperature) and their relative lack of resources (battery power, CPU speed, mem-
ory, storage and bandwidth, etc.). A new view of SNs is emerging, in which SNs consist
of a heterogeneous collection of sensing, actuation, and computing systems; the increased
processing capability of (some) of the constituent nodes within the system enable a much
more complex sense and respond activities including image processing in tandem with more
traditional (e.g., temperature and light monitoring) capabilities.
We envision the emergence of general-purpose, well-provisioned sensor networks—which
we call “Sensoria”—that are embedded in (or overlayed atop) physical spaces, and whose use
is shared amongst autonomous users of that space for independent and possibly conflicting
missions. Our conception of a Sensorium stands in sharp contrast to the commonly adopted
view of an embedded sensor network as a special-purpose infrastructure that serves a well-
defined, fixed mission.
2Our work (and indeed interest) is focused on the goal of enabling shared, dynamically
tasked sensory infrastructures: physical environments augmented with a rich set of sense and
respond capabilities that may be tasked simultaneously by both the owners and occupants
of the space.
Many shared physical spaces (e.g., Shopping Malls, Airports, Elder Care facilities) al-
ready enjoy some of the “low-hanging” benefits of sensor deployments, achieved via separate,
disjoint, non-programmable sensing “networks.” In these environments most processing and
response is performed by simple dedicated circuitry or humans (e.g., a security guard watch-
ing a closed-circuit video feed). The goal of our work is to provide an acquisition, response,
and computation infrastructure that completely replaces, and ultimately supersedes, these
existing closed deployments.
To motivate this alternative “open system” view of a SN, consider a public space such
as an airport, shopping mall, museum, parking garage, subway transit system, among many
other such examples. Clearly, there are many di↵erent constituents who may have an inter-
est in monitoring these public spaces, using a variety of sensing modalities (video cameras,
motion sensors, temperature sensors, smoke detectors, etc.). In the case of a shopping mall,
these constituents may include mall tenants, customers, mall security, local police and fire
departments, etc. One alternative is for all these di↵erent constituents to overlay the public
space they share with independent SN infrastructures – comprising separate sensors, actu-
ators, processing and storage server nodes, and networks – each of which catering to the
specific mission or application of interest to each respective constituent. Clearly, this is
neither e cient nor practical, and for many constituents may not be even feasible. Rather,
it is reasonable to expect that such a shared SN infrastructure will be an integral part of
the public space in which it is embedded, operated and managed by an entity di↵erent from
the entities interested in “programming” it for their own use.
By example, we consider a parking garage which already contains a closed-circuit video
surveillance system that is monitored by the on-site security personnel to detect suspicious
activity. The easiest way to transition this environment to a programmable infrastruc-
3ture would be to connect a computer with digital video capture capability directly to the
existing camera network; doing so essentially turns the existing closed-circuit camera de-
ployment into an IP camera network. Once the video frames are available digitally, they
can be processed by any number of image manipulation/recognition operations. A simple
monitoring process might try to detect someone breaking a car window on the premises
by computing motion vectors across the images and producing warning whenever a short,
fast movement is detected. Audio sensors would also be e↵ective in this environment, as
loud noises would indicate that there is an event that requires attention (especially when
coupled with the image processing data to further increase confidence). What makes the
use of the programmable network so appealing, is the ease with which new services could
be easily added, at least “in theory.”
Consider placing a new camera in full view of the license plates of cars as they enter
and leave the parking garage. These data sources can be used to count the number of
cars that have entered/exited the garage. This data can be used to estimate the number
of remaining open spots in the garage (possibly updating some display to indicate when
the garage is full), o↵er a pricing discount if the garage is far under capacity, allow police
o cials to occasionally query for stolen vehicles, or enable real-time queries in the event of a
highly time sensitive crime (e.g., an Amber alert). These example uses allude to some of the
inherent needs of such an embedded sensory environment, including (but not limited to):
(1) the ability to perform processing on multiple data sources, on more than one computer,
with processing done potentially o↵ site, (2) a notion of di↵erent task priorities (the tasks
of the police take priority over the simple car counting example), (3) di↵erent tiers (or
groups) of users who utilize the system, each with di↵erent device access, and (4) a notion
of di↵erent time constraints (counting cars would likely have a strict (measurable) time
latency bound, while querying for the entrance of stolen cars can probably be dealt with as
time permits). A myriad of other potential examples are also possible (e.g., allowing mobile
users to check the number of remaining spaces, which floors have open parking spaces, or
to query where they parked their car). We cannot underscore enough the need that arises
4from the need to close the gap between imagining new potential, sensory applications and
actually implementing and deploying these new applications.
Harnessing the power of such shared SN infrastructures will hinge on our ability to
streamline the process whereby relatively unsophisticated “third parties” are able to rapidly
develop and deploy their applications without having to understand or worry about the
underlying, possibly complex “plumbing” in the SN infrastructure supporting their appli-
cations.
Low-level Sensor Network development requires the specification of highly synchronized
and concurrent source code for each of the constituent nodes/roles in the larger SN applica-
tion. This task is challenging for well-trained software developers and is cruelly out-of-reach
for those who would see the most benefit from a SN deployment; security, civil engineers,
elder care professionals, etc. In an attempt to lower the complexity of service composition
and SN construction, a variety of works have emerged that explore extending language
and common run-time support services to SNs as an alternative to low-level, device and
role-specific code.
Existing SN research in this domain underscores the inherent challenges in making
a system accessible to novices, while not simultaneously rendering the system impotent
by over-simplification. We observe that the current o↵erings make many trade-o↵s, have
tangible disadvantages, and ultimately bring about a strong sense of deja-vu.
Today, programming SNs su↵ers from the same lack of organizing principles as did pro-
gramming of stand-alone computers some forty years ago. Primeval programming languages
were expressive but unwieldy; software engineering technology improved with the develop-
ment of new high-level programming languages that support more expressive and useful
abstraction mechanisms for controlling computational processes, as well as through the
wide adoption of common software development platforms that leverage these abstractions.
For SNs, we believe that the same evolutionary path need not be (painfully) retraced, if
proper abstractions, expressive languages, and software engineering platforms are developed
in tandem with advances in lower-level SN technologies.
51.2 The Sensor Network WorkBench
To this end, this thesis presents the Sensor NetworkWorkBench (or snBench). snBenchleverages
type-theoretic concepts from the Programming Language (PL) community in tandem with
lessons learned from traditional Operating and Distributed Systems work. snBench em-
bodies an accessible, flexible, and extensible programming platform and run-time system
that support the entire life-cycle of of distributed sensory applications. Our primary focus
is not on optimizing the various algorithms or protocols supporting an a-priori specified
application or mission, but rather on providing flexibility and extensibility for the rapid
development and deployment a of wide range of applications.
SNAFU
compiler
compilation
SSD/
SRM
bound
STEP
bound
STEP
bound
STEP
SXE
SXE
.
.
.
.
.
.
linking dispatch
SNAFU
program
unbound
STEP
program
verification
STEP
static 
verifier
certified
STEP
program
Figure 1.1: The SN program life-cycle as enabled by snBench. Rectangles represent data,
circles represent tasks/processes, and the dashed lines represent control communication
(i.e., dependency).
The snBench framework allows Sensorium users to easily program, deploy, and monitor
the services that run in this space while insulating the user from the complexity of the phys-
ical resources therein. snBench provides a high-level programming languages with which
to specify programs (services) that are submitted to the resource management component,
which in turn disseminates program fragments to the run-time infrastructure for execution.
snBench is extensible by design insofar as new hardware and software capabilities may be
painlessly folded into the infrastructure by its advanced users and those new capabilities
easily leveraged by its novice users.
The components of snBench are analogous to those commonly found in traditional,
stand-alone general-purpose computing environments (language safety, APIs, virtualization
6of resources, scheduling, resource management, etc.). High-level languages that support
stateful, temporal, and persistent computation are compiled into an intermediate, abstract
representation of the processing graph, called a STEP (Sensorium Task Execution Plan).
STEP is a strongly-typed functional language that is verified for safety and resource require-
ments, then linked to available Sensorium eXecution Environments (SXEs). A Sensorium
Service Dispatcher (SSD) decomposes the STEP graph into a linked execution plan, load-
ing STEP sub-graphs to appropriate individual SXEs and binding those loaded sub-graphs
together with appropriate network protocols. The SSD may load many such programs
onto a Sensorium simultaneously, taking advantage of programs’ shared computation and
dependencies to make more e cient use of sensing, computation, network, and storage re-
sources. snBenchprovides each user access to his or her own “private” SN, easily tasked
with new programs and handling the scheduling, deployment, and management concerns
transparently (i.e., o↵ering each user an abstract, Virtual SN).
The architecture of snBench has grown naturally from the properties we desire from
the systems/services that we target with it. Foremost, the snBench infrastructure aims to
provide a modular sense and response platform with which SN services can be e↵ortlessly
composed and on which multiple, potentially competing, SN services can be executed si-
multaneously on heterogeneous resources. The central organizing principle of our system
is the use of a common, data-centric tasking language that provides the “thin-waist” of a
layered programming approach, wherein multiple programming abstractions may be layered
atop each other to o↵er multiple abstraction granularities to users of varying sophistication
simultaneously (Figure 1.2).
We conceive of a SN service as a flow of data through a series of atomic functions. As
such, we are able to share data when multiple services require the same sensing resources
simultaneously . We provide an “interactive” functional language (i.e., a functional language
with inherent temporal dependency) as our tasking language; the functional style fits data-
centric programming well and dovetails naturally with the desire for formal methods to
statically verify safety and resource requirements.
7STEP
???ASM JavaBytecode
SQL-like
Java-like
ML-like
C-like
Figure 1.2: The thin-waist (hour glass) model applied to SN Programming Languages. We
provide higher level languages that are compiled down to our common ISA, STEP. If a node
cannot execute STEP directly, it can be recompiled into an alternate representation.
Distributing a SN service across a set of nodes requires partitioning the service into
components to be places on available resources (which is made easier by the functional
nature of the tasking language), however the desire to support multiple SN services running
simultaneously drives the need to also partition the SN resources to support multiple SN
service components simultaneously. When a SN service is distributed across a resource set,
the service programmer may not care which specific resource runs what computation in
every case, so the resource allocation component must support services compositions are
potentially both resource aware and resource agnostic (i.e., if the programmer does not
specify where a computation is to occur, it will be assigned to any resource that exists and
is able to run his or her computation). These needs motivate explicit resource annotation
in our tasking language as well as extensions to our type checker to statically determine an
expression’s resource demands and execution delays for resource allocation.
Finally, as the SNs targeted by snBench are not limited to collections of homogeneous
resources, snBench must provide a common tasking abstraction and execution environ-
ment that abstracts away the unimportant nuances of di↵erent hardware components while
exposing the unique capabilities of these devices to the programmer (and infrastructure,
at large). Our type system must not only infer data types but also must extract the rela-
tionship between data sizes and resource availability, potentially suggesting changes to the
program to improve performance or enable execution, in general, given resource availability
8(e.g., suggest a specific image resolution or the use of a specific sensor that supports that
resolution) based on contextual use or timing constraints).
The work in this thesis has been developed in response to the needs and requirements
detailed above.
1.3 Organization of this Document
What follows is an overview of the individual chapters of this document.
Chapter 2: Related Work
This chapter presents a survey of other works that are related to snBench as a whole (i.e.,
other Sensor Network Construction Platforms). Some individual chapters of this thesis also
contain their own, individual related work sections to specifically consider works that are
related to the contributions described therein.
Chapter 3: Functional Tasking Languages For Service Composition
This chapter presents the two tasking languages provided within snBench.
We present the functional-style common tasking language (i.e., virtual Instruction Set
Architecture), Sensorium Task Execution Plan, or STEP. STEP is the unifying, thin-waist
language in our tiered tasking model (Figure 1.2). STEP is used to task both the larger
SN and the individual execution environments within the SN. STEPs chain together core
capabilities supported by the runtime environment of the SN to form a logical path of
execution. Conceptually, a STEP instance is viewed as a directed graph of the computations
requested of a single computing element. Given a program’s representation as a graph,
detecting parallelization and other optimizations become tractable.
We also detail the high-level, SN-scoped programming language (SNAFU) and the com-
piler that produces STEP code from SNAFU programs. SNAFU exists to ease development
and allow the developer a clear shift toward resource agnostic programming (i.e., program-
9ming the network rather than the nodes). SNAFU is merely one instance of a higher level,
domain specific language that can target compilation to STEP. It is a layer of syntactic
sugar and provides significant convenience over programming in STEP alone.
Chapter 4: The snBench Architecture and Infrastructure
This chapter describes the run time components of the architecture that provide resource
management, task assignment, and the execution environment for participant nodes.
The Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE) is the run-time virtualization environment
for heterogeneous computing and sensing resources; it is a common runtime that provides
sensing and/or computing elements of the SN the ability to interpret and execute dynam-
ically assigned task execution plans. In part, the execution environment hides irrelevant
di↵erences between various physical components and exposes a unified virtualized interface
to their unique capabilities.
There are two key run-time support components that monitor SN resources and sched-
ule newly submitted STEP programs to available SN resources. The Sensorium Resource
Manager (SRM) is responsible for maintaining a current snapshot of the available resources
in the SN, while the Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD) is responsible for accepting new
STEP programs for the SN and scheduling the tasks of the STEP to available resources.
Optimally, the scheduler must identify tasks within the new STEP that match currently
deployed tasks and reuse them as appropriate and find a partitioning of the STEP program
that can be deployed to physical resources.
Chapter 5: Safety Verification Through Programming Language Formalisms
This chapter describes a static-analysis methodology that provides type safety checks as
well as data size bounding and resource requirement estimation on STEP instances. The
multi-dimensional sized type checker tracks and constrains the upper and lower size bounds
for data and, in doing so, can recommend resolution ranges for image processing data, check
if a feasible data size exists to satisfy the temporal requirements of a program, and carry
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size constraints from the sized data to the sensors that generate it. The ability to infer
constraints on data and the sensors that produce it is essential to facilitating the resource
agnostic programming model.
Chapter 6: A Native Execution Environment for Embedded Devices
Resources that are highly constrained and have (soft) real-time constraints (e.g., robotics
platforms) may require finer grained control over their resource utilizations. To that end
we provide an alternate execution environment and instruction set architecture for these
devices. This work consists of a small, virtual machine (the STEPvm) and a compiler
that takes STEP instances and produces functionally equivalent representations in our
lightweight ISA (snCode).
Chapter 7: Case Study: Combined Physical and Wireless Network Security
This chapter presents and instance of how snBench can empower its users to capitalize on
the SN resources they have, in order to develop novel, previously hard to conceive of, sense
and respond application. In particular, specific details are given as to how snBench can
be used to bridge the gap between physical security (i.e., CCTV survallience) and wireless
network security. We argue (by example) that security on both planes (the physical and
the virtual) benefit from the data provided by the other.
Chapter 8: Case Study: snBench as a Teaching Aide
This chapter details experiences over the course of three years using snBench as the basis
for semester-long group projects in a mixed graduate and undergraduate software engi-
neering class. Much of the work submitted as part of these student projects has been
adopted back into the snBench code base, in some form or another, including a graph-
ical programming development environment, alternative scheduling policies for the sensor
execution environment, and a myriad of image manipulation functions (opcodes).
Chapter 2
Related Work
In much the same way that a Distributed Operating System provides scheduling and man-
agement services to collect disparate and disjoint hardware into a single programmatic
interface, snBench aims to provide the same functionalities for sensing and responding
environments. In our consideration of related work, we consider other works that ease the
development and deployment of Sensor (and Responder) Networks. We label such works as
Sensor Network Construction Platforms (or SNCPs); all of which provide mechanisms that
ease SN construction and deployment (e.g., high(er)-level languages, abstractions, APIs,
run-time support services, libraries). SNCPs allow SN services (or SN instances) to be
constructed at a higher-level by leveraging an underlying run-time or library to provide
functionalities commonly required of SN nodes/services (e.g., network topology discovery
and maintenance, routing, naming, sensory data acquisition and manipulation, task prop-
agation and scheduling). Unlike the previous generation of SNs that were hand coded to
optimally achieve a single predetermined goal, SNCPs enable Sensor Networks that can
be shared and are dynamic in function (i.e., executing multiple tasks simultaneously, and
capable of re-tasking after the initial deployment).
Sensor Network Construction Platforms provide the means to describe new sensory ser-
vices and the runtime components that enable the individual sensing/computing hardware
(or hardware abstraction layer) to execute these sensory services (i.e., analogous to middle-
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ware in a software stack). What di↵erentiates an SNCP from a rich operating system for
sensors is that (1) rather than providing a single, fixed solution/implementation for common
SN tasks, the implementations may be adjusted (i.e., are modular) to suit the requirements
of the SN services they execute and (2) the composition and orchestration of the SN service
is supported from a perspective that is higher-level than that of the single node.
For example, TinyOS [HSW+00], is a small e cient event driven “operating system”
that allows programs written in the nesC programming language to access the hardware
of the device (e.g., radio, timers, sensory devices). Programming in nesC for TinyOS is
naturally low-level and application/role specific. As such, it is not considered an SNCP
in and of itself, however several systems constructed on top of TinyOS are considered as
SNCPs.
We organize our discussion of these related works by their particular abstraction gran-
ularity; ranging from those that provide services to ease programming at individual nodes
(e.g., libraries for nesC) to those that abstract away the SN entirely (e.g., represent the
SN as Database). Figure 2.1 illustrates the complete range of abstraction granularities and
classifies various Sensor Network Construction Platforms in that spectrum. The reader
should note that not all of the works presented were designed to be SNCPs as their primary
goal (i.e., many have been implemented to highlight and address other specific research
issues) and as such criticism of the adequacy and/or completeness of these works as SNCPs
is unfair, and is not our intent. Instead we present these works as the state-of-the-art in
their progress and contributions toward the individual goals required to provide a complete
Sensor Network Construction Platform.
Relation to Distributed and Grid Computing
Providing a unified interface and infrastructure to allocate, task and maintain distributed
Sensor Networks is a goal similar to that of Distributed Operating Systems and Distributed
Computing (e.g., Grid computing), however there are significant di↵erences in the tasks
targeted by emergent Sensor Networks. SNs (unlike Grid environments) consist of het-
erogeneous devices with non-uniform constraints and capabilities; these capabilities (i.e.,
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Figure 2.1: Organizing Sensor Network Construction Platforms by their abstraction gran-
ularity.
Sensing and Actuating) are themselves novel to the SN environment. Additionally, in tra-
ditional Distributed Computing scenarios, submitted jobs tend to be batch jobs (i.e., CPU
intensive) while those tasks targeted by Sensor Networks are diverse, and may consist of
highly I/O intensive tasks (e.g., streams of video). Distributed Computing jobs tend to
be long-running while SN tasks may be persistent or potentially quick, transient requests.
Related to this, in a traditional Distributed Computing environment with long running
batch jobs, there is not a focus on minimizing the latency between new job submission and
execution, whereas in a SN environment, short, event-responsive tasks must be deployed as
quickly as possible.
2.1 Classification By Abstraction
2.1.1 Complete Transparency
SN as a Database
The works in this section are at the extreme end of the transparency spectrum. Just as
many Distributed OSes strive for complete transparency (i.e., the user is unaware that the
underlying system is actually composed of several systems) the Sensor Network Construction
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Platforms presented here provide data acquisition SNs that abstract the network as a single
Database containing the data available at the sensors. At this level of abstraction, “tasking”
the SN is limited to inserting new queries for existing data and simple in network processing
(aggregation) on that data.
TinyDB
TinyDB [MFHH05] provides sensor nodes with TinyOS/nesC code that (1) participates
in the routing and processing of SQL style queries and responses and (2) performs simple
in network data processing and aggregation. Each node exposes sensory data via a table
(named sensors) that contains a column for each type (i.e., modality) of sensory data
(light, temperature, etc.) available in the network. This table must be configured prior
to deployment and the width of the table cannot increase during runtime resulting in an
inflexible SN with respect to adding new sensors or sensory data types after deployment.
To the credit of TinyDB, this work does abstract away the SN while still providing SN-
centric controls, e.g., augmenting the SQL-like query interface with the ability to specify
persistent queries with explicit periodicity (e.g., SELECT .. SAMPLE PERIOD 30s), event
based queries, and adaptive node behavior and message routing aimed to help reduce battery
consumption. The Tiny Application Sensor Kit (TASK) [BHH+05] is built on TinyDB and
provides a “turn key” sensor network distribution suite including device monitoring and
reporting tools for novices wishing to deploy SNs.
Cougar
Cougar [YG02] is similar to TinyDB in that it also abstracts the SN into a single SQL style
database. Rather than exposing tables at the nodes, Cougar stores sensor information at
the nodes in a custom abstract data type (ADT). Cougar uses a centralized task dissemi-
nation strategy that sends queries from and returns ADTs to a central tasking entity which
ultimately exposes the database-style interface. Unlike TinyDB, Cougar lacks in-network
aggregation. Cougar shares many criticisms in common with TinyDB; particularly di cult
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sensor adaptability (evolution) without re-deployment and a fixed notion of sensor node
data types, however the use of a custom ADT would theoretically make it easier to support
new sensors, data and types after deployment (i.e., localizing most of the required changes
to the central tasking entity).
2.1.2 SN Programming “In the large”
At this granularity of abstraction, Sensor Network Construction Platform provide the capa-
bility to task the SN with expressive programs in the scope of the SN as a whole, describing
the program in terms that span/address the SN rather than the individual nodes. As op-
posed to “micro-programming” the individual nodes (i.e., providing device and role specific
micro code), this approach has been referred to as “macro-programming.” These works dif-
fer from the DB approaches discussed previously in that they go beyond the data-acquisition
functionality to o↵er arbitrary programmability.
SN as a VM
MagnetOS
MagnetOS [LRW+05] provides a thin layer Operating System to each node of the SN to
pool the resources into a power-aware, adaptive single Java Virtual Machine (JVM) im-
age. Magnet raises the bar for SN programmability beyond simple SQL queries by enabling
dynamic programming of the SN through single-system, event-centric Java programs. A
static partitioner (injector) divides the Java program among the nodes via binary rewrit-
ing using boundaries determined by object instances or method calls. Magnet allows for
explicit annotation within the Java program to allow programmers to define boundaries
and object placement. To increase network longevity MagnetOS provides algorithms that
migrate object hosting one hope at a time (NetPull) or multi-hop (NetCenter) to minimize
network transmission. Run-time components (LinkPull, PeerPull) monitor network traf-
fic to determine candidate nodes for object migration while network structure components
(NetCluster, TopoCenter) determine the connectivity and structure of the network.
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While the use of the standard Java programming language as a programmatic interface
to a SN implies no special considerations for SN programming, the authors do provide
several sensor-level abstractions that expose SN-specific run-time state (e.g., Node, Link,
NeighborSet, Energy) and provide alternate SN-centric versions of existing abstractions
(e.g., Lock and Thread). Requiring Java interpretation at every sensor node introduces
runtime overhead and additionally it is unclear how sensor-specific operations are provided
(device drivers, for example). Ultimately one may argue that a JVM is not an accessible
programming abstraction for a SN and, given some examples of program size from the paper
in which MagnetOS is described [LRW+05] (e.g., Audio Event Detection is 868 lines, Video
Multicast at 222 lines), it seems unlikely that novices would be able to pick up Magnet
programming with great ease.
Data-centric
In this section we consider works that task the SN in terms of the sensory data to be tracked,
either directly or via abstract objects defined from composite sensory data.
SINA
Sensor Information Networking Architecture and Applications (SINA) [SSJ01] treats the
nodes of its SN as taskable entities using a the Sensor Query and Tasking Language [JSS00].
SQTL is an sensor tasking protocol that packages execution directives along with a declara-
tive style program for the individual participant sensors. In SINA a front end node provides
an SQL-like user interface augmented with some tasking capabilities, produces SQTL mes-
sages to task the SN, performs data aggregation, and presents data to the end user. Sensors
host the SINA execution module (also called Sensor Execution Environment or SEE) that
runs SQTL and maintains an associative spreadsheet containing information about the local
node and programmatic data storage. To utilize the SN in tasks beyond simple responses
to data acquisition, the programmer must specify node-centric programs embedded into
SQTL. SINA’s SEE provides message routing and neighbor discovery on the nodes that,
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when coupled with the SQTL programming abstractions provided for nodes, sensors and
neighborhood, eases node-centric development on SINA. Ultimately SINA is a sensor-centric
programming environment that has been augmented to support simple query-response tasks.
EnviroSuite
EnviroSuite [LAHS06] is the current evolution of EnviroTrack [ABC+04], an object-based
development platform geared towards tracking objects in the physical environment. Entities
and locations in the physical environment are defined by their observable (sense-able) char-
acteristics. Programmers define objects by building a meta-specification including name
(type), the conditions that define when the object is found (context), the measurable prop-
erties of the tracked object (attributes) and methods that may be performed on the object.
EnviroSuite contains the environmentally immersive programming library for nesC (EIPLib)
that provides common sensing, processing and communication functionalities while the EIP
compiler (EIPLC) produces nesC code for the individual sensors given object definitions.
Naturally, not all conditions and functionalities exist in the libraries, such that high-level
specifications may also require nesC code to introduce new functionalities. The object ab-
straction of EnviroSuite is actually quite similar to the Semantic Streams notion in SONGs
which is discussed below.
SONGs/Semantic Streams
In the SONGS framework (Service-Oriented Network proGramming of Sensors) [LZ05] “pro-
grams” are specified as logic based queries that define abstract entities defined by sensable
features. Given these so-called ontological definitions of the entities of interest, an entity
query will be translated by the service planning component of the infrastructure to generate
a Semantic Stream [WZL06]. The semantic stream is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that
describes the flow of relevant data and any manipulations that are needed on the data path.
A semantic stream is composed of SONGS service components (implemented in .NET) that
specify their preconditions (input types) and post-conditions (output types). Service em-
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bedding tries to fit the semantic stream on to the current state of the system, deploying parts
of the computation to available resources. As the semantic stream for one entity may share
common observable characteristics across other entities (or queries), the service embedding
stage attempts to re-use existing deployed sensing operations or manipulations across se-
mantic streams. Service planning uses a logic inference engine to meet the requirements
of the high level semantic service. The SONGs architecture assumes a heterogeneous SN
architecture, using sensors purely for data acquisition while more powerful nodes perform
the roles of data processing (field servers) and service planning and embedding (gateway
servers). While the SONGs approach does seem rather accessible, it shares the same de-
traction of all the works surveyed in this category, that the programming model is more
data-acquisition and simple response oriented and it does not seem to support expressive
programming of the SN without delving into the source code at the nodes (in this case, the
service components).
Network-centric
In this section we consider works that task the Sensor Network in terms of the desired
behavior of the SN as a whole. Unlike the previous classification, these works enable the SN
to be programmed with tasks that go beyond simple data-acquisition, while maintaining
the benefit of not programming individual nodes. While we have placed our own snBench
framework in this classification (Figure 2.1), snBench ultimately transcends a rigid clas-
sification by abstraction insofar as it enables development to occur at any point in the
spectrum (e.g., at any height of abstraction).
snBench
snBench[OBK06] provides a high-level functional-style programming language to describe
SN behavior that is compiled into an intermediate data flow task graph and partitioned
across the shared physical resources of the SN infrastructure. The snBench programming
language, SNAFU (SN Applications as Functional Units), is a high-level strongly-typed
19
functional language that supports stateful, temporal, and persistent computation, a cycle-
safe recursion construct and annotation of run-time properties (called flow types) SNAFU
is compiled into an intermediate, abstract representation of the processing graph, called a
STEP (Sensorium Task Execution Plan). A STEP, serialized as XML, contains nodes that
express the resources, values, and sampling and computation operations required to execute
the program. The STEP graph is then linked to available Sensorium eXecution Environ-
ments (SXEs) possibly taking into account user requested bindings, where appropriate. A
Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD) decomposes the STEP graph into a linked execution
plan, loading STEP sub-graphs to appropriate individual SXEs and binding those loaded
sub-graphs together with appropriate network protocols. The SSD may load many such
programs onto a Sensorium simultaneously, taking advantage of programs’ shared compu-
tation and dependencies to make more e cient use of sensing, computation, network, and
storage resources.
snBench has been designed with extensibility in mind and, as such, provides a clear
path (interface) to extend the computations supported within STEP, the sensory data types
(i.e., modalities) manipulated by STEP, and the computation and sensory hardware that
comprise the larger system. To facilitate this flexibility, the run-time components (e.g.,
SXEs) are implemented in Java, yet this comes at the cost of less-predictable processing
overhead that may be inappropriate for some time sensitive operations. As a solution to
this potential fault, compilation to a lightweight VM for embedded devices or time sensitive
tasks is o↵ered (and is described in Chapter (6)).
Unlike other works considered, snBench advocates a tiered programming model, such
that multiple high-level languages can be developed and compiled into the common tasking
language (i.e., there is not one single interface to task the network). At the narrow-waist,
the common tasking language (STEP) can be used to task either individual nodes or a set
of nodes; snBench enables development at whichever height of abstraction is suitable for
the target audience.
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snBench is the only work to employ static verification of sensory services and provides a
formal type theory to perform static analysis for safety and resource requirements analysis
given a STEP instance. Not only is this the only SNCP to employ static verification of
Sensory tasks, doing so on the common target (tasking) language enables static verification
to occur on the generated tasks regardless of the particular source (composition) language
or level of abstraction.
Regiment
Regiment [NW04] describes a functional language for SNs that treats the Sensor Network
as a data structure. The authors cite the benefits of a functional approach including that
straightforward manner in which parallelism can be extracted, that computation can be mi-
grated/replicated without e↵ecting evaluation and that hiding state manipulations from the
programmer allowing the compiler to decide how state should be stored. Regiment is a fully
expressive programming model and allows the composition of functions that pass functions
in as arguments (an unrestricted functional language). Functional programs composed in
Regiment may compute upon and derive events from the abstractions of the SN’s elements,
space and time. Each sensor is represented as a typed data object (Node) that exposes state,
a Space is a collection of Nodes that can be assembled based on common characteristics of
Nodes and a Region is a stream of Spaces. Several useful constructs are provided in the
Regiment language to manipulate this data including aggregation (fold), a map operation,
filter, and several conditional event handlers (when, whenAny, whenPercent).
Regiment programs are executed via compilation into a Distributed Token Machine
(DTM) model [NAW05] in which data, synchronization and instructions are passed around
the system in tokens (a la Active Networking [SN04]). In Regiment’s DTM, the entire
program (DAG) is placed in the token (like a stack) and the nodes pass the remaining parts
of the computation along with any required results computed in a token to the node(s) that
should take the next action from the stack. At present only a subset of the language can be
processed by the compiler and the output runs in a simulator rather than on a live system,
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however the larger concern is that this framework assumes that the SN runs a single service
and does not seem to accommodate multi-tasking the SN.
Kairos
Kairos [GGG] provides a compiler and run-time support to provide macro-programming
of SNs in the same spirit of distributed memory. In Kairos the programmer specifies a
single high-level program in the extended C language Pleiades [KGMG07] that contains
code for logical groupings of sensors that may read/write variables at other nodes, iterate
through a nodes immediate neighbors and address arbitrary nodes. To specify behavior
at multiple nodes, the procedural single-image Pleiades program includes a concurrent-for
(cfor) construct that is executed simultaneously on all elements within the for loop.
To facilitate remote variable reads and writes Kairos implements a loosely consistent
distributed memory model that is handled by a run-time library that transparently manage
message passing, internal threads and object bookkeeping. The single “high-level” program
contains abstractions to iterate over nodes and the code within the iteration body is the
node specific actions to be taken on those nodes (potentially including iteration through
neighbors). A preprocessor generates the node specific code in the native language of the
individual node, relying on the Kairos run-time libraries to fill in data exchange and neighbor
location. Although [GGG] provides several examples of single image programs, the presence
of code for individual nodes within this global code is somewhat awkward and seems to defy
the expectation of ease in Macro-programming (namely that node specific code need not
be provided). On the other hand, the authors newly published Pleiades language seems to
simplify code specification and readability significantly.
DFuse
DFuse [KWA+03] is an architecture for programming streaming data applications focused
on optimizing function placement (i.e., node role assignment) against several di↵erent cost
functions (e.g., bandwidth, network longevity). A DFuse program consists of a collection
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of fusion functions and a data flow graph that indicates how data flows through the fusion
functions. Fusion functions may concurrently manipulate multiple streams of di↵erent data
types simultaneously (hence “fusion”) and each non-sink function will produce one or more
streams of data (e.g., a traditional aggregation would produce a single value stream from
several streams). Fusion function placement is a heuristic based approach where in nodes
decide whether or not to migrate to neighbor nodes given local information about node
“health” (where health is a particular feature of interest).
Fusion function implementation is C-based, but eased by the Fusion API, a library of
common capabilities including structure management (i.e., fusion communication channel
establishment and access), correlation control (i.e., filters to modify how data arrives in
the channel), computation management (i.e., the specification, application and migration
of a fusion function), memory management, failure and latency handling and a status and
feedback channel for inter-function or function-to-device control. Although fusion function
implementation is low-level and role specific the infrastructure satisfies node role assignment
with respect to a requested optimization such that, assuming a library of fusion function
implementations, DFuse could provide a macro-programming interface in its application
task graph.
DART/Abstract Task Graph
The Abstract Task Graph [BPRL05] is a macro-programming model that is a mix of
imperative-declarative programming style and data driven program flow. ATaG is a graph
in which the nodes are tasks that produce or consume some data and the edges are data
dependency (as in DFuse and snBench). Abstract tasks are implemented by programmers
in lower-level languages and otherwise programming is done graphically in the Generic
Modeling Environment by connecting and annotating tasks in ATaG.
Execution of an Abstract Task Graph is supported by the Data-driven ATaG Run-Time,
DART [BPP05], and the ATaG system features compiler support to produce node specific
tasking. DART consists of several modules; NetworkStack handles inter-sensor commu-
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nication, NetworkArchitecture performs neighbor/location to node ID resolution, ATaG-
Manager maintains the Task Graph, data channels and scheduling information, DataPool
provides access to shared variables, Dispatcher exchanges data across DataPools, and finally
UserTask is the actual code (instantiation) of a particular abstract task. Unlike DFuse and
snBench in which the respective connected functions communicate values directly between
each other, DART uses a local DataPool at each sensor run-time to exchange values between
functions on the local node and the Dispatcher sends data across remote DataPools. The
DataPool concept is present in the ATaG as well, which makes programs appear somewhat
complicated compared to a straight-forward data flow.
While at present DART runs on top of Java, there is reference to a µC/OS-II implemen-
tation that is in progress. Details are relatively slim on where ATaG compilation occurs,
whether it is performed on-line or o✏ine and if multitasking of the SN is supported. As no
details are given regarding automated task assignment we assume the service programmer
manually assigns tasks to nodes by annotation.
2.1.3 Individual Sensor Programming
The following works provide libraries and run-time support to ease tasking at the granularity
of individual nodes/sensors.
TinyCubus
TinyCubus [MLM+05b], is a SN support infrastructure that provides data management ser-
vices, a cross-layer framework and configuration engine that, when given the specification
of a SN program will produce a tailored library configuration including implementations
of common SN tasks, a data-sharing platform and task assignment. Although the overall
desired program behavior is defined at a high level including optimization parameters (e.g.,
energy, latency, bandwidth), application requirements (e.g., reliability), and system param-
eters (e.g., mobility, node density) the development of the SN application still requires
node-centric programming. More details about TinyCubus may be found in [MLM+05a].
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SNACK
The Sensor Network Application Construction Kit (SNACK) [GKE04] aims to promote
code reuse, both within SN deployments (SNACK service composition allows annotations
for event path merging) and to establish programmer libraries of stock implementations.
SNACK does not deal with task assignment or resource management issues, but rather
aims to aide in the construction of a single SN application. SNACK provides a library
of common SN tasks, linked together with a high-level role specific (e.g., for individual
motes) composition language. The language provided allows developers to describes com-
ponents and their corresponding interfaces and is ultimately compiled into nesC. SNACK
does not aim to lower the bar for SN composition to novice users; the service composer
must still understand the event-driven programming paradigm of nesC as well as concur-
rency and synchronization issues. The authors do allude to the fact that some higher-level
languages/interface could be created to interface with SNACK.
Active Sensor Networks
The Application Specific Virtual Machines (ASVM) approach presented in [LGC05] eases
Sensor Network programming by leveraging the authors prior work on Mate [LC02] which
provides Virtual Machines for sensing elements (motes). The ASVM run-time runs on
TinyOS and provides a core VM (static, middle-ware part) that can accept, schedule and
execute “capsules” that contain specific VM instances (a nesC bytecode translation for the
program and a support library implementing any functionality beyond the basic VM that is
needed by the bytecode). Programs are event driven, subscribing to events generated by the
hardware (including timers) to perform their computation. The compiler (i.e., tool-chain)
produces the bytecode and specific VM capsule generated from three provided higher-level
node-centric languages (i.e., higher than nesC). The core VM accepts ASVM capsules over
the network and schedules them for execution. In the distribution mechanism, all nodes run
the same code and messages contain both the data communication as well as the computa-
tions required to perform the task (a la Active Networks). Because scheduling of programs
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by the basic VM supports preemption it is theoretically possible to have concurrency on
these devices such that it would be possible for an infrastructure to run multiple simul-
taneous sensing tasks (see Melete, below). This work does not address issues of resource
management, fine grain code deployment, or computational reuse.
Melete
Melete [YRBL06] is similar to the Active Sensor Networks work described in the previous
section in that it is based on Mate, however this work adds fine grade task assignment
and concurrent execution. The authors extensions to Mate add multi-program support
(concurrency) and limited program isolation. Code dissemination is achieved using Trickle
[LPCS04] to perform selective flooding and programs are composed in TinyScript one of
the node-centric high-level languages supported in Active Sensor Networks.
SensorWare
SensorWare [BHS03] provides a dynamically tasked SN that is programmed at the granu-
larity of sensors using an event-based scripting language and run-time support. SensorWare
scripts are written in TcL and provides APIs to access sensing, communication and code
propagation (replication) services. While [BHS03] also discuses resource management issues,
such as computational reuse and automated task assignment, these issues are presented as
questions without answers. It is unclear to what extent this resource management work is
complete.
Squawk JVM
The Squawk JVM [SCC+06] is a Java Virtual Machine that runs on the bare hardware
of the sensing device without an intermediate OS. Squawk allows the programming of the
individual nodes of a SN using the familiar Java programming language but, of course,
o↵ers nothing in terms of automated resource management. While the Squawk JVM has
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a lot of promise in lowering the bar for device specific tasking, Squawk only supports the
Sun Spot [Smi07] device at this time severely limiting the applicability of this work.
2.2 Research Opportunities in SNCPs
While many works exist in this realm, many issues remain open in this domain. In this
section we enumerate a few of these research opportunities.
Program/Resource Fragmentation
Unlike Grid computing environments (e.g., Emulab) a SN user may have a short, one-
time SN application that, given some external deadline, requires immediate deployment
and thus cannot wait for an optimal resource allocation (e.g., observing an event that
is going to occur imminently, but only once). Such quick-and-dirty resource allocation
algorithms may exhibit extreme program fragmentation (excessive communication due to
low availability on every node) or resource a nity (most programs wind up on a few nodes).
By providing resource allocation as a modular component (e.g., as done in snBench) or
allowing optimization along multiple configurable axes (e.g., as done in TinyCubus) some
SNCPs can allow the composer to select an assignment scheme that best suit the needs of
the particular SN instance. Yet, it remains to be seen how various embedding solutions
balance the trade-o↵ between response time and fragmentation.
Authorization and Security
In any remotely programmable system it is imperative that only authorized users task
resources and that data is not intercepted by unauthorized third-parties. Similarly there
is a need to ensure that the SN computation correctness is not compromised by malicious
entities spoofing legitimate SN components. Traditional security approaches may prove too
heavy weight for the highly-constrained SN domain. At present, most works underscore the
importance of security concerns yet fail to address them in any concrete way.
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Fairness and Resource Cost
With multiple users tasking SN resources, some notion of fairness must be provided to
prevent any user(s) from monopolizing the system. While several approaches exist in the
Distributed Computing domain (e.g., fair share, virtual currency, auctions) the solution and
infrastructure to provide fairness must minimize bandwidth, CPU overhead and the latency
between job submission and execution.
Wide-area SNs
It is conceivable that future SN applications may span multiple independently adminis-
tered SNs (i.e., composing a larger wide-area SN). Such “elastic SNs” require potentially
specialized addressing, resource allocation, and program composition approaches.
Comparing Programming Granularities
A multitude of programming languages exist today with di↵erent aims (e.g., scripting,
printing and reporting) and all of which leverage the API provided by the Operating System.
Similarly we expect multiple, high-level SN languages to emerge targeting di↵erent types of
applications that are all compiled to the SNCP’s API. As defining a “best” API is impossible
given the inherent qualitative nature of such a discussion, some metrics must be defined to
quantitatively compare SN APIs.
Further Work on Safety and Verification
Determining SN program faults statically (i.e., static type-checking) has established value
in the domain of desktop machines, yet there is very little work on extending either static
or run-time verification techniques to SN programs. In addition to the static type-checking
provided by snBench, one could easily imagine extending further safety and analysis tech-
niques into this domain (e.g., deadlock detection/prevention, race condition detection on
shared state).
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2.3 Conclusion
While many works may be considered SN Construction Platforms, very few of them ex-
pressly address the need to make SN development accessible to a wider programmer popu-
lation. Many of these works are proofs of concept which, while useful to further discourse,
fails to provide the stable platform on which real SNs may be deployed and research pur-
sued. The SN community sorely needs an extensible and cross-platform SNCP to emerge
as a catalyst, not unlike UNIX in the mid to late 70’s.
As with Operating Systems, SNCP o↵erings include run-time services, APIs and pro-
gramming languages that are ultimately compared by qualitative means, yet desperately
need a quantitative discussion. Unfortunately, real analysis of architecture (and perfor-
mance) is on hold until a standard way to acquire and compare benchmarks emerges.
We have seen Sense and Respond systems emerge from the traditional data-acquisition
SN approaches and similarly SN composition is diverging into three distinct camps; less
constrained devices (e.g., SunSpot), more constrained devices (e.g., RFID, smartdust) and
heterogeneous or hybrid SNs (i.e., both types of sensors in the same SN). While it remains
to be seen what will be considered “Sensor Network research” in the coming years, it is
clear that SNCPs will play an increasingly important role.
Chapter 3
Functional Tasking Languages For Service
Composition
As per the thin-waist development paradigm (Figure 1.2) of snBench, in this chapter
we present the high-level and common tasking interfaces of the infrastructure, and the
programming abstractions they provide. This chapter details the languages and abstractions
of snBench. These languages have been designed to well encapsulate the needs of SN
programming while (1) easing the resource assignment challenges we face in Chapter 4 and
(2) enabling the static verification techniques described in Chapter 5.
Programmatic access to the Sensorium is provided via high-level task-centric program-
ming languages that are compiled, distributed, scheduled, and monitored by snBench. The
prototype high-level snBench programming language is SNAFU (SN Applications as FUnc-
tions). SNAFU is a strongly-typed functional-style programming language which serves as
an accessible, interface for developers to glue together the functionalities of sensors, actu-
ators, processors, storage devices, and networking units to create stateful, temporal, and
persistent programs. In e↵ect, snBench presents programmers with an abstract, “single-
system” view of a SN, in the sense that SNAFU code is written for the Sensorium as a
whole, and not separately for each of its various subsystems.
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A SNAFU program (or any high-level language in snBench) must be compiled into
the common tasking language of STEP (Sensorium Task Execution Plan); Conceptually, a
STEP program takes the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG), in which the nodes are
the sampling and computation operations (functions) through which data flows in order
to execute the program. STEP graphs have a straightforward serialized XML representa-
tion. An execution plan may consist of nodes that are either explicitly bound (i.e. must
be deployed on a specific resource) or unbound (i.e. free to be placed wherever su cient
resources may be found). A STEP program instance is analogous to a program that has
not been linked (i.e., not connected to the resources that will execute it), an operation that
is described in Chapter 4.
SNAFU is provided as a convenient and accessible interface to the STEP tasking lan-
guage. Aside from syntactic sugar for commonly required STEP graph constructions and
the production of complete STEP syntax, SNAFU is a direct sibling of STEP in that they
are conceptually interchangeable. Indeed, SNAFU is not particularly unique as a high-level
language (aside from its proximity to STEP). We hope to eventually develop other domain-
specific languages that may also be compiled to STEP. In Chapter 8 we briefly discus the
Graphical STEP programming environment, which is essentially another high-level interface
by which to task snBench.
3.1 The SNAFU Programming Language
The current high-level snBench programming interface is a high-level, behavior descrip-
tion language called SNAFU. SNAFU is a type safe programming language designed to
specify the interdependence of sensors, computational resources, and persistent state that
comprise a Sensorium application. A novice user will specify a SNAFU program written for
the Sensorium (not the individual nodes), and the infrastructure will transparently handle
translation, resource allocation, and dissemination of the program to the nodes of the SN.
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SNAFU programs are written in a simple functional style; all SNAFU program terms
are expressions, the evaluation of which produces values. The language is implicitly typed
(i.e., data types are not explicitly annotated in the language). Type checking is done on
the target language (STEP) with hooks back to SNAFU in order to report errors that are
meaningful to the programmer; by type checking STEP, we relieve new high-level language
implementations from the burden of providing their own type checking. The connection
between STEP and the source language is maintained such that end-users remain blissfully
unaware of so much as the existence of the intermediate STEP representation during type
checking.
Despite this apparent gap between the languages (from the end user’s perspective), to
say that STEP and SNAFU are siblings is an understatement. Operationally, SNAFU is
little more than a convince wrapper (containing syntactic sugar) that is a more accessible
interface to service composition in STEP. In future iterations of SNAFU we plan for STEP
and SNAFU to diverge to a greater extent, as we wish to use the SNAFU interface to
restrict the programmer from the full potential (and pitfalls) of STEP ([GOKL06] shows
that STEP/SNAFU is Turing complete).
Major Features of the SNAFU/STEP languages
Functional Style: Both SNAFU and STEP are functional-style languages; we say func-
tional style, as there is both manipulated state and, as a result of manipulating sensors
and actuators in a physical environment, there is are temporal interactions within the
language. A programmer does not directly manipulate sensors or actuators, rather he
or she specifies a program that describes data flowing through a series of functions.
Cycle-Safe Iteration: Explicit recursion (e.g., by reference, fixed-point, or otherwise) is
disallowed in both languages. We provide an iterative model of computation with
limited state information such that the behavior of tail-form recursion can be emu-
lated. Presumably, a modified version of SNAFU could be developed that compiles
recursion by reference into a STEP-compatible, tail-recursion.
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Parallel Execution: Owing to its functional style and lack of recursion SNAFU programs
are easily represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) derived from the abstract
syntax tree. In this DAG potential parallel execution and computational dependency
is obvious. This graphical representation is STEP.
Explicit Run-Time Constraints: SNAFU and STEP both have a notion of functions
that constrain the run-time behavior of the program, without having an impact on
the computational value of the program. We call such functions Flow-Types. Example
Flow-Types include functions to annotate a particular block of code with an explicit
deadline, physical resource (or resource set) where the computation should occur, or
a resolution for an image.
Type Safe: SNAFU and STEP are implicitly typed (no explicit type annotation), yet
the type checking engine ensures that instances are type safe. Additionally our type
system provides multi-dimensional sized type checking, which can indicate if resolution
bounds or run-time constraints cannot be satisfied (Chapter 5 contains details of the
type system).
Event Driven: As SNAFU/STEP are intended for a Sense and Respond programming
environment, we include event driven programming constructs (e.g., the trigger con-
struct). These constructs allow the programmer to specify the predicate expression
to test for that, when satisfied triggers the execution of some response expression.
Persistent, Streaming Constructs: The event driven constructs described above may
take place over long periods of time; put di↵erently, computations, events and data
may persist in the system. STEP (and thus SNAFU) directly supports the specifica-
tion of event driven constructs that persist in the system. Their repeated evaluation
ultimately produces a stream of values, rather than a single value. We provide con-
structs to access a data stream as well as to produce it.
33
Temporally Aware: As our languages interact with a physical environment (i.e., interac-
tive functional language), the time at which an expression is evaluated may impact the
result of that expression. To that end in SNAFU we support multiple “ let” constructs
that each have their own explicit temporal evaluation semantic ( let ’s are “compiled
away” into lower level constructs in STEP).
Extensible: Programs written in SNAFU manipulate data through a series of functions.
These functions include two forms of “user specified” functions: those that are pro-
vided by other SNAFU code, and those that are implemented at a lower level (e.g.,
library functions) which we call Opcodes. Should the lower-level implementation of
the Opcodes change, the higher-level SNAFU service logic would not need to change.
We drive the discussion of the constructs and abstractions of SNAFU through several simple
examples.
Simple Sensor (and Actuator) Manipulation:
To understand the composition of the functional form of the SNAFU language, consider
the following example SNAFU program that inspects a single video frame and returns the
number of faces detected in that frame.
(* count the number of faces found in an image taken from camera 1 *)
facecount(get(sensor(IMAGE ,"camera1"))))
The function sensor() takes two arguments and returns a sensor (or actuator). The first
argument is the type of sensor and the second is the ID of the sensor to be returned. In the
event the caller does not know (or does not care) which sensor sensor to use, the keyword
ANY may be specified to indicate to the run-time that any sensor of this type is su cient (if
sensor is specified with only a single argument, ANY is assumed).
The function get() is a function which takes a sensor (of any type) and extracts a data
sample from that sensor. In the example given above, get(sensor(IMAGE,"camera1")), an image
is returned from the named camera, "camera1".
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The final function that appears in this example is facecount(), which, as is probably
clear from context and its name, takes an image as input and returns the number of faces
detected in that image. This function is an Opcode in our nomenclature (i.e., a primitive
operator to others). An Opcode is a library function that is defined by an “advanced”
user (engineer) of the snBench. The list of the available Opcodes, their descriptions and
their type signatures is provided as an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) file to both the
graphical STEP editor (IDE) and the SNAFU IDE alike.
Conditionals, Event monitoring and Repetition: SNAFU provides a typical if-
then-else conditional construct, cond(x,y,z) that evaluates a predicate (x) and will evaluate
either clause branch depending on the result of the predicate.
Unlike the conditional, the “trigger” construct provides repeated evaluation to provide
event monitoring; the trigger associates a standing predicate (P) and clause or result (Q)
that will be evaluated when the predicate is satisfied. Thus the predicate event triggers
the evaluation of the clause. There are multiple trigger repetition semantics supported in
SNAFU, which can be divided into two larger classes: terminating and streaming.
Terminating Triggers: A terminating trigger evaluates the predicate until some point
at which it return a single value. Thus we say the evaluation of the trigger terminates.
The default terminating trigger(P,Q) will repeatedly evaluate P until it has evaluated to
true, at which point Q will be evaluated and the value of Q is returned as the value of the
trigger expression. The trigger will not execute P again after it has evaluated to be true
(i.e., it will terminate).
The while_trigger is similar to the previous trigger, except that it evaluates Q every time
P evaluates to true and when P eventually evaluates to false it returns the last value of Q
(or NIL if P was initially false).1 The while_trigger construct is required to act as an iterator
function (i.e., make progress over a list) when implementing functionalities such as “map”
or “reduce” that apply an operation to all entries in a list.
1The while_trigger cannot be built up from the default trigger construct as there is internal state to
maintain the prior value of Q.
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Streaming, Persistent Triggers: Persistent triggers extend the basic triggers in that
they continue to re-evaluate their predicate “indefinitely” and they return a stream of values
from their clause over their persistent evaluation.
We provide two types of persistent triggers. The level_trigger(P,Q) will continually
evaluate P and every time P evaluates to true, Q is re-evaluated. The edge_trigger(P,Q) will
continually evaluate P and will only evaluate and return the conseqent Q when P transitions
to true (i.e., on the edge of the signal P). The trigger’s value is initially NIL and is up-
dated to the value of Q every time Q is evaluated. The SNAFU trigger example below runs
“indefinitely”, repeatedly counting the number of faces found at the specified sensor.
(* produce stream of data: the number of faces found at camera1 *)
level_trigger(true ,
facecount(get(sensor(IMAGE ,"camera1"))))
)
In fact, persistent triggers typically live for a configuration-specific period of time (e.g.,
one hour). To terminate a persistent trigger based on some run-time predication, the
programmer may wrap the persistent trigger within a terminating trigger. Alternatively
a persistent trigger may be wrapped in a Flow-Type function allowing the programmer to
specify a particular temporal persistence policy.
Iterators and State: SNAFU provides symbolic assignment and function definition,
however it forbids explicit recursion by reference. Yet, for some tasks, the body of a trigger
expression may need to make use of its own prior evaluation (i.e., utilizing prior state to
manipulate a list of entities iteratively). This functionality is supported within STEP via
the token LAST_TRIGGER_EVAL, which can be used within the body of the predicate or response
clauses to refer to the previous evaluation (value) of the trigger response. LAST_TRIGGER_EVAL
can be used in persistent triggers as well as in the terminating while_trigger. It does not
make sense to support the LAST_TRIGGER_EVAL in a simple trigger, as in that context the
response is only evaluated once, at the conclusion of the trigger’s evaluation.
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(* an example of last_trigger_eval in use: when the trigger first runs , LTE
is NIL so the stream returns I for latter iterations we return P applied
to the previous value *)
level_trigger(true ,
cond((LTE==NIL),I,P(LTE))
)
Access to a Trigger’s Value Stream: Naturally the results of persistent triggers
may be used by other expressions as data sources for some other task. As the values
of persistent triggers are transient and the temporal needs of the dependent expression
may vary, we provide four di↵erent read functions that allow the programmer to specify a
synchronization rule for the read of the trigger with respect to the trigger’s own evaluation.2
Specifying a “non-blocking” read to a trigger requests that the read immediately return
the result of the last completed evaluation of the trigger’s target expression, (or nil if the
response has not yet returned a new value). A “blocking” read waits until the response
has produced a value before returning. A “fresh” read waits for a complete re-evaluation
of the trigger’s predicate and target expressions before returning a value (i.e., it clears the
outstanding values and waits for the next value). Finally the use of a “buffered” read will
bu↵er results to ensure transient values are not lost by the consumer. If the user desires a
lock-step semantic (i.e., do not evaluate the producer until the consumer has completed)
then the persistent trigger is the wrong construct to be using on the producer side and the
code should be reorganized.
Let Semantics and Temporal E↵ects: SNAFU provides the ability to bind a value
to a recurring symbol to either some fixed value (constant) or commonly occurring sub-
expression (macro). Functional languages typically adopt a single semantic to deal with
when a let-bound sub-expression is evaluated (e.g., eager, lazy). Given the implicit e↵ects
that time has on value production (i.e., the image retrieved from a camera changes de-
2The value of a persistent trigger should always be read using one of these primitives. A program term
containing an expression that directly accesses the value of a persistent trigger will be rejected by the SNAFU
type engine. Terminating triggers, on the other hand, have an implicit blocking semantic and should not be
wrapped by read primitives.
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pending on when it is captured) SNAFU o↵ers multiple let semantics to cover the various
possible temporal semantics desired the programmer.
The letconst directive assigns a constant term or expression to a symbol, such that
the value of an expression is evaluated only once (when first encountered). All further
occurrences of the symbol are assigned the previously computed value and will not be
evaluated again. This behavior is analogous to eager evaluation. In the following example,
the allocation of the sensor cam1 will be performed exactly once, at the first instance of cam1
in Z, and all other instances of cam1 in Z will refer to this same sensor.
(* bind cam1 , once , to any image sensor *)
letconst cam1 = sensor(IMAGE , any) in Z
Alternatively symbols may also be used as a shorthand to represent longer (sub)-
expressions, each instance of which is to be independently evaluated (i.e., macros). The
leteach binding, “leteach x = y in z”, replaces every occurrence of x in z with an indepen-
dently evaluated instance of the expression y. This behavior is analogous to lazy evaluation.
Notice in the example below every instance of cam2 in Z may refer to a di↵erent sensor.
(* (re)bind cam2 to a an image sensor on every occurrence *)
leteach cam2 = sensor(IMAGE , any) in Z
Finally, SNAFU allows a symbol to be assigned within the scope of a trigger such that
the symbol obtains a new value once per each evaluation of the trigger (i.e., once per
iteration). The letonce bindings, for use with trigger contexts, have the form “letonce x =
y in z” and allows the expression y to be evaluated for the symbol x once per iteration of
the containing trigger defined in z. Consider the use of the letonce binding in the following
program fragment that continues from the previous example, the intent of which is to take
an image sample from each camera once per iteration and then return the image sample
that has the most faces in it in a given iteration.
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(* repeatedly take two images and returns a stream of images , where each
instantaneous value is the image in which more faces were detected *)
letonce x = get(cam1) in
letonce y = get(cam2) in
level_trigger(true ,
cond(( facecount(x)>facecount(y)),x,y)
)
Flow Types: SNAFU allows program terms to be wrapped by “flow type” functions.
Flow types provide explicit constraints for program deployment and/or execution in the
Sensorium, providing type information for the control flow as well as the data flow. As
examples, the programmer may require a particular periodicity for a trigger term’s eval-
uation, or may wish to ensure that some computations are only assigned to a trusted set
of resources. We provide some concrete Flow types within the current snBench however,
much as the opcode library is extensible, we imagine the palette of Flow types will grow
organically as further deployments occur.
The example below includes several useful Flowtypes. The Flowtype function resolution
specifies a restriction on the resolution of the image sensor (camera). The bindto Flowtype
specifies that the facecount computation should occur on the specified SXE and finally the
Flowtype deadline indicates that the computation must be completed within the (abstract
and discretized) time allowed. All of these Flowtypes have one thing in common; they
impact the decisions made by the service dispatcher when it assigns resources to execute
this service. Details on how this data is extracted and used in static analysis techniques is
provided in Chapter 5.
(* An example including several Flowtype functions *)
bindto("sxe40.bu.edu",
deadline (30,
facecount(get(
resolution (320 ,1024 ,
sensor(IMAGE ,any))))))
39
SNAFU Compilation: SNAFU has been designed to ensure that the abstract syntax
tree (AST) of a SNAFU program maps to a task dependency diagram in the form of
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with a single root.3 Nodes in the DAG represent values,
sensors or tasks while edges represent data communication/dependency between nodes. The
graph is evaluated by lower nodes executing (using their children as input) and producing
values to their parents such that values percolate up toward the root of the graph from
the leaves. The SNAFU compiler transforms the AST of the SNAFU program into such
a representation, which we call a “Sensorium Task Execution Plan” or STEP. The terms
and expressions of SNAFU have analogous constructs (nodes) in STEP or clear encoding
in the structure of the STEP graph. For example, the single-evaluation letconst construct
is a directive to link a single subtree onto several parents, and the if-then-else function
refers to the placement of a conditional (cond) STEP node.
3.2 Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP)
A Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP) is a specification of a Sensorium program in
terms of its fundamental sensing, computing and communication requirements. A STEP is
serialized as an XML document that encodes the directed acyclic graph (DAG) of the explicit
task dependency (evaluation strategy) of a Sensorium program. The STEP language is used
to describe (1) whole programs written in the scope of the entire Sensorium (i.e., programs
compiled from SNAFU that are either largely or entirely agnostic as to the specific resources
on which their constituent operations are hosted) and (2) (sub)programs to be executed by
specific individual sensor execution environments to achieve some larger programmatic task
(i.e., to task the individual Sensorium resources in support of (1)).
STEP is the preferred target language for the compilation of SNAFU (and other future
languages) and as such we refer to STEP as the Sensorium “assembly language” (i.e., STEP
is our ”lowest-level” Sensorium programming language). That said, STEP is a relatively
3Although the SNAFU AST is a tree, the execution semantic of SNAFU is actually a graph. Consider
the letconst binding that allows a single node to have multiple parents.
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high-level interpreted language. Although STEP programs are technically human-readable,
their XML representation (including attributes which the user may have no interest or
business assigning) make direct program composition in the STEP language inadvisable at
best. We note that while STEP is the preferred target language for SNAFU compilation,
for some constrained resources, running a STEP interpreter may not be desirable. In
such situations we have two options: (1) Rely on gateway nodes to interpret STEP and
relay requests on the nodes behalf (we use this approach within our current Sensorium
to integrate Berkley Motes for temperature sensing), or (2) Our STEP re-compiler that
produces a lighter weight ISA to run in the “native” SXE which is more suitable for highly
constrained, time-sensitive devices (detailed in Chapter 6).
Individual tasks within a STEP (i.e., nodes within the STEP graph) may be “bound”
to a particular SN resource (e.g., some sensor sampling operation that must be performed
at a specific location) while others are “unbound” and thus free to be placed anywhere in
the SN where requisite resources are available. In general, SNAFU compilation results in
the creation of an “unbound” STEP – a STEP graph containing one or more “unbound”
nodes.
Unbound STEPs are analogous to unlinked binaries insofar as they cannot be executed
until required resources are resolved. Unbound STEPs are posted to a Sensorium Service
Dispatcher (SSD), the entity responsible for allocating resources and dispatching STEP
programs. Given the state of the available system resources and the resources required
by the nodes comprising this graph, the SSD fragmenting the unbound STEP graph into
several smaller bound STEP subgraphs.
In the remainder of this section we describe the “classes” of tasks (nodes) that are sup-
ported by the STEP programming language and convey with broad strokes the runtime
semantic they convey. The reader should note a correlation between the node classes pre-
sented in this section and the presentation of the SNAFU semantic. Indeed, these constructs
are a direct encoding of the functionalities presented in that section.
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We frame this discussion within the context of an example for which we provide both
the SNAFU and the STEP program below. The program returns the number of faces
detected/observed from any camera (with a resolution ranging from 320 to 1024) that is
mounted on s05(.sensorium.bu.edu).
(⇤ count the number o f f a c e s from any camera connected to s05 ⇤)
f acecount (
get (
r e s o l u t i o n (320 ,1024 ,
sensor ( image , any@s05 ) )
)
)
The STEP program that results from compiling this SNAFU snippet is given below.
<stepgraph id=”sampleprogram”>
<exp id=”facecount” opcode=”sxe . core . image . facecount”>
<exp id=”get” opcode=”sxe . core . sensor . get”>
<s enso r id=”image any@s05”>
<dev i ce id=”any” type=”image” u r i=”s05”/>
<f l owtype l a b e l=”resolution”>
<param name=”min” value=”320”/>
<param name=”max” value=”1024”/>
</ f lowtype>
</ senso r>
</exp>
</exp>
</ stepgraph>
step node: The step node is the root node of a STEP and contains the entire STEP
program. The node has an id attribute that is a globally uniquely identifier (GUID)
generated by the SNAFU compiler, uniquely identifying this program (and all nodes of
this program) from other programs. The immediate child of the step node is the true root
node of the program.
exp nodes: An exp (expression) node conveys a single computing, sensing, storage, or
actuator function to be performed by some Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE). An ex-
pression node has an opcode attribute that identifies which function should be performed,
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and the immediate children of the expression node are the arguments to the function. Ex-
ample opcodes include addition, string concatenation, image capture, image manipulation,
detecting motion, etc. Opcodes are core library’ operations distributed with the SXE. If an
SXE does not have the opcode required, the jar attribute may specify a URL where a Java
bytecode implementation of this opcode can be found. Similarly, the source attribute may
be used to specify the location of the Java source code for this opcode.4
cond nodes: A cond (conditional) node has three children: an expression that evaluates
to a boolean value (i.e., a condition), an expression that will be evaluated if the condition
is true, and an expression that will be evaluated if the condition is false. The conditional
node has an evaluation semantic that ensures the first child (sub-tree) is evaluated first and,
depending on the result, only the second or the third child will be evaluated.
sensor nodes: A sensor node conveys a specific physical device (i.e., sensor) within
the infrastructure, and is used to provide that device as an argument to some expression
node. In the example given the get expression node has a sensor node as a child to specify
on which particular image sensor it will operate. A sensor node has a device node as its
child. A device node may have a uri attribute to indicate where the device can be found,
and will have a type attribute to indicate the type of input that this device provides (e.g.,
image, video, temperature). Sensor/device nodes only appear as leaves in a STEP graph.
A sensor node requires additional processing on the SSD to resolve and reserve “wildcard”
sensors (i.e., when the uri of the sensor contains the keywords ANY or ALL).
trigger, while trigger, edge trigger, and level trigger nodes: All trigger
nodes specify that their descendants are subject to iteration as indicated by the corre-
sponding trigger construct (explained in Section 3.1). Trigger nodes have two children: the
predicate and the body. A trigger may also have zero or more flowtype nodes to convey
the runtime/deployment QoS constraints of this trigger. Related to trigger functions, read
nodes may appear as the parent of a trigger node to explicitly request specific temporal
access to the values produced by that trigger. The read node’s opcode attribute deter-
4The dynamic migration of opcode implementations raises clear security/trust concerns. We expect the
SXE owner will maintain a white-list of trusted hosts from which opcodes can be safely retrieved.
43
mines whether the trigger will be read via a “blocking”, “non-blocking”, “fresh”, or
“buffered” semantic (described in Section 3.1).
flowtype nodes: The flowtype nodes are used to encode run-time security, perfor-
mance, and persistence constraints. These nodes appear as children of the nodes that they
constrain.
socket nodes: socket nodes may be inserted into unbound STEP DAGs by the SSD
during the binding (scheduling) process to allow distribution of a program’s evaluation
across SXEs. The socket node connects the computation graph from one SXE to another
SXE across the network. A socket node has a role attribute which is set to either sender
or receiver. A sender node takes the value passed up by a child node and sends it across
the network to another SXE specified by the node’s peeruri attribute. Assuming the peer
SXE is hosting a corresponding receiver node, that receiver node sends this value along
to its parent node allowing a STEP “edge” to span SXEs. A protocol attribute specifices
which specific communication protocol should be used for data transfer (e.g., HTTP/1.1
pull, HTTP/1.1 push).
splice nodes: A splice node is used as a pointer to another node, allowing the
encoding of graphs within the tree-centric XML. The splice node indicates that the parent
of the splice node should have an edge that is connected to the “target” of the splice
node (the splice node has a target attribute specifies an id of another existing node). The
splice node only exists when a STEP is serialized as XML, when deserialized, the edge
is connected to the target node. These nodes may occur within a compiled STEP graph
if some node/subgraph has multiple parents (e.g., the “let” binding provided in SNAFU)
or a splice may occur as a result of computational reuse allowing one STEP program to
be grafted on to another. The splice node is also used by the SSD to specify the reuse
of previously deployed STEP graph components within a newly deployed STEP graph. If
the SSD deems that a sub-graph of a newly submitted task is functionally identical to a
previously deployed expression, that subgraph will be replaced with a splice node that
points to the preexisting computation.
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const nodes: The const node class is use to block the propagation of “clear” events
during evaluation, in e↵ect preventing the re-evaluation of its descendants (e.g., to support
the letonce and letconst bindings in SNAFU). A const node will have exactly one child,
namely the subgraph that we wish to limit to a single evaluation.
In the next Chapter, we provide the reader with details of how these constructs and
abstractions are executed by the runtime components of the snBench infrastructure.
Chapter 4
The snBench Architecture and Infrastructure
snBench abstracts a collection of dissimilar and disjoint resources into a shared virtual SN
(i.e., Sensorium). Programmatic access to the sensory infrastructure occurs via a high-level
task-centric programming languages that are compiled into the common tasking language,
STEP (Sensorium Task Execution Plan). These programs are written at the scope of the
SN rather than its individual components and thus specific details of the components or
deployment need not be specified by the developer. To execute STEP tasks, snBench pro-
vides a run-time support infrastructure that provides e cient (and extensible) automated
program decomposition, deployment, and resource management services.
In this Chapter we detail the run-time components provided by snBench, specifically
the Service Dispatcher, Resource Manager, and Sensor Execution Environment. These com-
ponents provide the back-bone of a Sensorium infrastructure, converting a heterogeneous
collection of nodes into a single, STEP task-able interface. Unlike other work in this domain,
these components have been designed to be as modular and and extensible as possible; as
a result the functionalities, policies, hardware, and even types of manipulated data can be
updated through provided interfaces with nominal changes. We frame our presentation of
these components within motivating examples in the domain of networked computer vision
applications.
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A Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP), is logically a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
in which the nodes are the sampling and computation operations required to execute the
program. An execution plan may consist of nodes that are either bound (i.e., must be
deployed on a specific resource) or unbound (i.e., free to be placed wherever su cient
resources may be found). An unbound STEP is analogous to a program that has not
been linked. When transfered within the system, a STEP instance has a straightforward
serialized representation in XML (the eXtensible Markup Language).
The Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD) is responsible for the linking and scheduling of
a STEP onto the SN infrastructure. In general, the SSD solves a restricted form of a graph
embedding problem, finding resources capable of supporting sub-graphs of the STEP graph
and allocating them as appropriate. The SSD optimizes the use of resources and identifies
common subexpressions across already deployed execution plans such that computation
resources may be shared and/or reused. The SSD relies heavily on the Sensorium Resource
Manager (SRM), a registrar of computing and sensing resources available in the system at
present. The SSD decomposes a single “unbound” STEP graph into several smaller “bound”
STEP graphs and dispatches those graphs onto available Sensorium functional units.
Each Sensorium functional unit features a Sensorium eXecution Environment (SXE),
which is a run-time system that realizes the abstract functionalities presented to SNAFU
programmers as basic building blocks. Such realizations may rely on native code (e.g.,
device drivers, or local libraries) or may entail the retrieval of programmer-supplied code
from remote repositories. An SXE interprets and executes partial STEP graphs that have
been delegated to it by the SSD. Such a partial STEP graph may involve computing, sensing,
storage, or communication with other SXEs.
4.1 The Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD)
The Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD) is the administrative authority of and single in-
terface to each “local-area” Sensorium. The SSD is responsible for allocating available con-
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crete Sensorium resources to process STEP (sub)programs (i.e., scheduling) and dispatching
STEP (sub)programs to those resources. Each SSD is tightly coupled with a Sensorium Re-
source Manager (SRM) that maintains the state and availability of the resources within the
Sensorium.
The current SSD/SRM implementation is Java based and utilizes HTTP as its primary
communication model; an HTTP server provides an interface to managed resources and
end users alike. Communications are XML formatted and, for end users, responses are
transformed into viewable interactive web page by XSLT. The HTTP namespace is leveraged
to provide a natural interface to the hierarchal data and functionality o↵ered by the SSD.
The SSD/SRM has two primary directives: Resource Management and STEP Scheduling
and Dispatch. Both are described below.
4.1.1 Resource Management
The Sensorium Resource Manager monitors the state of the resources of its local Sensorium
and reports changes to the SSD. Each computing or sensing component in the managed
domain that hosts an SXE sends a heartbeat to its SRM, the result of which is used to
populate a directory (hashtable) of all known SXEs and their attached sensoring resources.
The heartbeat includes the SXE’s uptime, sensing capabilities, and a scaled score indicating
available computing capacity. Should an SXE miss a configurable number of heartbeats, or
the SXE report an unexpected computing capacity change without notification of a “STEP
complete” the SRM assumes the SXE has failed or restarted and informs the SSD of the
change. The SRM’s knowledge of the state of the managed Sensorium is essential to the
SSD’s correct operation in deploying and maintaining STEP programs.
When an SXE leaves the Sensorium (e.g., SXE shutdown, reboot, or graceful exit) there
may be impact to one or more running STEP programs as multiple STEP applications may
be dependent on a single STEP node or resource. When the SRM detects that an SXE
has left the Sensorium, the SSD will treat all STEP tasks deployed on that SXE resource
as a new STEP program submission and try to reassign it (in part or in whole) to other
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available resources.1 Updated socket nodes are sent to redirect those SXEs hosting sockets
connected to the exitting SXE.2 If no su cient resources can be found to consume the
STEP nodes that had been hosted by the old resource, we must traverse the dependency
graph and remove all impacted STEP nodes (i.e., programs).
4.1.2 Scheduling and Dispatch of STEP Programs
The SSD maintains a master, non-executable STEP graph consisting of all STEP programs
currently being executed by the local Sensorium. Each STEP node in this graph is tagged
with the GUID of the SXE on which that STEP node is deployed, such that this master
STEP graph indicates what tasks are deployed in the local Sensorium and on to what
resources.
When a STEP program is submitted to the SSD, the SSD must locate available resources
for the newly submitted STEP graph, fragmenting the newly submitted STEP into several
smaller STEPs that can be accommodated by available resources. We approach this task
as a series of modules that process the unbound STEP program (Figure 4.1). We present
our approach for each of these modules, yet emphasize the benefit of this modular approach
is that any module may be replaced with a di↵erent or improved algorithm to achieve the
same goal.
STEP
task
reuse
resource
locator
STEP
graph
partitioner
dispatch
to
SXEs
optimizer linker/scheduler dispatcher
Figure 4.1: The SSD’s Scheduling and Dispatch process for new STEP programs. Circles
represent modules, while downward arrows indicate these modules may reject a STEP
program due to insu cient resources.
1STEP nodes that are submitted to the SSD pre-bound to some specific resource cannot be migrated to
another SXE and therefore must be terminated
2Synchronization issues abound when this occurs so a “reset” is sent to all nodes involved to restart
communication in this event
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Code Reuse: In the version of snBench described in this thesis, we assume that the
reuse of computation is paramount. When a new STEP graph is posted, the SSD first tries
to ensure that the scheduling of unbound expression nodes does not result in unnecessary
instances of new tasks. Unfortunately checking for all instances of “functionally equivalent”
tasks in a language as expressive as STEP is NP-hard.
Indeed, as many sensing functionalities will be dependent on the use of fresh data,
our current code reuse algorithm is intentionally conservative to avoid the reuse of stale
data. Unless explicitly specified with flowtypes, the SSD will only reuse nodes that are
“temporally compatible”. 3 Thus all new nodes that match already deployed nodes are
replaced with splices (i.e., pointers) to the previously dispatched nodes.4 Regardless of how
the code-reuse module is implemented, after it is complete the “new” computation cost of
the submitted STEP graph should be reduced.
Admission Control: The SSD must deny admission if any bound STEP node refers
an unavailable resource or if the remaining resource cost exceeds total available resources.
The SSD first iterates over all bound nodes of the STEP graph to ensure that requested
SXEs are known by the SRM and have available computing resources to consume these
computations (including available sensors where sensors are prerequisites for a computa-
tion). Once complete, the SSD ensures that the total free resources in the Sensorium are
su cient to accommodate the total cost of the remaining unbound nodes.
Graph Partitioning: The SSD must bind all unbound nodes in the STEP graph to
specific resources, a task analogous to a graph partitioning where each partition represents
deployment on some SXE (i.e., physical resource) with the goal of minimizing the total cost
of edges between partitions (i.e., minimize induced communication cost between SXEs).
Fortunately, the computations represented at each node have associated datatypes and
that type information yields a bound on the “cost” of each edge. For example, if a STEP
3At present, temporal compatibility is ensured by reusing only identical, trigger- rooted subexpressions
in the local Sensorium (giving us a tractable problem).
4There are certainly instances in which such blind bias toward computational reuse will result in a
communication penalty that outweighs the benefit of code reuse, however we have not accounted for this in
the implementation of the SSD presented in this thesis.
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Figure 4.2: Generating colored partitions in a STEP graph. Coloring nodes is analogous
to assigning a task to a particular SXE. Uncolored nodes should be colored to minimize
communication between SXEs (colors) – there is no communication cost when adjacent
nodes are the same color.
node returns an Image, the communication cost of spanning this edge across two di↵erent
physical resources (i.e., adding this edge to the cut) will be greater than cutting and edge
of a node that produces an Integer value (Figure 4.2).
Our initial graph partitioning algorithm makes only a nominal attempt to reduce com-
munication cost. The procedure tries to assign the entire unbound region of the graph to
any single available resource. Failing that, the unbound region of the graph is split into
smaller subgraphs and we recurse, trying to find a resource large enough to consume the
“whole” parts.
Our next generation partitioning algorithm uses a relaxed form of spreading metrics
[ENRS95] to produce partitions. A spreading metric defines a geometric embedding of a
graph where a length is assigned to every edge in the graph such that nodes connected via
inexpensive edges are mapped to be geometrically close, while nodes across expensive edges
are physically “spread apart” from each other.
The optimization detailed in [ENRS95] relies on a linear program to assign lengths to
edges. Instead, we will use a “quick-and-dirty” approximation of the spreading metric,
in which weights and distances for edges are derived entirely from the type information
of the nodes (Figure 4.2). Although this approximation will not yield partitions with the
same bounds on minimizing the cut, our approach is favorable in running time and we
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can compute, o↵-line, the minimum cut of the spreading metric to use as benchmark for
comparison against our approximation algorithm. Again we point out that any graph
partitioning solution may replace our existing partitioning logic, and are investigating some
“o↵ the shelf” solutions.
Dispatch: Once all STEP nodes are annotated with bindings the SSD must generate the
STEP sub-graphs to dispatch to each individual resource. During this phase the SSD inserts
socket nodes to maintain the data flow of the original STEP graph after the partitioning.
As each SXE receives only a part of the larger computation (and sockets to SXEs with
which it shares an edge) each is unaware of the larger task it helps to achieve.
To dispatch the STEP sub-graphs, the SSD performs an HTTP post of the STEP to the
SXE’s web server. If all SXEs respond to the dispatch with success, the SSD’s dispatch is
complete and the STEP program is live. If not, all partial STEPs of the larger STEP that
had been posted to SXEs before this failed partial STEP are deleted from those SXEs and
the user must resubmit.5
4.2 Sensorium Execution Environments (SXEs)
The Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE) is a runtime execution environment that provides
its clients remote access to a participating host’s processing and sensing resources. An SXE
receives XML formatted Sensor Typed Execution Plans (STEPs) and the SXE schedules
and executes the tasks described. Indeed an SXE is a virtual machine (Figure 4.3) providing
multiple users remote access to virtualized resources including sensing, processing, storage,
and actuators via the STEP program abstraction.
The SXE communicates its capabilities and instantaneous resource availability to its lo-
cal Sensorium Resource Manager (SRM), allowing the Sensorium Service Dispatcher (SSD)
5We do not attempt to re-optimize the Sensorium’s global STEP graph (i.e., all computations on the
current Sensorium) when a new STEP is submitted. It is possible that a better, globally optimal assignment
may exist by reassigning nodes across the global STEP graph however we expect the computational cost
will far outweigh the benefit. In the implementation of snBench presented in this thesis we do not move
computations once they have been initially assigned unless absolutely necessary (e.g., in the event of resource
failures).
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to best utilize the each SXE. Each SXE maintains a local STEP graph containing a com-
posite of all the STEP graphs (and subgraphs) tasked to this node by the SSD. In this
section we describe the essential functionalities of the SXE and our current implementa-
tion of these functionalities. As is the case with the SSD, the SXE is also implemented
with extensibility as a chief goal. We describe the SXE in terms of its necessary actions in
support of the larger Sensorium via the STEP interface: STEP Program Admission, STEP
Program Interpretation, STEP Node Evaluation and STEP Program Removal.
cpu
Sensor eXecution Environment
sensors
STEP
STEP
fragment
STEP
Host OS
CPU
video 
camera
NICmemory
opcodes sockets
STEP
Figure 4.3: The SXE abstracts the devices provided by the OS, allowing clients to task
these devices through the Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP) abstraction.
Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP) Admission: When a new STEP graph
is posted to an SXE via the SSD, the new tasks to be executed may be independent of
or dependent on previously deployed tasks. Within a newly posted STEP graph, the SSD
may embed “splice nodes” in the new STEP graph specifying edges that are to be spliced
onto previously deployed STEP nodes (i.e., for task reuse) or nodes that should replace
previously deployed STEP nodes with new nodes (task replacement).
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1. Task Reuse: A newly posted STEP graph may contain one ore more “splice” nodes
with target ids that point to previously deployed STEP nodes, indicating some new compu-
tations will reuse the results computed by existing tasks. Although the splice is specified by
the SSD through its seemingly omniscient view of the local Sensorium, each SXE maintains
local scheduling control to avoid race/starvation issues.6
2. Task Replacement: If a new STEP graph includes non-splice STEP nodes with the
same (unique) IDs as nodes already deployed, this indicates these new nodes should replace
the existing nodes of the same ID. The replacement operation may result in either removal
or preservation of children (dependencies) of the original node, while parent nodes are
una↵ected (although those may modified through iterative replacement)7.
STEP Interpretation: Recall a STEP is a directed acyclic graph in which data prop-
agates up, through the edges from the leaves toward the root. Tasks appearing higher in the
STEP graph are not be able to be executed until their children have been evaluated (i.e.,
their arguments are available). Likewise, the need for a node to be executed is sent down
from a root (parents need their children before they can execute however once executed
they don’t necessarily need to be executed again).
The SXE’s local STEP graph may have several roots, as its graph may be the confluence
of several independent STEP subprograms, however there is not necessarily a one-to-one
mapping between the number of STEP graphs posted and the number of roots in the local
STEP graph.
Each STEP node may be in one of four possible states: ready, running, evaluated, and
blocked (Figure 4.4, left). The SXE’s role in interpreting a STEP program consists of (1)
maintaining and updating the control flow of a STEP graph, advancing them through their
state transitions (described in this section) and (2) the actual execution of STEP nodes
that are in the ”running” state to enable the data flow of a STEP graph.
6It may also be interesting to consider admission-control algorithms for determining when a new partial
STEP DAG is eligible for splicing onto an existing STEP DAG. At present, the SXE takes a “the customer
(SSD) is always right” policy toward admission control.
7Notice that such node replacements may cause synchronization di culties when replacements involve
nodes that communicate across multiple SXEs. In general, we limit our use of replacement to redirect
communication nodes to a replacement SXE when another SXE has left the Sensorium.
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Figure 4.4: The SXE’s STEP node evaluation state transition diagram. During evaluation,
STEP expression nodes move between three bu↵ers on the SXE
The SXE interprets its current STEP nodes by continually iterating over all nodes and
checking if they are “ready” to be evaluated. A generic node is determined to be ready to
be evaluated if it (1) is wanted by a parent node, (2) has fresh input from all immediate
children and (3) has not been already executed already (this can be reset by a parent node
to enable a node to run more than once as in the case of a node with a parent trigger).
Within our present implementation, all nodes are iterated over in a round-robin fashion
to determine if they are “ready”. When non-expression nodes are ready they are evaluated
immediately while expression nodes are placed in a separately serviced FIFO run-queue.
This approach to evaluating STEP nodes is not unique. Indeed, the selection of which
nodes to consider next amounts to a scheduling decision which may be constrained by QoS
requirements, or other considerations (frame rates, etc.). In fact any scheduling algorithm
may be swapped in to service the run queue (Figure 4.4, right) without adverse e↵ect on
graph evaluation or the data flow.
A node in the ready queue is evaluated by the evaluation function that corresponds
with its node class. When no STEP nodes are ready (i.e., the ready queue is empty), the
evaluator sleeps until either a new STEP graph is admitted or another relevant event occurs
(e.g., timer, socket node data arrival, SXE shutdown). Once a node has been evaluated, it
produces a value that is pushed up the graph to its immediate parents. Providing values
father up the graph may, in turn, enable parent nodes who were previously blocked while
waiting for fresh input from their children. For some node classes, the ready function
55
is overridden to accommodate the node’s nonstandard execution semantic. For example,
persistent triggers always return to the ready queue (i.e., are always wanted), while a
transient trigger only returns to the ready queue if a parent node explicitly wants it.
STEP Node Evaluation: Each STEP node class specifies its own evaluation function.
The evaluation function of most node types maintains the runtime semantic of the STEP
graph by updating any needed internal (including the execution state flag) and passing up
values received from children. The exception to this trivial evaluation model is the evalu-
ation of STEP expression (exp) nodes. In all cases, the expectation is that the evaluation
function for the node will produce a value to its parents.
The evaluation of trigger nodes requires updating the trigger’s internal state, ensuring
that first the predicate is evaluated and that the post condition will be evaluated (and
re-evaluated) as per the trigger type and result of the predicate. Similarly evaluation of a
conditional (cond) node maintains state and determines whether the second or third branch
should be evaluated and returned depending on the evaluation of the first branch. A socket
node’s evaluation sends or receives data along the socket, a value merely passes a serialized
value up the tree and similarly sensor nodes are like value nodes in that they merely act
as an argument to the immediate parent (exp node).
The evaluation of an expression exp node may take some time and as such the evalua-
tion function for an expression node merely schedules the later execution of the expression
node by a separate scheduler and execution thread (exp node evaluation should not block
the entire resource). Expression nodes are tasks, analogous to the opcodes of the STEP
programming language. These nodes are calls to fundamental operations supported by the
SXEs (e.g., addition, string concatenation, image manipulation), yet the opcode implemen-
tations themselves may be dynamically migrated to the SXE at runtime as needed.
Sensor Management and Datatype Extensibility: To provide access to the sens-
ing resources of an SXE, all physical sensors are abstracted as generic sensors (data sources)
with specific functionalities implemented via classes on top of the generic sensor (e.g., Im-
ageSensor, TemperatureSensor).
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Opcodes do not directly manipulate sensors, but rather manipulate snBench typed
data. Specific details of the sensor hardware of the SXE are abstracted away by a Sen-
sorHandler module that is capable of communicating with and reformatting the data from
a specific sensor to produce to snBench typed data; support for new sensor device types
require the addition of new SensorHandler modules8.
snBench is extensible by design insofar as support for new sensing devices may be
easily added. The Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE) requires the implementation of two
relatively small interfaces to support new sensing devices; the SensorHandler enables the
SXE to communicate with the new device type, while the SensorDetector module provides
facility to detect new devices of this type, initialize them and inspect their state. The
SensorHandler is akin to a device driver, abstracting away the specific idiosyncrasies of
the particular device’s interface, and enabling the device to be accessed by higher-level
programming constructs. As far as the snBench framework is concerned, the abstracted
device becomes just another managed input device/event generator only di↵erent from a
video camera or motion sensor insofar as the datatype of its output.
In the snBench framework there is a distinction between a SN Service Developer who
uses high-level programming languages to compose Services by gluing together Opcodes and
sensors (generally without regard for how the Opcodes are actually implemented beyond
their type signature) and the snBench “engineers” who are responsible for expanding
the Opcode and SensorHandler libraries to enable new functionalities. snBench’s modular
approach allows for an advanced user (i.e., engineer) to extend not only the available opcode
library (by providing new Java classes that support the Opcode interface) but also to provide
new data types (i.e., new snObjects) which is analogous to providing new modalities to the
sensing and actuation capabilities of the system. As a concrete example, if an engineer
wished to add audio detection/manipulation, doing so would require the addition of a new
snObject, new Opcodes to manipulate the data, and a new sensor to communicate with
8SXEs can retrieve Opcode implementations at run-time, however support for loading new sensing devices
at run-time is not currently supported. Such functionality is not di cult to support, and is analogous to
dynamically loading device drivers to support new hardware.
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the hardware and extract a sensor reading as a value; we give specific details of providing
new sensors, by example, in Chapter 7, which describes adding wireless network intrusion
sensors into snBench.
STEP Program/Node Removal: The removal of STEP nodes from the SXE may
occur due to local or external events. When the evaluation of a STEP graph completes (ei-
ther successfully or in error) the SXE reports the completion event with the STEP program
ID to the SSD. The SXE may mark the local nodes for deletion if no other programs depend
on these nodes (i.e., If any ancestor node attached to these nodes has a di↵erent program
ID than that of this program the SXE knows other programs are dependent on this com-
putation). Externally requested node removal may be signaled by the SSD (for operational
reasons or by request of an end user). Removal may be specified at the granularity of single
nodes, however removal of a node signals removal of any parent nodes (dependent tasks)
including those from di↵erent programs (assuming the SSD knows best).
In either case, the SXE does not immediately delete the nodes from its URI namespace,
rather deletion is a two-phase operation, consisting of garbage marking followed by a later
physical deletion by the NodeJanitor process. The garbage marking algorithm is a straight-
forward postfix DAG ascent, while the cleanup algorithm simply iterates over all nodes,
removing those which have expired.
4.3 Implementation Overview:
Our current implementation of the SXE, SSD, and SRM each leverage Java technologies;
each component is written in Java 1.6 (a.k.a. Java 6), utilizing the Java Media Framework
(JMF) for sensor interaction and the Java based NanoHTTPD [Elo] as a lightweight HTTP
server. As a mature, strongly-typed language with exception handling, the use of Java pro-
vides programming convenience as well as safety benefits. Java also provides straightforward
mechanisms for dynamically loading new functionality, at run-time, over the network (via
jar files or dynamically compiled source code), which is a key requirement for our SXE
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component. Similarly, Java also provides isolation and run-time inspection properties via
its sand-boxed runtime environment and virtual machine profiling API.
The size the jar file for the execution environment (SXE) containing all basic func-
tionality including execution plan interpretation, evaluation, web server and client is about
200kB uncompressed. We expect the SXE to it to be deployed on low-end desktop machines
(Pentium Pro) and have not attempted to port to micro-devices at present. Instead, we
have approached this challenge in two ways: (1) we have implemented opcodes that act
as gateways to communicate with restricted devices and (2) we have developed the “native
SXE” a lightweight, stack-based virtual machine that executes a small bytecode that is gen-
erated from re-compiling STEP programs (the native SXE and its compiler are described
in Chapter 6).
The SXE’s primary mode of communication is via HTTP, acting as both a server and
client, at various times. The SSD communicates with constituent SXEs via their HTTP
interfaces and each SXE utilizes an HTTP client to communicate with the SSD, SRM, and
other SXEs. Each SXE may also utilize other communication protocols to communicate
with non-standard SXEs or non-SXE Sensorium participants (motes, IP video cameras,
etc.). Data transfer between snBench components is almost exclusively XML formatted,
including Base64/MIME encoding of binary data. The SXE sends an XML structured
heartbeat to the SRM via an HTTP post from the SXE to the SSD. STEP graphs are
uploaded to an SXE via HTTP POST of an XML object.
The SXE is distributed with a core library of basic “opcodes” implemented in the Java
programming language known as sxe.core. For example, there is a class /sxe/core/math/
add.java corresponding to the opcode sxe.core.math.add as there is for each opcode
known to the SXE. We implement a custom Java ClassLoader to support the dynamic
loading of new opcodes from trusted remote sources (i.e., JAR files over HTTP)9.
Internally, all opcode methods manipulate snObjects, a first-class Java representation
of various STEP datatypes. The snObject itself is a helper class that provides common
9We imagine that applets could be used to allow opcodes from untrusted remote sources, and new
instances of VMs created to ensure complete protection from this untrusted code.
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methods that allow data to be easily serialized as XML for transmission between SXEs
and for viewing results via a standard web browser (using standard mime- type appropri-
ate content). Similarly, snObjects implement a method to parse an object from its XML
representation. Specific snObjects exist including snInteger, snString, snImage, snBoolean,
snCommand, etc. Opcode implementations are responsible for accepting snObjects, and
returning snObjects such that the result may be passed further up the STEP graph. A
sample example opcode is given below for illustrative purposes.
/⇤ The add i t i on Opcode ⇤/
snObject Ca l l ( snObjectArgList argv )
throws CastFai lure , InvalidArgumentCount
{
return ( sn In t ege r ) ( argv . popInt ( ) + argv . popInt ( ) ) ;
}
While the implementation of an Opcode is invoked via a Java class, within the body
of the Opcode, computations are not limited to Java calls. For example, the opcode may
communicate with remote hosts, execute C++ code (or other languages) via the Java Native
Interface, or generate machine code on-the-fly and and transmit it to a another host for
remote execution.
4.4 Putting it all together
We now illustrate the operation of the various snBench components by following an exam-
ple sensing application through-out its operational life cycle. We assume that a Sensorium
has been deployed, with an SSD and SRM hosted by ssd(.sensorium.bu.edu) with several
participant SXEs. In particular, the SXE deployed on host labeast(.sensorium.bu.edu)
is on-line and with an attached image sensor. labeast advertises its computational and
sensing resources via periodic heartbeats to ssd.
Suppose an end-user, Joe, would like to see the names and faces of people in that lab.
Perhaps Joe does not know everyone’s name yet, such that an image of the people currently
in the lab, with the faces of people detected superimposed on the image would be useful
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to our user. As opcodes that support these functionalities (e.g., grabbing frames, finding
faces) are available to the SXEs, this program is easily composed in SNAFU.10
Our user would generate a SNAFU program to accomplish this goal using the SNAFU
integrated development environment (IDE). The SNAFU program (and the development
environment) are each shown below:
letconst x =
get(sensor(image ,cam0@labeast)) in
drawstring(identify(facedetect(x)),x)
Figure 4.5: A screen-shot from the SNAFU Integrated Development Environment.
The SNAFU compiler generates an unbound STEP graph, stored as XML. A shorthand
of the STEP XML graph is shown below (some attributes have been removed for clarity).
Notice that the usage of the let binding in the SNAFU program results in the second instance
of “x” in the STEP program being stored as a splice onto the same node.
10Recall that the SXE is extensible such that, if the computation that Joe requires from an SXE is not
defined in the core SXE opcode library, Joe may develop his own opcode implementations.
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<?xml version=”1.0 ”?>
<stepgraph id=”joes program”>
<exp id=”root1” opcode=”sxe . core . video . drawstring”>
<exp id=” identify0” opcode=”sxe . core . image . identify”>
<exp id=”facedetect0” opcode=”sxe . core . image . facedetect”>
<const id=”const0”>
<exp id=”x” opcode=”sxe . core . sensor . get”>
<s enso r id=”image cam0@labeast0”>
<dev i ce id=”cam0” type=”image” u r i=”labeast/cam0”/>
</ senso r>
</exp>
</ const>
</exp>
</exp>
<s p l i c e id=” splice x0” t a r g e t=”x”/>
</exp>
</ stepgraph>
To submit the STEP program to the infrastructure, the user can either do so directly
from the SNAFU IDE or may manually launch a web browser and navigate to the SSD that
administers the Sensorium deployed in the lab in this case: http://ssd.sensorium.bu.
edu:8079/snbench/ssd/. An XSLT rendered HTML interface is presented by the SSD,
one option of which allows Joe to upload the STEP program (XML file) to the SSD using
a standard HTTP POST.
The SSD then parses the posted STEP graph looking for reusable STEP components
(i.e., nodes). Assuming no STEP programs are deployed elsewhere in the Sensorium, the
SSD proceeds to try and satisfy pre-bound computations. In our example, the sensor node is
“bound” to labeast.sensorium.bu.edu and the SSD’s scheduler requires that any opcode
immediately dependent on a sensor node should be dispatched to that same resource as the
sensor. In practice, this is a reasonable restriction, as it ensures that the SXE hosting the
sensing device will be responsible for getting data from the sensor. This will not create a
bottleneck as additional STEP programs needing data from this sensor will share the need
for the same opcode and reuse will occur attaching new computations to that opcode. In
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our example, the get opcode will be bound to lab-east while the other opcodes are free
to be scheduled to any available SXE resource (potentially including lab-east).
To make things more interesting we assume lab-east is only able to accommodate the
get opcode, so the STEP graph must be split across multiple SXEs. Fortunately, another
SXE host on c02 has available resources for the remaining opcodes. Notice that if we were to
split across three SXEs for these computations the Sensorium would pay the communication
penalty for transferring the image twice (despite the splice). In this case we only transfer
the image once and the socket is reused as a splice target. This is illustrated in the short-
hand STEP sub graphs given below:
<stepgraph id=”joes program:a” bindTo:”lab east . sensorium . bu . edu”>
<socke t r o l e=”sender” id=”A” peer=”B”>
<exp id=”x” opcode=”sxe . core . sensor . get”>
<s enso r id=”image cam0@labeast0”>
<dev i ce id=”cam0” type=”image” u r i=”labeast/cam0”/>
</ senso r>
</exp>
</ socke t>
</ stepgraph>
<stepgraph id=”joes program:b” bindTo:”c02 . sensorium . bu . edu”>
<exp id=”root1” opcode=”sxe . core . video . drawstring”>
<exp id=” identify0” opcode=”sxe . core . image . identify”>
<exp id=”facedetect0” opcode=”sxe . core . image . facedetect”>
<const id=”const0”>
<socke t id=”x” r o l e=”receiver” id=”B” peer=”A”/>
</ const>
</exp>
</exp>
<s p l i c e id=” splice x0” t a r g e t=”x”/>
</exp>
</ stepgraph>
The SSD dispatches each STEP sub graph to the appropriate SXE (via HTTP/1.1
POST). If the POST at either SXE fails (e.g., the SXE does not respond, fails to accept the
STEP), the SSD deletes the graph posted at the other SXE by sending a DELETE of the
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STEP graph’s program ID. If both SXEs respond with success codes (200 OK), the SSD
and SRM commit their changes and are updated to maintain this new program. The SSD
presents Joe with a web page containing a successful POST result and an HTTP link to
the SXE node where he may (eventually) find the result of the computation:
http://c02.sensorium.bu.edu/snbench/sxe/node/root1. Optionally, as a security mea-
sure, the SSD may be used as a relay to prevent end users from directly connecting to SXEs.
Joe may now navigate to that link or other presented links to node in the original STEP
program tree and will see the current value or runtime state of each of the STEP sub
computations.
As soon as the SXE has accepted the posted STEP program, its own web namespace will
be updated to include the posted nodes and their current execution state and values. The
SXE on lab-east has the lower part of the STEP graph (and no external dependency) such
that it can immediately start executing its portion of the STEP graph. When the socket
node is encountered, lab-east tries to contact c02 and in doing so, provides c02 with the
data it needs to begin its execution. When c02 computes a result for the orphan node
“root1” it will contact the SSD informing it that the program ”joes-program” is complete.
As a single-run (non-trigger) program, the STEP evaluators on each SXE will only run
the computation nodes through once and after a configurable amount of time both the
nodes and the result are expunged from the SXEs.
4.5 Conclusions
snBench provides a foundation for research that occurs both on-top of and within the
snBench platform. Users of the snBench framework may develop distributed sensing
applications that run on the provided infrastructure. Researchers developing new sensing
or distributed computation methodologies (e.g., the development of distributed vision al-
gorithms, distributed hast tables) may take for granted the communication, scheduling,
and dispatch services provided by the snBench freeing them to spend their energy inves-
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tigating their area of interest and expertise. These modules can be provided as opcode
implementations and plugged into the architecture with ease. Instead, in this section, we
focus on the research taking place within the components of the snBench itself; that is, the
development and research that extends the snBench to improve Sensorium functionalities
and meet the unique challenges of this environment.
4.5.1 Catalytic Work
We envision snBench as a catalyzing agent for a number of interesting research directions
both intrinsic (i.e., research that aims to improve future generations of snBench) as well
as extrinsic (i.e., research that advances the state-of-the-art in other areas). The following
are examples, inspired by the projected trajectories of active research projects currently
being pursued within our department.
Extrinsically, snBench abstracts out the details of the SN infrastructure allowing re-
searchers to work on the problems they are best suited to deal with. For example, vision
researchers don’t need to understand communication protocols, real-time schedulers, or net-
work resource reservation to research HCI approaches for assistive environments [MSWB04].
Similarly, snBench provides researchers in motion mining [TLS05] and in stream database
applications [CLKB04] with a unique opportunity to implement and test proposed ap-
proaches and algorithms in a real setting. The functional, and strongly-typed nature of
snBench programs may inspire the development of snBench (domain-specific) program-
ming languages that are more expressive than SNAFU. In particular, SNAFU maps to
STEP in a fairly straightforward way; additional more expressive front-end languages with
less intuitive mappings could also be developed.
Intrinsically, the ability of the SSD to guarantee system performance could leverage
advances in overlay network QoS management [GBM+04], distributed scheduling [Bes97],
and on-line measurement, inference and characterization of networked system performance
[BBH05]. Moreover, the algorithmic e ciency of the SSD will depend upon finding e cient
solutions to labeled graph embedding problems [CBMP03], where those labels will have
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interesting interactions with the scheduling and performance issues already raised. SXEs
ought to be high-performance runtime systems, and thus can benefit significantly from
operating systems virtualization [ZBG+05] and optimization techniques [WZSP04].
Chapter 5
Safety Verification Through Programming
Language Formalisms
snBench is a platform on which novice users compose and deploy distributed Sense and
Respond programs for simultaneous execution on a shared, distributed infrastructure. It is
a natural imperative that we have the ability to (1) verify the safety/correctness of newly
submitted tasks and (2) derive the resource requirements for these tasks such that correct
allocation may occur. To achieve these goals we have established a multi-dimensional sized
(i.e., dependent) type system for our functional-style Domain Specific Language (DSL)
called Sensor Task Execution Plan (STEP). In our type system, data types are annotated
with a vector of size attributes (e.g., upper and lower size bounds). Tracking multiple
size aspects proves essential in a system in which Images are manipulated as a first class
data type, as image manipulation functions may have specific minimum and/or maximum
resolution restrictions on the input they can correctly process.
Through static analysis of STEP instances we not only verify basic type safety and
establish upper computational resource bounds (i.e., time and space), but we also derive
and solve data and resource sizing constraints (e.g., Image resolution, camera capabilities)
from the implicit constraints embedded in program instances. In fact, the static methods
presented here have benefit beyond their application to Image data, and may be extended
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to other data types that require tracking multiple dimensions (e.g., image “quality”, video
frame-rate or aspect ratio, audio sampling rate). In this chapter we present the syntax and
semantics of our functional language, our type system that builds costs and resource/data
constraints, and (through both formalism and specific details of our implementation) provide
concrete examples of how the constraints and sizing information are used in practice. As
far as we are aware, we are the first such project to actually provide a system that employs
such static verification techniques in this domain. Additionally, unlike other attempts to
provide static verification to the lowest level language (in other domains), we apply our
techniques to the narrow-waist tasking language, and thus are able to provide the benefits
of static verification independent of the source language or target platform.
5.1 Introduction
Motivation
The Sensor Network WorkBench (snBench) is a collection of compile-time tools and run-
time components that enable the painless development and deployment of Sense and Re-
sponse services that run on a shared infrastructure. Toward snBench’s goal of enabling
novice users to compose these services we provide our users with a functional-style Domain
Specific Language (DSL) for specification, called STEP (Sensor Task Execution Plan).1
STEP is resource agnostic insofar as service logic may refer to particular types of resources
(e.g., an Image sensor) without indicating which specific resources should be utilized within
the service.
Our ability to allocate resources on which to deploy STEP services is contingent upon
our ability to verify the safety of new services and to derive resource requirements from new
service instances. In this chapter we present the static analysis techniques that we have
developed to provide safety and resource constraint extraction on our sensing-centric STEP
language. We base our type system on sized (a.k.a. static-dependent) type systems, wherein
1We actually provide other, high-level languages that are compiled down to STEP as our common In-
struction Set Architecture.
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upper bound size annotations on types coupled with cost functions are used to determine
memory (storage) and processing (worst case execution) bounds.
We expand our size tracking to multiple dimensions (i.e., multiple dimensions of size
annotations) toward the goals of (1) supporting Images as a first-class data type and (2)
enabling the static inference of required image (and image sensor) resolutions from implicit
constraints.
Unlike traditional scalar data, both size bounds of an Image (i.e., upper and lower,
where the lower bound is the potential minimum image resolution) may have an impact
on functional correctness. For example, attempting to recognize a face in a low-resolution
image may never succeed, or worse, might diverge depending on the implementation. While
one could consider adding additional types and subtyping relations to the type system to
support awareness of image resolutions (e.g., LowResolutionImage, MediumResolutionIm-
age, HighResolutionImage) it should be obvious that this sort of solution does not scale.
Our sized type system cannot only bound costs for memory and computation, it can also
produce sensing domain specific resource constraints. In tracking both upper size bounds
and lower size bounds we are able to make statements that bound a worst-case execution
time and also provide bounds for Image resolution; the latter property ultimately leads to
establishing the correctness of Image processing expressions.
A Motivating Example
Our goal is to be able to leverage the size annotations in the type system to provide both an
upper-bound for computational requirements of services (as prior works have done), while
additionally (1) maintaining minimum size aspects to verify correctness in the presence
of functions that require a minimum size to ensure correctness and (2) determining and
maintaining implicit constraints on resources and data sizes as extracted from contextual
usage in a given service instance.
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For example consider the code fragment below:
(* every 100 milliseconds , take an image from "any" camera and
try to detect motion. If motion is detected , send an e-mail. *)
letonce img = get(sensor(image ,any)) in
period (100ms,
trigger(facedetect(img),email("mocean",img))
)
In the code given, the variable img represents an image captured from “any” image
sensor. However not all image sensors (i.e., cameras) have the same capabilities with respect
to image resolution (e.g., a webcam might caputre images at a resolution several times
lower than that of an embedded Pan-Tilt-Zoom camera). In this program instance there
are implicit constraints on the image that indicate that not just any sensor will do. The
function (or as we call it, Opcode) facedetect constrains the size of img, as it requires a
minimum resolution to correctly detect a face in an image. While the explicit periodicity
function (or as well call it, Flowtype) period indicates that this expression must run every
100 milliseconds. Thus there is another constraint on the resolution; the resolution must
also be low enough to allow computation every 100 milliseconds. These constraints on the
resolution of the image must propagate back to the image sensor from which the image will
be acquired to ensure that the sensor reserved for this program can support the required
resolution (or range of resolutions).
Our size constraint set (when solved) can be used to (1) guide task assignment (e.g.,
do not split computation over the network where the data size will incur a steep network-
ing overhead), (2) guide resource allocation (e.g., reserve the correct sensor determined
from a resolution range derived from use in context), and (3) determine if a program is
fundamentally or temporarily infeasible (e.g., some specific resolution too low to perform
computations, required periodicity cannot be met given current available resources).
In this chapter we present our type system as applied to a subset of our domain specific
language, give details of its implementation, and work through concrete examples of the
system in use. The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 provides
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the syntax of our DSL and the static and dynamic semantics of our type system, and Section
5.3 applies this formalism to some examples to show the system in action as well as giving
an overview of our implementation. In Section 5.4 we indicate some of the many possible
future directions for this work.
Related Work
Bounding the execution time of programs and program fragments is a well-established
problem in computing. Our work has been largely inspired by existing works that aim to
solve this problem by providing a formal type system that has been annotated with upper
size bounds on data types to estimate an upper bound on execution time and memory
requirements given input size. These works are largely known as Dependent Type Systems.
We have made the conscious decision to apply static verification to our narrow-waist
tasking language, unlike other attempts to provide verification to the lowest level language
in other domains, and thus are able to provide these verification benefits independent of the
source language or target platform. Examples of applying static verification at the lowest
(i.e., Assembly language) level include the Typed Assembly Language [MWCG99] and a
closer comparison can be made to the Dependently Typed Assembly Language [XH01] or its
current incarnation as ATS (Applied Type System) [Xi04]. Ultimately these works, insofar
as they are focused on the lowest level language, are naturally used to verify properties at
the lowest level that are relatively outside the scope of the Sense and Respond environments
that we target (e.g., array size bounds and valid memory references are considerably di↵erent
than determining image sensor constraints for resource allocation).
Works that define Dependant Type Systems on higher-level functional languages include
(but are not limited to) Static Dependent Costs [RG94], Sized Type Systems [HPS96], and
Sized Time Systems [LH96]. Indeed, there was a large interest in applying custom type
systems to domain specific languages in the late nineties (e.g., the USENIX Conference on
Domain-Specific Languages (DSL) in 1997 and 1999). We intended to use the Dependent
Typing techniques (with small adjustments to support STEP) in order to verify basic type
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safety and extract execution and memory bounds to guide resource allocation and scheduling
within snBench. The operating environment of snBench is intrinsically distributed and
time dependent, yet it seemed that these existing works should have been able to be ported
more or less directly ([HFH06], for example, is the current incarnation of the Sized Time
System, and is aimed directly at the real-time embedded sensing community). However,
this was not the case.
Our language (and infrastructure) supports the direct modification of Image data which,
unlike traditional scalar data, has an overloaded notion of size (i.e., resolution) that has a
direct impact on functional correctness. In this environment the type signature of a function
must include explicit resolution (size) bounds to convey what size ranges of data a function
can correctly process. Thus our needs began to diverge almost immediately. In the existing
works size annotation has nothing to do with functional correctness, moreover we recognized
a need to track a lower size bound (annotation) in addition to the upper size bound. From
the need to add the additional lower size bound we have established a system in which the
size annotations are multi-dimensional ; while the formalism described in section 5.2 only
includes a lower and upper size bound, Section 5.4 discusses how easily more dimensions
could be added and gives examples.
Additionally our system uses size constraints to solve for data size when it is not ex-
plicitly specified by the programmer (i.e., size annotation variables). Our constraint set is
explicit within the typing rules yet constraints are derived implicitly from program code, us-
ing our constrained size type signature for primitive operators. In solving the constraint set
we can deduce feasible (and/or optimal) data sizes which directly map to image resolutions,
resource constraints and sensor capabilities for image manipulation programs. Finally we
allow primitive operators that directly manipulate the constraint set, allowing the program-
mer to explicitly constrain types without influencing the execution (so called, Flowtypes).
We are unaware of any other work that treats images as first class datatypes or that uses a
type system to statically create such size constraint relationships to deduce required image
sizes and sensor capabilities.
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It is also worth noting that our language includes a slightly unusual let semantic which
is advantageous in time dependent programming environments. While several functional
languages include this same let behavior in their implementation, in time-independent op-
erating environments implementation of the let discipline in this way does not influence the
result of the computation, but rather is provided as an optimization. In our environment,
this is not the case. Thus, we define our let semantic formally and include it in our proofs
for soundness and completeness.
5.2 Formalism for “Core” STEP
In this section we present the formal logic that underlies the verification component de-
scribed above. The type system we present in this Section supports a subset of the complete
STEP programming language; we call this subset “Core STEP.” We discus the challenges
of supporting the few remaining STEP components in Section 5.4.
Readers who are actively familiar with the project may note that what is presented as
STEP appears to be STEP’s high-level, functional sibling SNAFU. In fact, SNAFU is a
largely a convenience wrapper for STEP, including some additional syntactic sugar (which
we do not address in this chapter).
In Core STEP we formally present only one let form. As we show later, this let behaves
in a way that is temporally interesting. The Complete STEP supports other, traditional
let forms (i.e., lazy and eager), yet we omit them from the Core formalism as they are
well-known and relatively less interesting in our domain.
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5.2.1 Syntax of Expressions
Below we define the syntax of the valid expression forms of Core STEP.
e ::= expressions
v value
x variable
cond e e e conditional (if-then-else)
let {xi=ei}i21..n in e let binding
get e read a sensor
op e opcode/primitive operation
trigger {xi=ei}i21..n e e construct for repetition
v ::= values
0 | 1 | 2 | . . . integer
true | false boolean
i image
time | image sensor
op ::= op1 | op2 | op3 | . . . opcodes
5.2.2 Preliminary Definitions
The evaluation (dynamic semantics) of expressions take the general form:
e | ⌫ | t ! e0 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
Where ⌫ is a special variable store required for our let semantic, and t is a discretized
time that increments per evaluation step (e.g., computation count, clock tick). We read
this in English as “ the expression e and its variable store ⌫ take an evaluative step to the
new expression e0 with new variable store ⌫ 0.”
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Definition: The Variable Store ⌫:
The evaluation of the STEP language is time dependent insofar as values that are read from
the sensing environment may change over time. Thus, when a function is evaluated will
directly e↵ect the value retrieved (specifically via the sensor reading function, get). Put
di↵erently, the let semantic we provide has a direct impact on the values retrieved for a
variable (e.g., an eager let retrieves a reading at time 0, a typical lazy or by-need let retrieves
a new reading at every time the substituted variable is encountered). To best accommodate
the needs of STEP and this temporal dependence, we define our default let-binding to be
a hybrid approach; we o↵er a deferred evaluation (i.e., by need) that also o↵ers the reuse
provided by eager evaluation (i.e., with caching).
To achieve the desired result our let-binding construct manipulates a variable store ⌫
that stores the mapping of variables to unreduced expressions which will be reduced within
the environment itself when the variable is encountered (by need). Should the same variable
be encountered again further in the expression, the mapping in ⌫ will later point to the fully
reduced value and will therefore return that previously computed value (with caching).
We define the store, ⌫ below, whose domain ranges over variable symbols, each pointing
to valid STEP expression (either an unreduced expression or a value).
⌫ = {x1 7! e1, x2 7! e2, . . . , xn 7! en}
Domain (⌫) = {x1, . . . , xn}
⌫(xi) = ei
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Definition: The free-variable function FV
FV calculates the free-variables in an expression (e) or expression and store pairing (e | ⌫).
FV (v) = ?
FV (x) = {x}
FV (cond e1 e2 e3) = FV (e1) [ FV (e2) [ FV (e3)
FV (let {xi = ei}i21..n in e) = (
n[
i=1
FV (ei) [ FV (e))  {x1 . . . xn}
FV (get e) = FV (e)
FV (op e) = FV (e)
FV (trigger {xi = ei}i21..n en+1 en+2) = (
n[
i=1
FV (ei) [ FV (en+1) [ FV (en+2))  {x1 . . . xn}
FV (e | ⌫) = (
[
{FV (⌫(x)) | x 2 Domain (⌫)} [ FV (e))  Domain (⌫)
Definition: expression and store pair closure
We say e | ⌫ is closed if and only if FV (e | ⌫) = ?.
5.2.3 Dynamic Semantics
In this section we present the evaluation rules (dynamic semantics) for the various constructs
(i.e., syntactic forms) of the language.
Conditional
(E-IfTrue) cond true e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! e2 | ⌫ | t + 1
(E-IfFalse) cond false e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! e3 | ⌫ | t + 1
(E-If)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫ | t ! cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
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Opcodes
We refer to primitive operators in STEP as Opcodes. Evaluation of opcodes is strict (ar-
guments must be reduced to values before the opcode may be evaluated). Evaluation and
typing rules for specific instances of opcodes (e.g., facedetect, resample) are given in
Section 5.3. The general form is presenter here.
(E-Op1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
op e1 | ⌫ | t ! op e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
where op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
(E-OpApply) op v1 | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t + 1
where v2 = Apply (op v1)
and op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
Sensor reads (and the physical sensor environment E)
As STEP is a sensing centric DSL, it is essential that we have the ability to read values from
sensors that are embedded in the physical environment. We imagine a logical array that
contains all the data that a sensor will produce at every discretized time interval. Reading
a value from a sensor is analogous to extracting a value from this array indexed at the
current time (t). We define an abstract matrix E to correspond to the physical sensing
environment such that Ei ,j is the reading (value) from sensor i at discretized time j . We
define the function fE(i , j) to extract the jth value (corresponding with time j) from stream
(sensor) i from E .
We define the (strict) function get to extract a value from the sensing environment. In
the simplified Core STEP we support only two types of sensors, a time sensor (time) and
Image sensors (image).
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(E-Get1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
get e1 | ⌫ | t ! get e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
(E-GetApply) get v1 | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t + 1
where v2 = fE(v, t)
and fE : Sensor ⌧ ⇥ Int ! ⌧
The time sensor returns the number of evaluations (computations) since the beginning
of the evaluation (i.e., returns t).
(E-GetTime) (get time | ⌫ | t)! (t | ⌫ | t + 1)
Let binding (by-need with caching)
Again, our let semantic is a hybrid approach that is deferred evaluation (ala lazy) coupled
with evaluation re-use (ala by-value/eager). To facilitate this, when a let is encountered, its
assignments are added directly to the store ⌫ (via E-LetN) without evaluation. Expressions
and instead are evaluated within ⌫ when their variable is encountered elsewhere (via E-
Var1 and E-Var2) including variables that point to other variables. Our let expression
allows for simultaneous assignment; in E-LetN we assume that all terms xi are assigned
simultaneously and may have interdependencies.2
Variable terms are subject to alpha renaming to avoid variable capture, etc.
(E-LetN)
let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1 | ⌫ | t
! en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1,...,xn 7! en} | t + 1
(E-Var1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
(x | ⌫ [ {x 7! e1} | t)! (x | ⌫ 0 [ {x 7! e01} | t + 1)
x /2 domain(⌫) [ domain(⌫ 0)
2Put di↵erently, the multiple assignments in E-LetN are not syntactic sugar for nested lets.
78
(E-Var2) (x | ⌫ [ {x 7! v} | t)! (v | ⌫ [ {x 7! v} | t + 1)
Triggers
STEP provides a trigger construct to specify repetitive conditional evaluation. It repeat-
edly evaluates a boolean expression until it is true and then evaluates a second expression
(the first expression “triggers” the second). We also provide the ability to provide sequential
let-bindings that behave as though they are within the scope of each trigger expression eval-
uation (i.e., the let-term is recomputed on every expansion of the trigger) are are available
to both branches of the trigger (a single let-binding result spans both trigger arguments).
We define the trigger’s repetition recursively, via the conditional. For completeness we
also define functionally degenerate trigger forms; expressions that specify a constant value
for the trigger predicate produce a superfluous trigger expression (i.e., trigger true e1
always reduces to e1 while trigger false e1 would never proceed).
(E-Trigger1)
trigger e1 e2 | ⌫ | t
! cond e1 e2 (trigger e1 e2)| ⌫ | t + 1
(E-TriggerDeg) trigger v e2 | ⌫ | t ! cond v e2 (trigger v e2)| ⌫ | t + 1
The letonce expression shown is syntactic sugar for the expanded trigger expression,
which builds a sequential set of variable assignments for which there is one one expansion
per trigger iteration (alpha renaming ensures we are not using the same variable in every
iteration). The binding is intentionally placed at the scope of both the predicate and the
conclusion (i.e., consequent) of the trigger term.
letonce {x1=e1,...,xn=en} in trigger en+1 en+2
⌘ trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2
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(E-TriggerLet)
trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2
! let {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} in
cond en+1 en+2 (trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn =en} en+1 en+2)
5.2.4 Syntax of Types
The syntax of types in Core STEP are given below.
t ::= base types
Int | Bool | Image
⌧p ::= primitive types
t{s,s} w/ size annotation
⌧ ::= types
⌧p primitive type
Sensor ⌧b sensor
⌧ ! ⌧ opcode
s ::= n | r size annotation
5.2.5 Static Semantics and Sizing of Types
The typing (static semantic) of an expression takes the general form:
  ` e : t{smin,smax} $c,
Where t is base type (e.g., Int , Bool , Image ), {smin, smax} is the size annotation for
the type (smin is the lower size bound, smax is the upper size bound)3, c is the worst-case
approximation of computational cost of the expression and  is a size constraint set (smax
and smin are size annotations constrained by the simple equations stored in , as we will
see later). In English we read this as: “Expression e has a worst-case computational cost
of c and is of type t under the typing environment  , where t has a minimum size smin, a
maximum size smax, and is subject to size constraints .”
3This pair can be expanded to a tuple to track more dimensions/aspects, as described in Section 5.4
80
For clarity of presentation we denote size annotations with di↵erent symbols depending
on the base type they annotate. We use ni to represent a size annotation for an Integer, and
ri for a size annotation on an Image. In our presentation we omit the implicit constraint
s1  s2 present for every size vector {s1, s2},
Primitive Types
The typing rules for values are given below. The computational cost (c) for a value is always
0.
(T-Int)
  ` n : Int {n,n} $ 0, {n = n}
A constant integer value has both size annotation variables constrained to the integer’s
actual value.
(T-Image)
  ` i : Image {r,r} $ 0, {r = resolutionof (i)}
The size of an image is given by its resolution, taken logically to be the number of pixels
in the Image, however to simplify our presentation we use only the width of the image.
The pair specifies the range of possible resolutions for the image; As with integers, both
values will be the same for a specific, concrete instantiation of an Image.
(T-Bool)
  ` b : Bool $ 0,?
A boolean (true | false) has a negligible fixed size and thus its size annotation is omitted
(i.e., {1,1}).
We define some convenience functions to manipulate the type and its size annotation :
minsize (t{n1,n2}) = n1 maxsize (t{n1,n2}) = n2
base (t{n1,n2}) = t
For example: minsize (Int {4,8}) = 4 base (Int {4,8}) = Int
maxsize (Image {2,n}) = n
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Subtyping (bounding sizes)
(S-Refl) ⌧ < : ⌧ (S-Trans)
⌧1 < : ⌧2 ⌧2 < : ⌧3
⌧1 < : ⌧3
(S-Arrow)
⌧2 < : ⌧1 ⌧ 01 < : ⌧ 02
⌧1 ! ⌧ 01 < : ⌧2 ! ⌧ 02
(S-Pair)
⌧1 < : ⌧2 ⌧ 01 < : ⌧ 02
{⌧1 ⇥ ⌧ 01} < : {⌧2 ⇥ ⌧ 02}
(S-Sensor)
⌧1 < : ⌧2
Sensor ⌧1 < : Sensor ⌧2
We define a relation similar to [LH96]’s subtyping relation (E) which allows a weakening
of the type to increase a size bound, in order to provide an upper bound of the size of the
input relative to work to be completed. In our environment we notice that the correctness
of Image processing functions may impacted by the size of the input (i.e., resolution of
the image); as such we cannot arbitrarily increase the logical size (resolution) of this data
without adverse consequences to functional correctness.
The need to track the lower bound extends into all aspects of the sized typing system,
so we use a general sizing/weaken rule (S-Sized) to describe the subtype relationship for
specific sized types.
(S-Sized)
(smin   s0min) (smax  s0max)
t{smin,smax} < : t{s0min,s0max}
Finally, we give the rule for weakening via the subtype relation, which should be clear
when considered with S-Sized, above. Notice the constraint set  grows to include the
sizing relationship between ⌧1 and ⌧2. If one were to expand the sizing pair to include more
dimensions/aspects of type size, then the S-Sized and T-Weaken constraints would be
augmented to support the new sizing logic (Section 5.4 has more on this).
(T-Weaken)
  ` e : ⌧1 $ c, ⌧1 < : ⌧2
  ` e : ⌧2 $ c, [ 2
where 2 = {minsize (⌧2)  minsize (⌧1), maxsize (⌧2)   maxsize (⌧1)}
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Conditional
(T-Cond)
  ` e1 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3
  ` cond e1 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ 1 + c1 + max(c2 c3),1 [ 2 [ 3
In the (common) event where terms of the conditional branches are di↵erent sizes, the
application of weaken can be used to relax the bounds on either side to meet at the lower
minimum size and larger maximum size.
In the event that either branch’s type contains a size variable, each branch may be
weakened to a new, common size variable for the conditional. The example that follows
portrays exactly this, in which two images (or expressions of type image) that have di↵erent,
yet unknown sizes that are supplied as the branches of a conditional only after applying
T-Weaken to each to arrive at the new size variables n5 and n6:
...
b : Bool $c0,0
i1 : Image
{r1,r2} $ c1,1
(T-Weaken)
i1 : Image
{r5,r6} $ c1,1 [ 01
i2 : Image
{r3,r4} $ c2,
(T-Weaken)
i2 : Image
{r5,r6} $ c2, [ 02
(T-Cond)
cond b i1 i2 : Image
{r5,r6}$ c0 + max (c1, c2),0 [ 1 [ 01 [ 2 [ 02
where:
01 = {r5  r1, r6   r2}
02 = {r5  r3, r6   r4}
Sensors
A Sensor is a “container” type; a sensor of type Sensor ⌧ will return values of type ⌧ when
“read”. The Sensor type has an negligible, omitted static size, however the inner (contained)
type can be annotated with size bounds to indicate the capabilities of the sensor (e.g., the
range of resolutions a camera can support). The rule below indicates that image is an image
sensor that can return images ranging in size from rmin to rmax (that should correlate with
the maximum and minimum resolution capabilities of physical hardware). As this judgment
has no premise and introduces the size variables r1 and r2 into the derivation tree, we will
solve our constraint set for these variables once type derivation is complete.
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(T-ImageSensor)
  ` image : Sensor Image {r1,r2} $ 0, {r1   rmin} [ {x2  rmax}
The time sensor returns the number of evaluations (computations) since the beginning
of the evaluation.
(T-TimeSensor)
  ` time : Sensor Int {n1,n2} $ 0, {n1   0}
(T-SensorRead)
type (get) = Sensor ⌧1 ! ⌧1   ` e1 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c,1
  ` get e1 : ⌧1 $ c1 + 1 + latentcost (get,maxsize (⌧1)),
Opcodes
(T-Op)
type (op) = ⌧1 ! ⌧2 constr (op) = 
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2 $ 0,
(T-OpApply)
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2 $ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧1 $ c,2
  ` op e2 : ⌧2 $ 1 + c+ latentcost (op,maxsize (⌧1)),1 [ 2
where op 2 {op1 | op2 | op3 | . . .}
The latentcost () function [RG94] returns the discretized computational cost of each
opcode as an equation of the size of its input. For example, the complexity of finding a face
in an image is a function of the total number of pixels in the image.
Let binding
An instance of a variable has whatever type is assumed for it in the typing environment  .
A variable has no computational cost or constraints associated with it, rather the costs and
constraints are assigned when variables are bound (i.e., in the let term).
(T-Var)
 (x) = ⌧
  ` x : ⌧ $ 0,?
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In a let term, we take the sum of the costs of the let-bound expressions as well as the
union of all of their associated constraints.
(T-LetN)
  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1
  ` let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1 +Pni=1 ci,n+1 [Sni=1 i
The cost defined in this rule is an over-estimate of the total cost as the let-bound symbols
(some xi) may not occur in the evaluation path of en+1. These costs will not, however, be
“charged” twice, as a variable itself has cost zero when computing the cost of en+1.
Triggers
A trigger’s cost and constraint takes much the same form as the cond and let instances
from which the trigger is derived.
(T-Trig)
  ` ei : ⌧i $ci,i (for i 2 1..n)  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+1 : Bool $cn+1,n+1  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 : ⌧ $cn+2,n+2
  ` trigger {xi=ei}1..nen+1 en+2 : ⌧ $ T ⇤ (cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci) + cn+2,n+1 [ n+2 [
Sn
i=1 i
where T is a new cost variable from the set of unused cost variables, C
Specific values for T may be provided by explicit user bounds or other means.
Typing of the Let-store, ⌫
We can assign a type (more accurately sequence of types) to a variable store ⌫ if we have
assumed types for all of the variables contained within the store. Similarly we associate a
cost and constraint set with the store (for use in interim steps of typing derivations).
(T-Nu)
 , 0 ` ⌫(xi) :  0(xi) $ ci,i (for every xi 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
  ` ⌫ :  0 $ Pni=1 ci,Sni=1 i
Finally we can combine an expression and a typed variable store into a typed pair by
discharging the typing assumptions of the variable store, as shown below.
(T-Complete)
  ` e : ⌧ $ c1,1 ? ` ⌫ :   $c2,2
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c1 + c2,1 [ 2
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5.2.6 Soundness of Core STEP
This Section proves Soundness for the Core STEP (Soundness = Progress+Preservation).
Progress means that every well-typed expression is either a value or can take an evaluative
step (i.e., expressions don’t get stuck), while Preservation means that every typed expres-
sion that takes an evaluative step results in another typed expression (i.e., evaluation is
type preserving). We begin by proving some Lemmas that will be useful for our proofs of
Progress and Preservation.
Lemma: L-Var
Suppose ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = xi, then for some c0 and 0:
? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0
Proof: By the structure of the derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, where e = xi.
 (xi) = ⌧
(T-Var)
  ` xi : ⌧ $ 0,?
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c,
(T-Complete)
? ` xi | ⌫ :  (xi) $ c,
From the premise of T-Nu:   ` ⌫(xi) :  (xi) $ ci,i
From the premise of T-Var:  (xi) = ⌧
Combining these we have:   ` ⌫(xi) : ⌧ $ ci,i
  ` ⌫(xi) : ⌧ $ ci,i ? ` ⌫ :   $ c,
(T-Complete)
? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0
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Lemma(s): Inversion+⌫
Suppose ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, is the last judgment J0 in a typing derivation tree
D. Then:
(1) The left premise of this judgment in D is   ` e : ⌧$c000,000 (say J1) for some
c000 and 000
(2) If J2 is a premise of J1 of the form  0 ` e0 : ⌧ 0$c0,0 for some c0,0 then
 0 ` e0 | ⌫ : ⌧ 0$c0,0 can be derived for all such J2.
Proof: (Generic) By the structure of the derivation of ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, (below). In
the general form, to have reached ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,, we must have an application of T-
Complete with right-side premise ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 and on the left side of the derivation
we find the individual sub-premises to type the expression e. We call this rule T-Rule as a
placeholder for specific instances of e and similarly denote the sub-premises as J2 and the
consequent (in which e is given a type) as J1. We can apply T-Complete with the right
hand side premise of the existing T-Complete to each sub-premise of J2 individually to
arrive at our conclusion. We detail the specific individual cases below.
J2
(T-Rule)
J1 =   ` e : ⌧$c000,000
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
J0 = ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,
Case L-Cond:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = cond e1 e2 e3 then for some c01, c02, c03 and 01,02,03:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : Bool $ c01,01
? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c02,02
? ` e3 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c03,03
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Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3
J1 =   ` cond e1 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ (1 + c1 + (max)(c2, c3))), (1 [ 2 [ 3)
T-Rule = T-Cond.
Case L-Get:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = get e1 then for some c01 and 01:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : Sensor ⌧1 $ c01,01
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c1,1
J1 =   ` get e1 : ⌧1 $ c001,001
T-Rule = T-SensorRead.
Case L-OpApply:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = op e2 then for some c01, c02 and 01,02:
? ` op | ⌫ : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ c01,01
? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c02,02
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧1 $ c,2
J1 =   ` op e2 : ⌧$c,1 [ 2
T-Rule = T-OpApply.
Case L-LetN:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 then for some c01 . . . c0n+1 and
01 . . .0n+1:
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? ` e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c01,01
...
? ` en | ⌫ : ⌧n $ c0n,0n
?, x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 | ⌫ : ⌧n+1 $ c0n+1,0n+1
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn :
⌧n ` en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1
J1 =   ` let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1 : ⌧ $ cn+1+
Pn
i=1 ci,n+1[Sn
i=1 i
T-Rule = T-LetN.
Case L-Trigger:
Suppose   ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, and e | ⌫ is closed.
If e = trigger {xi=ei}i21..nen+1 en+2 then for some c01 . . . c0n+2 and 01 . . .0n+2:
? ` e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1 $ c01,01
. . .
? ` en | ⌫ : ⌧n $ c0n,0n
?, {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+1 | ⌫ : Bool $ c0n+1,0n+1
?, {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0n+2,0n+2
Proof: Using the generic proof above, where:
J2 =   ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n  , {xi:⌧i}1..n `
en+1 : Bool $ cn+1,n+1  , {xi:⌧i}1..n ` en+2 : ⌧ $ cn+2,n+2
J1 =   ` trigger {xi=ei}i21..nen+1 en+2 : ⌧ $ T ⇤ (cn+1 +
Pn
i=1 ci) +
cn+2,n+1 [ n+2 [
Sn
i=1 i
T-Rule = T-Trig.
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Theorem [Progress]
Suppose e | ⌫ is closed and ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c, (for some cost c and constraint
set )
Either: (1) e is a value or (2) there exists some e0 and store ⌫ 0 such
that for every t :
(e | ⌫ | t) ! (e0 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1).
Proof: By induction on the number of unique sub-derivations of a typing derivation of
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,.
We proceed by analysis of the shape of e to show that the property holds for the larger
derivation.
Case e = v:
Satisfied trivially as these terms are values.
Case e = cond e1 e2 e3:
Applying the Induction Hypothesis to a derivation whose final judgment is   `
e1 | ⌫ : Bool $ c1,1 (v ia L-Cond) we can verify that progress holds for e1 | ⌫
(i.e., e1 is a value or e1 | ⌫ can take an evaluative step). So either (1) e1 is
a value (specifically, a Boolean) and E-IfTrue or E-IfFalse can be applied
or e1 | ⌫ can take an evaluative step such that E-If applies and (e | ⌫ | t) !
(cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1).
Case e = xi with xi : ⌧i and xi 2 Domain (⌫) (as e | ⌫ is closed):
By the definition of ⌫ (and the fact that e | ⌫ is closed) we re-write ? ` xi | ⌫ : ⌧
as ? ` xi | {xi 7! ei} [ ⌫+ : ⌧ . By the definition of ⌫ either ei = vi and E-Var
applies without premise or ei is a composite expression. To apply E-Var1 we
require progress for ei | ⌫. By the definition of ⌫ we can re-write ei as ⌫(xi) for
which progress holds via L-Var (to which we apply the Inductive Hypothesis).
Hence E-Var or E-Var1 may be applied and progress holds for this term.
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Case e = let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in en+1:
E-LetN takes an evaluative step without premise such that (e | ⌫ | t) !
(en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1,...,xn 7! en} | t + 1).
Case e =trigger {x1=e1,. . .,xn=en} en+1 en+2:
E-TriggerLet applies without premise for a single step of evaluation.
In the event that the let assignment set is empty (i.e., e =trigger en+1 en+2)
then E-Trigger1 applies without premise.
Case e = get e1:
Either e1 is a value and E-GetApply applies (or E-GetTime if e1 = time), or
by L-Get and the Inductive Hypothesis, we show progress holds on (e1 | ⌫) so
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1 and E-Get1 applies such that (e | ⌫ | t)! (get e01 |
⌫ 0 | t + 1)
Case e = op e2:
Either e2 is a value and E-OpApply applies, or by L-OpApply and the In-
ductive Hypothesis, progress holds on e2 | ⌫ so e2 | ⌫ | t ! e02 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1 and
E-Op1 applies such that (e | ⌫ | t)! (op e02 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1)
Theorem [Preservation]
Suppose e | ⌫ is closed and ? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,.
If (e | ⌫ | t) ! (e0 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1), then for some cost c0 and constraint set 0:
? ` e0 | ⌫ 0 : ⌧ $ c0,0
Proof: By induction on the number of distinct sub-derivations of a typing derivation of
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c,.
91
We proceed by analysis of the shape of e to show that the property holds for the larger
derivation.
Case e = v:
These cases are satisfied trivially, as these terms are values and do not make a
further evaluative step.
Case e = cond e1 e2 e3:
We consider each possible evaluative case, individually.
Case E-IfTrue:
(cond true e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (e2 | ⌫ | t + 1)
We consider the typing derivation of e | ⌫ in which we have   ` e2 :
⌧ $ c2,2 (from the premise T-Cond) and ⌫ :   $ c00,00 (from the
premise T-Complete). We combine them in a new application of
T-Complete to verify ? ` e2 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-IfFalse:
(cond false e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (e3 | ⌫ | t + 1)
We consider the typing derivation of e | ⌫ in which we have   ` e3 :
⌧ $ c3,3 (from the premise T-Cond) and ⌫ :   $ c00,00 (from the
premise T-Complete). We combine them in a new application of
T-Complete to verify ? ` e3 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-If:
(cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫ | t)! (cond e01 e2 e3 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-Cond e1 : Bool and by L-Cond e1 | ⌫ : Bool .
By applying the Inductive Hypothesis to a judgment with this as its
last term, we obtain e01 | ⌫ 0 : Bool .
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫ 0 : Bool :
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g = (  ` e01 : Bool $ c1,1)
  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j (for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
h = (? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00)
(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫0 : Bool $ c01,01
Now we apply T-Cond to g and the terms from the derivation of
cond e1 e2 e3 | ⌫ (if needed, see ↵ in L-Cond for clarity):
  ` e01 : Bool $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2   ` e3 : ⌧ $ c3,3
(T-Cond)
i = (  ` cond e01 e2 e3 : ⌧ $ c04,04)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` cond e01 e2 e3 |
⌫ 0 : ⌧ $ c0,0
Case e = xi with xi : ⌧i and xi 2 Domain (⌫) (as e | ⌫ is closed):
By the definition of ⌫ (and closure of the pair e | ⌫) we rewrite ` xi | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0
as ` xi | {xi 7! ⌫(xi)} [ ⌫+ : ⌧ $ c0,0. We now consider the possible evaluation
cases individually:
Case E-Var1 (⌫(xi) = vi) :
(xi | {xi 7! vi} [ ⌫+ | t)! (vi | {xi 7! vi} [ ⌫+ | t + 1)
We know from the derivation of e | ⌫, the premise of T-Nu gives
  ` ⌫(xi) : ⌧i $ ci,i. As ⌫(xi) = vi and  (xi) = ⌧i = ⌧ we can
re-write this as g = (  ` vi : ⌧ $ ci,i).
Again from the derivation we also have the premise of T-Complete:
h = (? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00). Combining g and h under T-Complete we
can verify ` vi | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0 = ` e0 | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case E-Var2 (⌫(xi) = ei):
(xi | {xi 7! ei} [ ⌫+ | t)! (xi | {xi 7! e0i} [ ⌫ 0+ | t + 1)
L-Var gives us (? ` ⌫(xi) | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0), which we rewrite by
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the definition of ⌫ as (? ` ei | ⌫ : ⌧ $ c0,0). Applying the Induc-
tive Hypothesis we have that (? ` e0i | ⌫ 0 : ⌧ $ c000,000). From the
typing derivation of this expression we have a right side premise for
T-Complete: h = (? ` ⌫ 0 :   $ c00,00). Combining h with our prior
left hand premise of T-Complete, the T-Var’s   ` xi : ⌧ $ 0,?, we
have:
` xi | ⌫ 0 : ⌧ $ c0,0 = ` e0 | ⌫ 0 : ⌧ $ c0,0.
Case e = let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1:
Case E-LetN:
(let {x1 =e1,...,xn =en} in en+1 | ⌫ | t) ! (en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7!
e1,...,xn 7! en} | t + 1)
Thus our goal is to type: en+1 | ⌫ [ {x1 7! e1, . . . , xn 7! en}
We first refer to the typing derivation of e | ⌫ (and define aliases to
save space):
g = (  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1 . . .   ` en : ⌧n $ cn,n)
h = ( , x1 : ⌧1, . . . , xn : ⌧n ` en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1,n+1)
Y =
g h
(T-LetN)
  ` let{x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en}in en+1 : ⌧n+1 $ cn+1 +Pni=1 ci,n+1 [Sni=1 i
Y
i = (  ` ⌫(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
? ` e | ⌫ : ⌧$ c1,1
We call ⌫1 = {x1 7! e1, . . . , xn 7! en} and call to g and h show that
each ⌫1(xi) :  (xi) for xi 2 Domain (⌫1). We see ⌫ 0 = ⌫ [ ⌫1 and now
we have what we need to apply T-Complete and show our desired
result.
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h
  ` ⌫0(xj) :  (xj) $ cj ,j for every xj 2 {x1, . . . , xn} = Domain(⌫0))
(T-Nu)
? ` ⌫0 :   $ c00,00
(T-Complete)
? ` en+1 | ⌫0 : ⌧$ c0,0
Case e = trigger e1 e2:
Case E-Trigger1:
(trigger e1 e2 | ⌫ | t)! (cond e1 e2 (trigger e1 e2) | ⌫ | t + 1)
From the typing derivation of e | ⌫ we have e1 : Bool , e2 : ⌧ , e : ⌧ ,
and ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00. We combine the first three under T-Cond
and the result with the last under T-Complete to obtain our desired
result.
Case E-TriggerDeg:
(trigger v1 e2 | ⌫ | t)! (cond v1 e2 (trigger e1 e2) | ⌫ | t + 1)
Identical to the above.
Case e = trigger {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} en+1 en+2:
Case E-TriggerLet:
(trigger {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} en+1 en+2 | ⌫ | t)
! (let {x1 = e1, . . . , xn = en} in (cond en+1 en+2 e) | ⌫ | t + 1)
From the typing derivation of e | ⌫ we have en+1 : Bool , en+2 : ⌧ , and
e : ⌧ . We combine these under T-Cond, the result with the variable
premises under T-LetN and finally this with ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 under
T-Complete to obtain our desired result.
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Case e = op e1:
Case E-OpApply:
(op v1 | ⌫ | t) ! (v2 | ⌫ | t + 1) The function Apply by definition,
returns a value (which is inherently typed). By the typing derivation
of op v1 | ⌫ we find ? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00 and can apply T-Complete to
obtain our desired result.
Case E-Op1:
(op e1 | ⌫ | t)! (op e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-OpApply e1 : ⌧1 and by L-OpApply e1 | ⌫ : ⌧1.
By the Inductive Hypothesis we have e01 | ⌫ 0 : ⌧1.
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫ 0 : ⌧1:
g = (  ` e01 : ⌧1$ c1,1) h = (? ` ⌫ 0 :   $ c00,00)
(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫ 0 : ⌧1$ c0,0
Now we apply T-OpApply to g and the terms from the derivation of
op e1 | ⌫ (if needed, see ↵ in L-OpApply for clarity):
  ` op : ⌧1 ! ⌧2$ c1,1   ` e01 : ⌧1 $ c2,2
(T-OpApply)
i = (  ` op e01 : ⌧2 $ c0,0)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` op e01 | ⌫ 0 :
⌧ $ c000,000
Case e = get e1:
Case E-GetApply:
(get v1 | ⌫ | t)! (v2 | ⌫ | t + 1)
The function get by definition, returns a value (which is inherently
typed). By the typing derivation of get v1 | ⌫ we find? ` ⌫ :   $ c00,00
and can apply T-Complete to obtain our desired result.
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Case E-Get1:
(get e1 | ⌫ | t)! (get e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1)
By the premise of T-SensorRead e1 : Sensor ⌧1 and by L-Get e1 |
⌫ : Sensor ⌧1. By the Inductive Hypothesis we have e01 | ⌫ 0 : Sensor ⌧1.
Looking at the typing derivation of e01 | ⌫ 0 : Sensor ⌧1:
g = (  ` e01 : Sensor ⌧1$ c1,1) h = (? ` ⌫ 0 :   $ c00,00)
(T-Complete)
? ` e01 | ⌫ 0 : Sensor ⌧1$ c0,0
Now we apply T-SensorRead to g and the terms from the derivation
of get e1 | ⌫ (if needed, see ↵ in L-Get for clarity):
  ` get : Sensor ⌧1 ! ⌧1$ c1,1   ` e01 : Sensor ⌧1 $ c2,2
(T-SensorRead)
i = (  ` get e01 : ⌧1 $ c0,0)
Now we apply T-Complete to h and i to verify: ? ` get e01 | ⌫ 0 :
⌧1 $ c000,000
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5.3 Applications of the formalism
In this section we present concrete instantiations of the formalism presented in the previous
section, in order to illustrate its benefit.
5.3.1 Additional Syntax
In addition to defining specific primitive operators (Opcodes) we also define the notion of
a pair to allow these operators to accept multiple inputs.
e ::= expressions
{e,e} pair
ft flowtypes
v ::= values
{v,v} pair
op ::= opcodes
fst first projection of a pair
snd second projection of a pair
sizedimage allocate an image sensor (supporting specific sizes)
add add integers
facect count faces in an image
resample change the resolution of an image
ft ::= flowtypes
deadline n e define a timing constraint
⌧ ::= types
⌧ ⇥ ⌧ pair
5.3.2 Typing and Evaluation Rules for Pairs
Evaluation (strict) and typing rules for pairs are handled in a standard way.
(T-PairCons)
  ` e1 : ⌧1 $ c1,1   ` e2 : ⌧2 $ c2,2
  ` {e1, e2} : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ 1 + c1 + c2,1 [ 2
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(T-PairFirst)
  ` fst : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 ! ⌧1 $ 0,?   ` e : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ c,
  ` fst e : ⌧1 $ 1 + c,
(T-PairSecond)
  ` snd : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 ! ⌧2 $ 0,?   ` e : ⌧1 ⇥ ⌧2 $ c,
  ` snd e : ⌧2 $ 1 + c,
(E-PairFst) fst {v1, v2} | ⌫ | t ! v1 | ⌫ | t
(E-PairSnd) snd {v1, v2} | ⌫ | t ! v2 | ⌫ | t
(E-Pair1)
e1 | ⌫ | t ! e01 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
{e1, e2} | ⌫ | t ! {e01, e2} | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
(E-Pair2)
e2 | ⌫ | t ! e02 | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
{v1, e2} | ⌫ | t ! {v1, e02} | ⌫ 0 | t + 1
5.3.3 Additional Typing Rules for Image Manipulation
Operations that manipulate images may explicitly specify a range of valid input sizes (i.e.,
size constraints) on their input to ensure correct processing. In the example below, the face
count opcode requires that its input be in the size range of 320 to 1024 (using manageable
image widths as a size rather than actual total numbers of pixels which fall in the millions
of pixels). The definitions of these opcodes implicitly combine an aspect of T-Weaken,
by using size ranges (rather than single values) in their constrained size variables. This
alternate approach has a distinct advantage over using T-Weaken prior to T-OpApply
(as is done in the Conditional in Section 5.2.5); namely the size and cost bounds are more
accurate if they are computed against the input’s actual size bound instead of weakened size
bounds. It should be obvious to the reader that the latentcost values for the functions in
this section have also been contrived in a manner to ease the presentation and discussion.
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(T-FaceCt)
type (facect) = Image {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} constr (facect) = 1
facect : Image {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} $ 0,1
1 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
latentcost (facect, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/2)
A resampling operation is analogous to casting an image to be of a di↵erent size.4 It
has no explicit values for the size variables of its input. Its only constraint is that the input
be of some positive size (greater than zero).
(T-Resample)
type (resample) = Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Image {r1,r2} ! Image {r3,r4} constr (resample) = 1
resample : Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Image {r1,r2} ! Image {r3,r4} $ 0,1
1 = {n1 > 0, r1 > 0, r3 = r1 ⇤ n1, r4 = r2 ⇤ n2}
latentcost (resample, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/8)
Image sensing hardware (e.g., a web camera) has the capability to capture images in a
range of possible resolutions. While the sized annotation makes sizing explicit in the type
system, our programming language lacks explicit type annotation within its syntax. Thus,
we formally define a new primitive to allocate a new image sensor (ala image) that accepts
a resolution range explicitly, as an argument.
(T-SizedImage)
type (sizedimage) = ⌧ ! Sensor Image {r1,r2} constr (sizedimage) = 1
sizedimage : ⌧ ! Sensor Image {r1,r2} $ 0,1
⌧ = Int {n1,n2} ⇥ Int {n3,n4}
1 = {n1 > 0, n3 > 0, r1   min (n1, n3), r2  max (n2, n4)}
latentcost (sizedimage, ⌧) = (maxsize (⌧)/8)
4While a resampling operation does increase the number of pixels in an image, it does not improve image
quality. We will return to this issue in Section 5.4.
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5.3.4 Flowtypes
Finally we introduce a new function whose sole purpose is to inject run-time constraints (a
Flowtype in our nomenclature). This function annotates that its argument has an explicit
deadline within the type system. For example, the example with function period() from
the Introduction would be implemented as syntactic sugar using deadline().
(T-Deadline)
  ` n : Int {n,n}$ 0,1   ` e2 : ⌧ $ c2,2
  ` deadline n e2 : ⌧ $ c2,1 [ 2 [ 3
where 3 = {c2  n}
(E-Deadline) (deadline n e2 | ⌫ | t)! (e2 | ⌫ | t)
5.3.5 In Practice
In this section we have expanded our core language as much as possible so as to reflect our
real operating and tasking environment. We will now construct several examples on which
we apply our type system.
Inferring Optimal Image Resolution
In practice, a user may not provide a specific resolution (size) bound for images that are
used as part of a larger computation in which the image is not part of the desired output.
For example, a user who wishes to determine whether or not a light is on in a particular
o ce is interested in a boolean result, not the intermediate image used to generate this
result. As image sensors are able to capture images in a range of possible resolutions, our
type system can use its size constraint system to suggest an optimal resolution, a range of
feasible resolutions, or indicate that there is no feasible solution for the program as specified.
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Example 1:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds:
facect(get(image))
D0 =
type (get) = Sensor ⌧ ! ⌧
(T-ImageSensor)
image : Sensor Image {r1,r2} $ 0,1
(T-SensorRead)
get(image) : Image {r1,r2} $ c1,1
D1 =
type (facect) = Image {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} constr (facect) = 2
(T-FaceCt)
facect : Image {r1,r2} ! Int {n1,n2} $ 0,2 D0
(T-OpApply)
facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c2,1 [ 2
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
Solving the constraints for r1 and r2 (we minimize r1 and maximize r2 subject to the
constraints given above, we determine the simple constraints that the resolution of the
image to manipulate, and thus the sensor itself, fall in the range [320, 1024]. Thus the SSD
may allocate any available sensor that can produce images within this range of resolutions.
A camera that can capture images at resolutions ranging from 1024 to 4096 is valid for this
service fragment (provided it samples at 1024), as is a camera that can capture images at
the range from 320 to 512.
Bear in mind that the minimum resolution in a range of resolutions is not always the
most desirable value; while the minimum will consume the least computational resources, it
may do so at the expense of computation confidence (e.g., it may not be possible to detect
all the faces in an image if the resolution is too small). As a result we advocate the use of
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the maximum size, provided there are resources available to accommodate the additional
processing overhead. This processing overhead is easily measured by the cost function (c2,
in the above).
Example 2:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds with an
explicit deadline: deadline 322 facect (get(image))
(T-Int)
322 : Int {n,n} $ 0,0 D1
(T-Deadline)
deadline 322 facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c2,0 [ 1 [ 2 [ 3
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
0 = {n = 322}
3 = {c2  322}
In this example the valid range for capture is no longer [320, 1024], when we solve for
r1 and r2 we are limited to the range [320, 512] as larger values of r2 would exceed the
constraint imposed by 3.
It is worth noting that, despite slight di↵erences in the typing derivation, this example
has a size bound result that is identical to an example with explicit (user-specified) size
bounds that are the same as those imposed by the facect opcode:
(deadline 322 facect(get(sizedimage({320, 1024})))).
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Example 3:
Face counting within an image from an image sensor with no explicit size bounds as the
response in a trigger expression:
trigger e0 facect(get(image))
We assume the presence of a Boolean typed expression e0 with cost c0 and constraint
set 0.
e0 : Bool $ c0,0 D1
(T-Trig)
trigger e0 facect(get(image)) : Int {n1,n2} $ c3,0 [ 1 [ 2
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = 1 + c1 + latentcost (facect, r2) = 1 + c1 + r2/2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {r1   320, r2  1024}
c3 = (T ⇤ c0) + c2
If expression e0 starts running at time tstart, transitions to true at time ttrue, and
delay (e0) is the time to evaluate e0 then we can write: T = d ttrue tstartdelay (e0) e. Recognizing that
c0 is a delay (bound) for e0, we can express this as T = d ttrue c2c0 e. This example underscores
the correctly bounding (or estimating) the “weight” of T is dependent on estimating the
factors required to cause e0 to transition to true, which may include information about the
sensing environment E and costs determined elsewhere in the derivation (i.e., to supply
tstart).
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Example 4:
Face counting within a resampled image, originally captured from an image sensor with no
explicit size bounds:
facect (resample {4, get(image) })
D2 =
4 : Int {n,n} $0, {n = 4} D0
(T-PairCons)
{4, get(image)} : Int {n,n} ⇥ Image {r1,r2} $ c1,1 [ {n = 4}
D3 =
type (resample) = Int {n,n} ⇥ Image {r1,r2} ! Image {r3,r4} constr (resample) = 2
(T-Resample)
resample : Int {n,n} ⇥ Image {r1,r2} ! Image {r3,r4} $ 0,2
D4 =
D2 D3
(T-OpApply)
resample {4, get(image) } : Image {r3,r4} $ c2,1 [ 2 [ {n = 4}
type (facect) = Image {r3,r4} ! Int {n3,n4} constr (facect) = 1
(T-FaceCt)
facect : Image {r3,r4} ! Int {n3,n4} $ 0,3 D4
(T-OpApply)
facect (resample {4, get(image) }) : Int {n3,n4} $ c3,4
c1 = 1 + latentcost (get, r2) = 1 + (r2/8)
c2 = latentcost (resample)+ c1
c3 = latentcost (facect)+ c2
1 = {r1   rmin, r2  rmax}
2 = {n > 0, r1 > 0, r3 = r1 ⇤ 4, r4 = r2 ⇤ 4}
3 = {r3   320, r4  1024}
4 = {n = 4} [ 1 [ 2 [ 3
We obtain that r1 ⇤ 4   320 ) r1   80 and r2 ⇤ 4  1024 ) r2  256. Minimizing for
r1 and maximizing for r2 gives the resolution range [80,256] required of the sensor to be
allocated for this fragment.
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Worst-Case Computational Cost and Expression Size Bounds
The worst case computational cost is given as a result of our type system as the first ar-
gument after the $ in a typing judgment. This is a scalar value and could be adjusted or
calibrated as a function to estimate actual execution times on various physical resources.
The worst-case computational bounds provided by our system provide one static-time val-
idation mechanism to determine if explicit deadlines (or other run-time constraints given
other Flowtypes) cannot be met as specified. As presented, the deadline opcode relies on
the unadjusted (discretized) computation bound.
In addition to static verification, the Service Dispatcher component of snBench often
must partition a task across physical resources if there is insu cient computing resources
available on a single node to accommodate the entire task. The worst case computational
cost, as presented, provides us with an initial metric to guide the allocation of physical
computing nodes and sensory resources for a given task (and its constituent subtasks).
Similarly, for any given task or sub-task we can look at the upper bound size annota-
tion on its type information to determine the potential network overhead associated with
partitioning the larger task at that point.
5.3.6 Implementation Details
The type system described in this document has been implemented in Java and utilizes the
open-source JavaCC project [Sri]. It is presented to the user as part of the snBench devel-
opment tool chain, and is automatically invoked when compiling a high-level programming
language (i.e., SNAFU) to STEP. As the implementation checks STEP code rather than
SNAFU code, there is no technical challenge to separating the use of the type checker apart
from the SNAFU compiler, however (1) SNAFU is eminently more readable than STEP
and (2) the implementation includes several hooks to trace STEP typing errors back to line
numbers within the SNAFU code as a convenience to its users. While the type system can
exist without SNAFU (and inevitably will when other high-level languages are provided),
the benefits of SNAFU are diminished without type checking.
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Our implementation of the type checking engine includes some degree of support for all
STEP constructs, rather than only the Core STEP subset that is presented in this Chapter.
Naturally, there are some significant limitations to that support; for STEP constructs for
which we lack complete formalism, we use heuristics to bound cost and, for opcodes which
lack size constraint annotation, we are forced to default back to basic, unsized type checking.
To solve the constraint sets that are built as a result of the sized type checking, we invoke
the GNU Linear Programming Toolkit (GLPK) [And], which can be used to solve a system
of constraints for linear programming, and mixed integer programming. The decision to use
GLPK is based on project maturity, community support and API availability. At present
we emit our sizing constraints in the GNU MathProg language and invoke the GLPK via
external script, though nothing (other than time) precludes finer integration via the GLPK
Java Interface [Bjo].
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are screen shots taken from the SNAFU development environment
that feature results generated from the implementation of the type checker.
Figure 5.1: A screen shot from the SNAFU compiler showing the successful type checking
of a STEP program. By default, the feedback is given graphically to the user.
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Figure 5.2: A screen shot from the SNAFU compiler showing size annotation constraints
that result from type checking a STEP program.
5.4 Future Work
5.4.1 Additional Type Annotations
In this chapter we have presented upper and lower size bound data type annotation, yet
other useful annotations exist and can be easily integrated into this type system by extend-
ing the existing annotation pair to a tuple or larger ordered set and defining the desired
subtyping relation.
One such example is the notion of image quality, which is di↵erent from data size.
Data size is used bound the operational requirements of a function (including those that
manipulate images), whereas image quality speaks to the valid data in the image. As far
as operational/functional correctness is concerned a resized image is operationally valid,
however with respect to the desired programmatic output, a smaller image that has been
resized to a larger resolution is not truly interchangeable with an image captured at a
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larger resolution. When an image is resized (e.g., via scaling or resampling, say) the size
(resolution) of the image changes no longer reflects the number of data points it contained
originally (we are calling this “quality”).
We could easily support a notion of an image’s quality within our type annotations, by
adding a dimension for the “lowest” value that we have ever seen for an image’s lower size
bound.5 This value could distinguish between a true high resolution image and data that
has been up-cast or coerced to satisfy a function’s size constraints. Quality also has a well
established meaning with respect to numerical data as well, and might be defined to reflect
potential for rounding errors, data accuracy, etc. Certainly other image and video related
aspects could be tracked as well, including color-depth for images, frame rates for video,
and so on.
5.4.2 Applications to Image Pyramids
Image Pyramids [Kro91],[AH91] are a well established technique in the field of image pro-
cessing. The technique involves maintaining multiple copies of the same image at di↵erent
resolutions (the a hierarchy of resolutions form a logical pyramid) such that the appropri-
ate resolution can be selected for manipulation depending on the needs of the manipulation
function. The applications of this formalism to this community is potentially two-fold. (1)
We can extend the type system to include an image pyramid as a first class type and extend
the annotations to support the list of resolutions available in the pyramid. (2) Static analy-
sis of the image processing flow can tell us precisely which resolutions need to be kept in the
pyramid and which can be removed. In the latter case, the potential benefit of snBench
and sized typing is quite significant as it might be possible to remove the pyramid entirely.
For distributed computations, we can split the pyramid into individual image instances
based on the analysis of size/use and ensure that we are passing as few copies of the image
(inside the pyramid) and as few copies of the pyramid itself, as possible.
5Recall the definition of T-Resample increases both the upper and the lower size bound.
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5.4.3 Cost and Size Signatures For New Opcodes
The operational correctness of the type system is contingent on the presence of accurate
size, cost and constraint data for Opcodes (primitive operators). snBench provides a
facility by which new Opcodes may be added to a service library quickly and easily, through
the implementation of a simple Java interface. At present the type system maintains an
embedded definition for the latent costs and size constraints of the current Opcode library,
however for the sustainability of the type system, it is essential that these definitions are
provided by the Opcode authors and automatically extracted directly from the Opcode
definitions. Beside changing the Opcode implementation interface, the type system must
also change to import the rules from the Opcode library directly. There is also a concern
that Opcode authors might specify very weak size constraints and very high costs (possibly
lacking the knowledge to do so correctly) and that the end result is a type system that is
only as strong as its weakest link. Any future work that would automatically extract this
information from an Opcode implementation would be a fantastic solution to this problem
(and others).
5.4.4 Di↵erent Models of Cost
At present our type system provides a single model of computational cost, a worst-case
upper bound. As there is the possibility for multiple size annotations (dimensions) of types,
there is an opportunity to provide multiple cost metrics based on these other dimensions.
Defining a so-called “minimum” computational cost (or optimal case) would be trivial, and
other cost models including non-computation costs models (e.g., defining some financial
cost, or total memory utilization cost) would be possible, if not trivial. The approach
that seems the most straight forward to enabling multiple cost models would be to provide
functional costs, such that all costs computed on the right hand side of the $ would be
user/programmer customizable and configurable as a function of the data available in the
typing rules.
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5.4.5 Expanding to “Complete” STEP
At present we support only a subset of the STEP programming language. The remaining
STEP constructs (e.g., streaming/persistent triggers and their associated read semantics)
are di cult to represent as a result of their asynchronous execution and complex internal
state. Despite these challenges, we have worked to establish a typing formalisms for these
constructs however they are presently incomplete. Despite this, the present limited form
is useful for non-persistent, “straight-shot” programs (which actually capture a significant
amount of image processing tasks). For persistent/streaming trigger constructs we apply
a simple heuristic: we solve the computable portion and multiply by estimates to derive
the approximate costs for services that include non-Core portions of STEP. Regardless of
this makeshift solution, it would be advantageous (and naturally appealing) to have a type
system that includes the complete STEP language.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented our formal type system for multi-dimensional sized types.
Unlike other sized type systems our work tracks both an upper and lower size bound for data,
defines a logical subtype relation for images capable of bounding computation, maintaining
functional correctness, and deduce feasible data sizes from implicit and explicit constraints
within program fragments. We presented this system and have provided examples that
illustrate the use of the type system. We are confident in the many potential uses for this
formalism to the Image processing and Sense and Respond communities.
Chapter 6
A Native Execution Environment for Embedded
Devices
Embedded sensing and actuation environments require language abstractions that enable
temporal execution constraints and safe resource sharing. Unfortunately, current real-time
language o↵erings are either too cumbersome for lightweight devices or too simplistic to
facilitate any guarantees of functionally or temporally correct behavior. snBench pro-
vides a high-level programming language, compilers and run-time support to manage an
embedded sensing and actuation environment with attention toward this challenge. In this
chapter we detail a compiler, virtual machine, and small ISA that naturally extend the
applicability of the snBench infrastructure to light-weight, resource constrained devices.
The simple instruction set (snCode) can be executed by a lightweight, stack-based virtual
machine without garbage collection. This work opens the door to a native Sensor eXecution
Environment (nSXE) that, in its reduced CPU and memory overhead, is appropriate for
embedded devices and well provisioned hosts alike. In addition to the reduced processing
and memory requirements, this alternate execution environment provides fine grained re-
source control, memory protection and predictable performance with which we can extend
soft real-time performance guarantees to the programs executed on top of the snBench.
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6.1 Overview
The particular (embedded) SN infrastructure targeted by snBench is, in part, character-
ized by the presence of resources of varied capabilities. The standard run-time execution
environment of snBench is appropriate for well apportioned devices that do not require
fine grained resource control. It has always been our intent to provide a “lightweight” exe-
cution environment for highly constrained sensing and actuation devices that, by their very
nature, are subject to legitimate real-time constraints.
In this chapter we describe the design and technical challenges of the “native” Sensor
eXecution Environment (nSXE). The Sensor eXecution Environment’s primary task, the in-
terpretation and execution of remotely dispatched Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP)
XML programs, is achieved on the nSXE by compiling STEP programs into a function-
ally equivalent lightweight half-byte code representation (snCode). snCode features a very
small set of opcodes (4 bits worth, naturally), and thus the execution environment for this
instruction set can be quickly and easily ported to a myriad of devices. Translation of
the functional-style STEP language into an imperative, stack-based snCode representation
requires unwinding the functional program; and the compilation rules are included herein.
While the STEP-to-snCode compiler and corresponding nSXE could eventually replace the
STEP-based SXE for all devices, the snCode is not a replacement for STEP (i.e., our static
analysis techniques target STEP). We also detail the design and requirements of our proof
of concept nSXE (virtual machine) and provide benchmarks that compare the performance
of the native SXE with the original SXE.
6.2 Related Work
Clearly our work is not the first to provide lightweight code to task embedded, sensing and
actuation devices. Although we briefly mention non-VM based, approaches we believe the
advantages a↵orded by Virtual Machines in embedded deployments are di cult to dispute.
Separating performance concerns, VMs extend safety to embedded applications including
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memory protection and separate, protected services that monitor the health of embedded
applications and perform dynamic updates. Such functionality is ideal in embedded devices,
particularly when devices must be updated with new code and deployed in inaccessible
locations (e.g., Mars). We would readily trade a performance/computational throughput
penalty for interpretation, provided we can obtain predictable performance.
The Lego Robotics platform (“Mindstorm” and its successor “NXT”)[KL99] has several
programmatic interfaces to tasking the robot devices. The user community’s Not Quite C
[Bau] o↵ers a low-level C-like interface to programming the Mindstorm while Not eXactly
C [Han] provides a much richer, yet still low-level C interface for the NXT devices (each
of which is compiled into a bytecode for the devices). Much closer to high-level interface
of STEP is the graphical tasking language of NXT-G [LN] which allows users to specify
their programs graphically, in a functional manner. While the interfaces are somewhat
similar, STEP provides the capability to task devices beside robotics, to specify programs
at a scope of an overall distributed computation (not just role local device behaviors) and
finally to be inherently extensible to support new functionalities and devices by the Opcode
and GenericSensor abstractions, respectively.
As we o↵er a bytecode and virtual machine, the natural comparison is to Java Standard
Edition (Java) and its JVM or the Java2 Micro Edition (J2ME) and its KVM. While
these comparisons are apt there are several clear ways in which our works di↵er. Java
su↵ers from a tension between supporting many target device platforms while simultaneous
o↵ering an extremely large and well provisioned core runtime API. A JVM implementation
must support over 200 bytecodes (admittedly, many operations are virtually identical, i.e.,
perform the same operation, but on di↵erent types of data). While the KVM for J2ME
aims to be a smaller, yet “complete” JVM, even the smallest “complete” JVM is still
overblown for our needs. For example, snCode is generated from the compilation of STEP,
which is a functional language. Thus snCode does not manipulate explicit state and does
not require a heap or GarbageCollector. Additionally neither the Java or J2ME address
real-time concerns.
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The Real Time Specification for Java (RTSJ) does extend real-time concerns and con-
straints to Java, however they are largely centered around the implementation and exten-
sions of the core API and do not restrict the bytecode in any way. To extend predictable
execution to the RTSJ we must have worst- case execution time (WCET) for the byte-
code and a hard rule about how threads will be implemented in the JVM (i.e., native or
user level). Several Java “bytecode-interpreter in hardware” solutions exist, however we
are interested in maximum portability and device independence. Related, the Squawk VM
[SCC+06] enables Java bytecode to be executed on embedded devices, however they target
a particular platform, the SunSPOT device, and thus the applicability is sorely limited.
Programming sense and respond services from a high level language is akin to the tasking
of small embedded devices and is thus related to Active Sensor Networks [LGC05], which
leverages the TinyScript scripting language (among others) to task sensors. TinyScript is
compiled into code that runs on the Mate Virtual Machine for Sensors and, as Mate requires
the presence of TinyOS, the result in a rather limited target architecture and no memory
safety or real-time performance guarantees.
Finally, we address why we do not use the GNU Compiler for Java [Lic] to produce native
code from our Java SXE as suggested in previous publications. Unfortunately, compiling
Java with GCJ requires a fair amount of tweaking for relatively complicated code (GCJ does
not support all of Java) and we would need to port libgcj to every target device (the present
version does not support threads, file I/O or networking). Even if GCJ could compile the
SXE for the target device, the result would be too heavyweight and maintaining the binary
output would require intimate knowledge of GCJ.
6.3 The STEP Virtual Machine
The requirements of the STEPvm and the snCode language itself were established in tan-
dem, driven by the needs of the STEP language. As STEP programs are functional, there is
no explicit state manipulation possible in user code. As a result the STEP Virtual Machine
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(STEPvm), unlike the Java VM, does not provide dynamic memory allocation or garbage
collection, however does utilize a variable stack. The STEPvm must maintain some shared
state to support the runtime semantic of the STEP language constructs, however these
memory needs are known at compilation time. There is no dynamic generation supported
in STEP.
The snCode mnemonics, their function, and their e↵ects on the stack are given in Table
6.1. The STEPvm is arguably a descendant of Landin’s Stack Environment Code Dump
(SECD) abstract machine [Lan64], however STEPvm is considerably more simple insofar
as the source language (STEP) lacks traditional functional recursion.
A central concept to STEP programming is the persistent trigger abstraction, which is
used to specify asynchronous STEP code fragments that produce data streams. To support
the simultaneous and concurrent execution of persistent triggers, the STEPvm requires
multi-threaded execution. Each thread has its own context frame consisting of its own
code segment, program counter, stack, small memory segment to pass arguments to library
functions, and relative priority for scheduling. The STEPvm maintains a shared, global
“environment memory”, a critical section lock pool and all thread context frames. New
threads (frames) are created by the compilation process either from a program root or the
presence of persistent trigger expressions.
In the STEPvm each thread contains its own code segment such that, when a thread
expires or a new thread is added dynamically (i.e., dispatched to the nSXE), instructions
can be easily removed or added on a thread-by-thread basis. In STEP, threads do not
generally have code in common, unless explicitly indicated by the presence of a splice
STEP node; the splice node indicates that the value of a STEP node (or STEP sub-graph)
should be shared by multiple parent nodes in the graph, without re-computation. The
STEPvm’s shared environment memory is used to facilitate the semantic of splice nodes.
In a snCode translation of the STEP splice node, the code first checks to see if a value
has already been stored in the environment and will compute the value only if it does not
already exist.
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When a splice node enables the sharing of values across two (or more) threads of exe-
cution (i.e., subtrees that are shared by di↵erent root nodes), there is a potential for a race
condition: multiple threads could simultaneously see the value of the environment variable
as non-initialized and each start computing the value in their own thread (computing the
value multiple times). The STEPvm provides a critical section construct and it used in
the splice node scenario to prevent the thread scheduler from causing a spliced subexpres-
sion to executed by multiple threads simultaneously. The critical sections are identified by
the shared environment memory values they ultimately compute, and therefore logically
translate to locks on the specific shared memory variable. As STEP is defined, the splice
nodes are the only environment memory variables that may exist in common across separate
threads of execution in the STEPvm; this is the scenario in which protected access to the
environment memory is required.
In addition to the features already specified, the STEPvm must also support the ex-
ecution of the functional library operations (so called “STEP Opcodes”), invoked by the
Expression nodes of the STEP language. The STEPvm is agnostic to the particular imple-
mentation of the Opcode library, provided the individual functions/subroutines can produce
valid data.1
6.4 STEP Compilation
A STEP graph is a functional-style Sensor Network program, in which the STEP nodes
represent sensors, values, and manipulation functions required to perform a given task.
There are nearly a dozen STEP node types in the larger STEP programming language.
Each node in a STEP graph is an instance of one of the STEP node classes; the node’s
class defines its interpreted behavior and how it is connected to other nodes. For example,
a conditional node has three children: a predicate node (or subgraph) that produces a
boolean value, and two other children, one to be evaluated if the predicate is true and one
to be evaluated if the predicate is false.
1The STEP Opcode library is similar to Java’s core runtime API, rt.java.
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push Push the arg on to the stack
pop Pop a value o↵ the stack
dupe Replicate the top value on the stack
jump Unconditional jump to the line specified
jumpf Jump to the line specified if Pop() == false
jumpv Jump to the line specified if Pop() != ERR
estore Pop a value o↵ the stack and store it into the shared environment
memory specified as an operand
eload Push a value onto the stack loaded from the shared environment
memory location (operand), pushes ERR if not found
nop No op (for label/line number consistency)
arglist Build an arglist from the operand many popped values from the stack
op Jump to a subroutine passing in the ARGLIST as arguments
mutexlock Prevent any other thread from entering the critical
section defined by the shared variable
mutexunlock Release the lock on the critical section
ebufadd Pop a value o↵ the stack and store it into the shared environment
FIFO bu↵er specified as an operand
ebufrmv Remove the oldest element from the named shared environment
bu↵er and push this value onto the stack (blocks if bu↵er is empty)
Table 6.1: Opcodes for snCODE
In unwinding the functional style of the original STEP program graph, we translate
STEP constructs to a directed flow graph and determine basic blocks [AU77]. In compi-
lation, we apply dynamically generated labels to basic blocks to enable jumps/branching
required for the trigger and cond constructs of the STEP programming language. The
compilation rules presented take a STEP node (class) and an optional label as arguments,
and produce a functionally equivalent snCode representation. When compilation is complete
we replace the logical label references with line numbers.
Below we present the compilation strategy for each of the STEP node classes, including
the node’s representation in STEP (as XML) and its compilation rule. The XML examples
have been abbreviated to call attention to the attributes most relevant to the compilation
process. A more detailed discussion of the STEP nodes is presented in Chapter 3.
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Value nodes
Value nodes convey a constant/literal value. In the example STEP value node below is of
type integer with value 45 and has the unique ID intnode.
<value id=”intnode”>
<snob j e c t type=”integer”>
45
</ snob j e c t>
</ value>
The compilation rule is given below, which simply pushes the value of the node onto the
stack. The label argument, which is used for other STEP constructs to reconcile line
numbers as jump targets, will be clear in further examples.
C(label , value)) label : push value
Conditional nodes
Conditional nodes convey an “if-then-else” semantic. It has three child nodes/subtrees, the
predicate (P), the subtree to be executed if true (T) or the subtree to be executed if false
(F).
<cond id=”condnode”>
<P/><T/><F/>
</cond>
The compilation of conditional nodes utilize labels to ensure the correct jump target. The
new labels, cond .f and cond .r are derived from the cond node’s id attribute.
C(label , cond(P, T, F))) C(label , P);
jumpf cond .f ;
C(nil , T);
jump cond .r ;
C(cond.f, F);
cond .r : nop;
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Expression nodes
Expressions convey a particular computation (STEP Opcode) to be performed by the SX-
E/nSXE host, with the child nodes of this node passed as arguments of the operation. We
assume Opcode library implementations are available and, in some way trusted, not entirely
unlike the implementation of the host-specific Java runtime classes (rt.java).
<expnode opcode=”sxe . core .math . add” id=”other”>
<A/>
<B/>
</expnode>
Invocation of a STEP Opcode involves two operations in snCode; First, arguments are
removed from the stack and placed in the thread’s argument memory via a call to arglist.
Second, a call to op passes control (and the argument memory) to the library function
outside the STEPvm (i.e., a library call). The result of the op is passed back to the
STEPvm and placed at the top of the variable stack.
C(label , exp(A, B))) C(label , A);
C(nil , B);
arglist 2 ;
op exp;
Transient Trigger nodes
Triggers enable user specified reactions that are “triggered” by the evaluation of a user spec-
ified predicate. In STEP, triggers are either of two forms; transient or “fire-once” triggers
and persistent or “streaming”. Persistent triggers execute their predicates in perpetuity,
concurrent with their parent expressions. Transient triggers run on demand of their parent
nodes and are thus, much easier to understand.
“Basic” Trigger nodes: The basic transient trigger node executes the predicate expres-
sion repeatedly, until it evaluates to true. At that point the response is executed and
returned as the value of the trigger expression.
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<t r i g g e r id=”trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ t r i g g e r>
Compilation into snCODE is straightforward, utilizing the jumpf opcode to jump back to
the predicate expression if the value on the top of the stack is false.
C(label , trigger(P, R))) C(label , P);
jumpf label ;
C(nil , R);
While-Trigger nodes: The transient while trigger node executes the predicate expression
repeatedly, and evaluates the response while the predicate is true. When the predicate
evaluates to false, the last value of the response is returned (which may be NIL).
<wh i l e t r i g g e r id=”whiletrigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ wh i l e t r i g g e r>
The compilation of the while trigger to snCode entails tracking the previous evaluation of
the response (R), which we initially place in the stack as ERR, indicating to the “caller”
that P was initially false (i.e., the response has never executed). Should P be initially true,
we repeatedly execute and maintain the prior value of R on the stack. When the execution is
complete (i.e., P is false) the prior value of R is the only value left on the stack at completion.
Additionally the while trigger must also store its prior value of R in the environment
to support the LAST TRIGGER EVAL construct (the compilation of which is detailed in
Section 6.4).
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C(label , while trigger(P, R))) l: push ERR
C(↵, P)
jumpf  
pop
C(nil , R)
dupe
estore trigger.id
jump ↵
 : nop
Persistent Trigger nodes
The persistent trigger constructs supported by STEP associate a STEP (sub) program
“response” (R) to be executed (i.e., “triggered”) when the persistently evaluated “predicate”
expression (P) evaluates to true. In e↵ect, a persistent trigger runs in a separate thread of
control and has a return type of a stream of values.
To support repeated evaluation in the SXE’s STEP interpreter, these triggers are always
in the “ready” node queue for scheduling.2 To achieve a similar e↵ect in the nSXE’s
imperative version, persistent triggers run in a separate thread in the VM.
Discretization from the stream of values into individual reads are handled by the STEP
read node construct, which is detailed below. Value exchange between the trigger thread
and the reader occurs using the environment memory which is shared across all threads.
Values from the trigger are placed into the memory named for the calling read node and
the read node encapsulates the specific read semantic. By default, a stream value is a single
memory location; only the bu↵ered read requires utilizing more than one memory location
for its trigger/read semantic.
2This is an over-simplification, but conveys the spirit of the persistent trigger.
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Level Trigger nodes: Level trigger nodes fire their response expression every time the
predicate evaluates to true.
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
C(l , level trigger(P, R))) // New VM Thread
C(l , P);
jumpf l ;
C(nil , R);
dupe
estore read .id
estore trigger .id
jump l ;
Edge Trigger nodes: Edge trigger nodes fire the response expression every time the
predicate evaluation transitions from false to true (and on the first true evaluation).
<e d g e t r i g g e r id=”edge trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ e d g e t r i g g e r>
The snCode version must track the previous value of the predicate on the stack and the
current value. The branches each ensure that the current predicate value becomes the new
prior predicate value. We place FALSE on the stack as the first prior evaluation to facilitate
the desired behavior that the first evaluation of P that produces TRUE should also result
in the execution of R.
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C(l , edge trigger(P, R))) // New VM Thread
l : push FALSE ;
C(↵, P);
jumpf l ;
jumpf  ;
push TRUE ;
jump ↵;
 : push TRUE ;
C(nil , R);
dupe
estore read .id
estore trigger .id
jump ↵;
LAST TRIGGER EVAL nodes
LTEs allow the predicate or response expressions of a trigger expression to refer to the
previous value generated from a trigger response. As the LTE will only occur within the
expression of a containing trigger the LTE can directly read the value of the trigger without
threat of a race condition. The example below assumes the LTE is embedded in the some
trigger expression (as defined above).
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
. . .
< l a s t t r i g g e r e v a l id=”lte” t a r g e t=”level trigger”/>
. . .
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
As the STEP contains an attribute which specifies to which trigger the LTE is attached,
the emitted snCode uses that target attribute as the label for access.
C(l , LTE)) l: eload target
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Read nodes
Read nodes are required to access to the value stream of a persistent trigger expression; a
STEP graph must always have a read node parenting a persistent trigger unless the trigger
is the root of the graph. We consider the specific read semantics: block, nonblock, fresh,
and buffered.
Non-blocking read: A non-blocking read returns immediately with whatever value (or
NIL) is currently available to the consumer.
<read id=”readnode” type=”nonblock”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ read>
As a non-blocking read may legally return NIL, we compile the read to a load of the
environment variable that contain the value for the trigger expression. If the value had not
been set, the load will immediately return NIL, which is in keeping with the non-blocking
read semantic.
C(l , read nonblocking(T))) l: eload read.id
C(nil , T)
Blocking read: The blocking read must ensure that a value is available before returning
(i.e., will not return NIL).
<read id=”readnode” type=”block”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ read>
For illustrative purposes, the implementation shown below is a busy wait. A better
performing solution would be to require a new Opcode, EWAIT, which would wait until
the shared environment variable is available before returning.
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C(l , read blocking(T))) l: eload read.id
dupe
jumpv ↵
pop
jump l
↵: nop
C(nil , T)
Fresh read: The fresh read must ensure that the returned value has not been previously
read (i.e., is a fresh computation).
<read id=”readnode” type=”fresh”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ read>
The implementation shown clears the cached value (ensuring that the value is freshly
computed for this consumption) and continues with a blocking read implementation to
ensure the value is available before proceeding.
C(l , read fresh(T))) l: push ERR
estore read.id
 : eload read .id
dupe
jumpv ↵
pop
jump  
↵: nop
C(nil , T)
Bu↵ered read: The bu↵ered read semantic implies the presence of a bu↵er on the values
produced by the trigger, and that the reader will (eventually) retrieve every value produced.
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<read id=”readnode” type=”buffered”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<P/><R/>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ read>
The bu↵ered read must not lose values; a concern not present in the previous read
semantics. To facilitate this, we utilize the Opcodes ebufadd and ebufrmv to add an entry
to a bu↵er and remove an entry from the bu↵er. We require that the trigger expression be
compiled to use ebufadd for the line estore read .id . This is handled during compilation
by the maintenance of internal state that indicates the type of read that encloses this trigger.
C(l , read buffered(T))) l: ebufrmv read.id
C(nil , T)
Const nodes
Const nodes are used to prevent the re-evaluation of its child node. Its use is transparent
to a service composer using the higher-level SNAFU language, rather it is emitted by the
SNAFU compiler. For example the SNAFU letconst variable binding is syntactic sugar
that allows a symbol to be used as a macro for a sub-expression that is computed once
(i.e., the compilation parents the subexpression with a const node). Similarly the letonce
SNAFU binding is used to ensure that a symbol standing in for a sub-expression evaluates
once per trigger evaluation.
<const id=”constnode”>
<A/>
</ const>
The const node is supported by using the environment memory store to store a computation
and retrieving that value rather than recomputing the expression3.
3A node can be parented by a const node and be a splice target. In this scenario the value can be
recomputed “out from under” the const node. In fact, this is the desired behavior and is the way in which
the letonce binding is supported in SNAFU.
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C(l , const(A))) l: eload const.id
dupe
jumpv ↵
pop
C(nil , A)
dupe
estore const.id
↵: nop
Splice nodes
Splice nodes are used to encode a STEP graph into a tree for serialization in XML. Typically,
the presence of a splice node indicates that a given STEP node has multiple parents. Splices
are used for value re-use (not re-computation) and as such the call to a splice node should
return the value of the evaluation of the target without necessarily re-evaluating the target.
One possible solution has any node that is the target of a splice node record its value
in global state and the splice node itself return the value from the global target variable.
A problem arises, however, should the splice node occur in the execution path before the
target node. It is not possible to statically check that the target will be evaluated before
the splice and swap the ordering (e.g., a splice is on one branch of a conditional clause and
the splice target on the other).
Instead we resolve splices as a special case where in both parents will jump to the same
code block that first checks the environment to see if this value has already been computed
and, if not, computes the value and stores it in the environment. To facilitate this, the
compiler records all splice targets before compilation and, when such a node is encountered,
an entry is placed in a table mapping targets to their corresponding label (line number).
<s p l i c e id=”splicenode” t a r g e t=”other”/>
The first instance of either the splice or the target is compiled as indicated below and
further splices jump into that code block. To protect against erroneous behavior from an
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expression that is shared between nodes in di↵erent subtrees (e.g., a subexpression shared
between two graphs with distinct roots) we designate a critical section to ensure only one
thread will evaluate the target.
C(l , splice)) l: mutexlock target.id
eload target.id
dupe
jumpv  
pop
C(nil , target)
dupe
estoreconst.id
 : mutexunlock target.id
Sensor nodes
Sensor nodes refer to physical resources to be manipulated by opcodes.
<s enso r id=”image any0”>
<dev i ce id=”any” type=”image”/>
</ senso r>
Like value nodes, sensor nodes are compiled into literals.
C(label , value)) label : push sensor type@id
Socket nodes
Socket nodes send or receive serialized snBench typed values to another SXE across the
network. The socket node has an attribute “role” which defines whether it is a sender (send-
ing the value of its child node across the network) or a receiver (accepting a value from the
network and passes it up the STEP graph) and the “protocol” attribute specifies the type of
transfer (e.g., HTTP/1.1 push HTTP/1.1 pull, UDP client, TCP server). Structurally they
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are compiled exactly as Expression nodes that invoke network operations. The compilation
of socket nodes is still incomplete at this time, as its implementation on the SXE is tied to
its HTTP server; we have not provided an HTTP server to the light-weight nSXE as of yet.
6.5 Benchmarks
We can clearly measure the performance gains of moving to snCODE programs from the
original interpreted STEP SXE; specifically faster execution times and decreased memory
usage. These findings confirm our expectations. To level the comparison, we use a modified
SXE STEP interpreter that removes all tasks that are not needed for our execution time
benchmarking purposes (the HTTP server, SSD heartbeat communication, etc). Similarly
our STEPvm has been implemented in Java and utilizes the same Opcode library (to remove
any bias for faster opcode implementations). The latter implies that further memory and
execution time improvements could be achieved.
In our benchmarks we compare execution time and peak memory usage between program
execution in the STEP interpreter and STEP compiled to snCODE. We do compare only
the execution/evaluation time for both the traditional SXE evaluator and the STEPvm.
We are not including the time to load the STEP graph, or the time to compile the STEP
graph in these benchmarks.
The first benchmark (Figure 6.1) attempts to clearly isolate the computational overhead
of evaluating the STEP Graph compared to the linear, snCode representation. In our first
test use a while trigger to count up to n, and show the execution times of both the snCode
Evaluator (STEPvm) and the traditional STEP Evaluator (the SXE). These benchmarks
are measured against the Sun 1.6 03 Java Virtual Machine running in server mode with
parallel garbage collection, assertions and debugging messages enabled (to avoid dead code
elimination e↵ects). Additionally, to that end, we are using a cold JVM (i.e., a JVM
instance is created per execution trial); doing so ensures that we limit hot spot (dynamic
recompilation) e↵ects and dead code elimination (i.e., performance times improve drastically
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over successive runs within the same VM). These benchmarks have been executed under
Linux 2.6 running on an Intel Pentium-M 1.7GHz processor.
This benchmark shows a clear performance improvement in the snCode evaluation
model.
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Figure 6.1: Comparing execution times to evaluate snCode versus STEP. The common
source program is a while trigger counting up to n. Table 6.2 contains the precise values
illustrated here.
n = snCode (ms) STEP (ms)
5 5.12 17.65
50 8.82 130.47
100 12.813 279
200 21.27 322.17
300 45.07 405.66
400 55.37 444.1
500 66.54 485.6
1000 133.07 746.25
Table 6.2: Performance measurements for Figure 6.1.
The next two figures show the peak memory pool usage and garbage collection over-
head of the STEPvm versus the traditional SXE STEP evaluator for this same counting
application. Again, we are using the same Opcode implementations and “sn-Typed” data
131
objects. Despite this, we observe a significant memory usage decrease in the STEPvm eval-
uator. In these scenarios we have chosen to limit the upper bound of heap memory to the
realistic (indeed, default) JVM client setting of two megabytes (allowing for one megabyte
for use by the Eden or new allocation memory pool). In Figure 6.2, we see that the snCode
evaluator is significantly slower to reach the maximum allocation than the STEP Evalua-
tor. The cost of reaching the maximum allocation bound is paid in execution time, where
(as reflected in Figure 6.3) the STEP Evaluator su↵ers through significantly more garbage
collector invocations.
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Figure 6.2: Comparing peak memory pool usage between the evaluation of snCode versus
that of STEP. The common source program is a while trigger counting up to n.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Work
Initially we considered trivially compiling STEP into an intermediate representation of
either C or Java and then a second compiler pass to produce native executable code or Java
bytecode. Other functional languages have been compiled into C as an intermediate target,
e.g.[JHH+93]. Trivially compiling the functional-style STEP language into a procedural
representation is achieved by traversing the STEP graph to produce a function declaration
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Figure 6.3: Comparing the number of times the Copy Garbage Collector is invoked between
the evaluation of snCode versus STEP. The common source program is a while trigger
counting up to n.
for each node (named by its corresponding node’s unique ID) and inserting a call to the root
node’s function in the main() of the program. The separate Java or C compiler unravels the
functional execution flow at run time, weighing on the call stack. While creating separate
functions for each node would yield more detail from profiling tools that support stack trace
inspection, we would rather unravel a STEP graph without resorting to excessive function
definitions, incur penalties on the call stack which are not strictly necessary, or rely on a
third party compiler which removes the granularity of control we desire over the program’s
ultimate execution.
In fact, translating demand and value propagation into function calls required a fair
amount of uninteresting book-keeping; e.g., ensuring that function names are unique (guar-
anteed by the STEP node ID), that function names are valid and do not clash with any re-
served words in the target language. Intermediate function definition also required complete
type annotation and although STEP is strongly typed, it lacks complete type annotation
in its serialized XML form. Thus we wrote a type inference module for STEP itself that,
given STEP’s restrictions, uses an ad-hoc type inference/checking algorithm that runs in
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at most three passes over the STEP graph.
In STEP interpretation, a fair amount of node state is maintained to support proper
evaluation of the graph (e.g., checking whether a node is wanted by its parents, has fresh
input, has not evaluated) and in converting the program into a procedural execution context
this is unnecessary – only those nodes whose values are needed will be called in the body
of the main() method. However some of the state information that was previously stored
within nodes needed to be moved into the compiled program’s global state to maintain the
semantics of the particular node types (not entirely unlike the shared memory environment
we employ in the STEPvm). This intermediate translation from STEP to C, although
ultimately successful, served only to motivate us to proceed toward the interpreted approach
described herein.
Our ultimate goals for this work require that we migrate the current implementation
to run in either a Real-Time Java Virtual Machine to gain greater control over the VM’s
overhead, scheduling and garbage collection policies. Additionally we may consider a lighter-
weight representation of snObjects to reduce the memory overhead of the STEPvm. If we
do so, however, we run the risk of breaking compatibility with the existing STEP Opcode
library. It is unclear, at this time, if the expected performance benefit would out-weight the
cost of maintaining multiple Opcode implementations. Regardless of whether the STEPvm
Opcode library has the same specification and underlying implementation as its heavier-
weight sibling (the SXE), there are several specific Opcodes we intend to develop for this
environment. Specifically, we have designed a series of Opcodes that facilitate mobility
and remote way-point tasking for a robotics platform with self locomotion (we discus this
further in Chapter 9).
Chapter 7
Case Study: Combined Physical and Wireless
Network Security
Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) monitor 802.11 wireless frames (Layer-2) in
an attempt to detect misuse. What distinguishes a WIDS from a traditional Network IDS is
the ability to utilize the broadcast nature of the medium to reconstruct the physical location
of the o↵ending party, as opposed to its possibly spoofed (MAC addresses) identity in cyber
space. Traditional Wireless Network Security Systems tools are still heavily anchored in the
digital plane of “cyber space” and hence cannot be used reliably or e↵ectively to derive the
physical identity of an intruder in order to prevent further malicious wireless broadcasts,
for example by escorting an intruder o↵ the premises based on physical evidence.
In this chapter, we show that Embedded Sensor Networks can be used e↵ectively to
bridge the gap between digital and physical security planes, and thus be leveraged to pro-
vide reciprocal benefit to surveillance and security tasks on both planes. Toward that end,
we present our recent experience integrating wireless networking security services into the
snBench. The snBench provides a high-level programmatic interface to the resources of
a Sensor Network (SN) and thus the inclusion of wireless network sensors enables intrusion
detection and response services to be written quickly and easily. The snBench has been
designed with extensibility and modularity as a central tenet and therefore the changes
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required to include these new sensing modalities is quite low. Moreover, the framework’s
modular nature allows a user to swap in any improved emergent wireless surveillance tool
or technology (be it algorithmic or a physical turn-key device) with nominal e↵ort and
such changes would be transparent to their dependent services. We submit that our pro-
grammable, adaptable SN framework is the ideal foundation on which to compose Wireless
Network Security services and physical security services alike, providing reciprocal benefit
to each. The example programs given provide some insight into the highly customized,
cross-modal Wireless Security behaviors that are possible in this context.
7.1 Motivation
Wireless Network Security is a non-trivial problem and as such a variety of Wireless Intru-
sion Detection Systems (WIDS) have been created. WIDS deploy wireless probes/sensors
to passively or actively monitor the MAC frames transmitted on the wireless medium and
identify misuse by observing either suspicious characteristics of individual frames (e.g., ex-
hibiting characteristics imprinted by standard hacking tools) or a particular pattern in a
sequence of frames (e.g., sequences in violation of protocol standards). Wireless misuse
includes illegitimate users attempting to gain access to the network (intrusion), man-in-
the-middle attacks (e.g., luring legitimate users into communication with a rogue access
point), and various Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [BS03] (e.g. spoofing a legitimate wire-
less Access Point (AP) and sending a disauthenticate beacon to legitimate users).
While it is generally advantageous to secure a network at the lowest layer possible, the
appropriate layer for incorporating security functionalities is highly dependent on the nature
of the threat and whether such threat could be dealt with (i.e., identified and managed) at
that layer. For example, the threat of wireless intrusion is often dealt with using Layer-3
mechanisms (e.g., content based packet filtering, IP address isolation), essentially ignoring
the option of Layer-2 detection and prevention. Layer-3 IDSs are likely popular because
there is far more data available at Layer-3, making it straightforward to respond to attacks,
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and because detection and response at Layer-3 is independent of the Layer-2 connection
medium. On the other hand, wireless Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are much more
di cult to deal with at Layer-3 as these attacks occur at Layer-2 and, even if detected,
response is limited given that attackers will likely utilize fictitious or spoofed MAC addresses
and may not have an IP address to retaliate against. Ultimately the only way to respond
to these types of attack is to utilize information derived from the wireless medium (e.g.,
received signal strength) to reconstruct physical location toward the goal of preventing
further wireless transmissions from that user [Far05].
Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems provide mechanisms to identify, detect and locate
DoS attacks, yet these systems are generally limited to logging or email alert response
mechanisms. Many works ultimately recommend dispatching administration personnel to
further analyze and respond to a detected attack – a costly and impractical solution in
most situations. Instead, once the physical area of an attack has been derived it is possible
to utilize automated responses from a variety of actuation hardware, if available; e.g.,
embedded pan-tilt-zoom video cameras to gather an image, wireless detectors on pan-tilt
motors to pin-point a signal, programmable robots to triangulate signal, a common message
display (virtual bulletin board) in the environment informing users why their service has
been interrupted and who is responsible. Additionally, there would be a clear benefit from
including other, non-network centric inputs to the Wireless Network Security System (e.g.,
driving a MAC whitelist from Bluetooth/RFID tracking, security camera images, passcard
logs).
To achieve such cross-modal interaction within the context of a Network Intrusion De-
tection tool would require the generation of extensive, package and deployment specific
software (modules, scripts, etc) that are, by their very nature, cumbersome to maintain.
Indeed, such an approach is wrong headed. We observe that Wireless Network Security Ser-
vices are specific, narrowly focused instantiations of an Embedded Sensor Network wherein
sensory data includes the output of such monitoring tools. Rather than “hack” a Wire-
less Security System to include Sensor Network functionality, we advocate the inclusion of
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Wireless Security within a Sensor Network. Thinking di↵erently about Network Security,
the integration of new sensory data (e.g., motion detection, face detection) and actuation
responses expand Network Security beyond the digital plane and into the physical plane.
In this paper we detail our work to include wireless network monitoring devices as
sensors in our Sensor Network infrastructure, the snBench (Sensor Network Workbench).
The snBench provides a high-level programmatic interface to the resources of a Sensor
Network (SN) and thus the inclusion of wireless network sensors enables intrusion detection
and response services to be written quickly and easily. The snBench has been designed with
extensibility and modularity as a central tenet and therefore the changes required to include
these new sensing modalities are quite modest. Moreover, the framework’s modular nature
allows a user to swap in any improved emergent wireless surveillance tool or technology
(be it algorithmic or a physical turn-key device) with nominal e↵ort and such changes
would be transparent to their dependent services. We submit that our programmable,
adaptable SN framework is the ideal foundation on which to compose Wireless Network
Security services and physical security services alike, providing reciprocal benefit to each.
The example programs given provide some insight into the highly customized, cross-modal
Wireless Security behaviors that are possible in this context.
7.2 Related Work
While many Network Intrusion Detection (Security) Systems exist (both commercial and
open-source), we are presently unaware of any other work that leverages a programmable
Sensor Network framework toward joint physical and Wireless Network Security, and thus
believe we are unique in this regard. We present works that are related in three major
thrusts; We distinguish between works that provide detection on a single wireless source
(probe) as Wireless Intrusion Detectors (WIDs), those works that detect events across
multiple detectors simultaneously as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and finally those
that determine attack location asWireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDSs). Although
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WIDSs contain a WID component, these works are not necessarily proper subsets of each
other, as IDSs may not provide wireless detection.
Wireless Intrusion Detection
Kismet [Kerb] is the de facto open-source Layer-2 Wireless Intrusion Detector. Kismet
passively scans 802.11 channels for activity and can be used for a variety of uses including
finding hidden access points, mapping access points in a geographic region via GPS, or
generating alert events when suspicious frames are detected. A Kismet deployment may
consist of three distinct components, (1) a light-weight Kismet Drone that passively captures
the wireless frames from its local interface and sends them to (2) a Kismet Server that
processes the frames from one or more drones to detect either fingerprint or trend based
suspicious activity and (3) an optional remote Kismet client that connects to the Server to
receive notifications and render the results. The Kismet server may drive external wireless
event notification by providing custom clients that communicate using the published Kismet
protocol. Kismet may be configured as an Intrusion Detection System by associating several
drones with a single server process to build a single, central wireless event log file. Kismet
is not considered a Wireless Intrusion Detection System by our definition however, as the
Kismet server does not indicate which physical drone is responsible for an alert which
prevents spatial intrusion tracking. Kismet-newcore, a re-write of the Kismet project, does
preserve which drone generated a wireless alert event yet lacks a stable build at this time.
Other tools have existed in the WID space prior to Kismet (e.g., WIDZ [lfb]) but have
been largely unmaintained in recent years. Similarly, AirIDS [Lyn] set out to be the first
open-source Intrusion Detection System aimed at 802.11 attacks, however the project never
reached a stable release, is no longer available for download, and appears to have been
abandoned.
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Intrusion Detection Systems
While Kismet is the de facto Layer-2 WID and IDS, Snort [Roe99] is the de facto standard
IDS for Layer-3 (IP tra c analysis). Snort is a mature IDS with a large user base and
comprehensive set of detection rules for detecting malicious content in IP packets for a wide
range of attacks. Snort also o↵ers very basic response mechanisms (e.g., logging or email
alert mechanisms) however the Barnyard project not only aims to increase performance of
logging output but also claims to enable the creation and use of custom output plug-ins.
As Snort is aimed at Layer-3, it o↵ers no support for wireless monitoring, however the
Snort-wireless [Loc] project adapts the Snort rule engine for Layer-2 wireless use by adding
wireless frame capture and replacing IP addresses with MAC addresses in rule processing.
Unfortunately the Snort-wireless project has not been updated since late 2005 and plans
for integrating Snort-wireless into Snort appear to have been abandoned.
In many ways, our vision is similar to that of modular IDSs (e.g., [Yoa], [VVK03]).
These modular (or so-called “Hybrid”) systems are designed to allow various Intrusion
Detection Software packages to be integrated as “Sensors” in the IDS. These works share
the modular approach which is similar in spirit to the cross tool integration that we hope
to provide to the Network Security community, yet these works are narrowly focused on
issues of traditional Network Security. Our work enables the composition of sense and
respond programs that manipulate both network data and physical sensory data (e.g.,
image processing on embedded video cameras) in a manner that would be impossible on
these IDS platforms without significant changes.
Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems
Tracking MAC addresses alone is insu cient for a WIDS as they may be easily spoofed
by malicious tools [BS03]. The requirement that a WIDS must determine attack loca-
tion is sensible, considering that Layer-2 DoS attack response generally requires physical
intervention [Far05].
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Nominally we expect we know the Cell of Origin (COO) of a detected wireless transmis-
sion (i.e., the user’s distance must be within the detection range of the physical location
of the detection point), however while this might be useful for short range media (e.g.,
Bluetooth, RFID) we’d like to obtain higher accuracy than the range of 802.11 (ranging
from 200 to 25meters, depending on the physical layout). Many approaches to derive lo-
cation from Signal Strength Information (SSI) of RF transmissions have been undertaken,
including Microsoft Research’s RADAR [BP00] which uses readings from multiple sensors
to perform on-line triangulation, compared against o↵-line training data. Many works since
have tried to loosen the o↵-line training needs of this work attempting to dynamically over-
come issues of transmission reflection, di↵raction and interference (e.g., [YAS03]). Work
presented in [TRLW03] frames these goals directly in terms of reconstructing wireless entity
location particularly for security purposes and a similarly goaled architecture is described
in [LRG03].
The work in [AAJI04] o↵ers an architecture for a Wireless Intrusion Detection System
that breaks from the norm slightly, in so far as it establishes wireless sensors that form a
perimeter around an access point (or area) to be protected and uses directional antennae
(opposed to the typical, omni-directional antenna found on WAPs) that would sweep the
region to better pin-point the location of a particular wireless user. This work provides
detailed analysis of particular directional antennas and is able to pinpoint wireless intruders
accurately. Our work is compatible with the use of sweeping directional antenna; and
perhaps more so than what is envisioned in [AAJI04] as the snBench can address and
direct the servos that control antenna movement explicitly, enabling on-demand target
tracking. In particular, we envision either making the directionality of the wireless sensors
explicit to be controlled within the service logic, or mounting the wireless antennae to the
pan-tilt-zoom camera network that sweeps the perimeter of our SN testbed. Additionally
we note that requiring a perimeter defense may be useful in some installations, but perhaps
impractical in most. The ability to use modalities other than directional antennae for
identification (e.g., the use of cameras) extends the applicability of our approach.
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In the commercial spectrum, the Wireless Intrusion Detection System AirDefense En-
terprise [Air] integrates the industry standard signal strength positioning system, Ekahau
[Eka] to provide location tracking of wireless intruders1. IBM’s Internet Security Systems’
Wireless Products [IBM] are also popular, but lack location tracking. Both tools attempt to
provide complete, turn-key detection and response systems for corporate wireless networks.
Given their single-solution nature, these tools do not provide integration with third-party
Intrusion Detectors or tools. Responses to wireless attack detection in these systems are
more pro-active, for example, disauthenticating a malicious user to e↵ectively kick him or
her o↵ the network, yet they do not o↵er an accessible programming interface to adjust
the sense and respond behavior. While these solutions represent the upper echelon of com-
mercial sense and respond WIDSs, their lack of extensibility makes cross-modal monitoring
solutions (e.g., utilizing video frames) unattainable.
7.3 Enabling Wireless Monitoring
snBench is extensible by design insofar as support for new sensing devices may be added
to the Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE) by providing implementations of two relatively
small interfaces; a SensorHandler translates snBench requests to interact with a specific
device and a SensorDetector module must provide facility to detect new devices of this
type and inspect their state. The SensorHandler is akin to a device driver, abstracting
away the specific idiosyncrasies of the particular device’s interface and enabling the device
to be accessed by higher-level programming constructs. As far as the snBench framework
is concerned the abstracted device becomes just another managed input device/event gen-
erator only di↵erent from a video camera or motion sensor insofar as the datatype of its
output.
To enable wireless network security service composition on snBench, we have added two
new sensors and a new actuator; The WifiAlertSensor reports wireless alert detection events,
1Popular turn-key hardware solutions to wireless device tracking also exist, e.g., Cisco’s 2700 Series
Wireless Location Appliance [Sys06].
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the WifiActivitySensor reports MAC addresses and Received Signal Strength Indication
(RSSI) for any passively observed wireless activity, and the WifiResponder actuator sends a
disauthenticate flood to a particular MAC address. Rather than implement wireless Layer-2
tools from scratch we opted to leverage several existing open-source software packages.
WifiAlertSensor
The WifiAlertSensor is a SensorHandler implementation that leverages the Kismet [Kerb]
wireless intrusion detector via a self-contained customized Kismet client. The Java based
WifiAlertSensor class is hosted by a “non-lightweight” SXE and translates the proprietary
Kismet client-server protocol into structured, typed snBench objects (tagged XML) that
encapsulate notifications from the Kismet server. The decision to use Kismet stems from
its passive scanning ability, wide range of hardware support, and modular design (described
in Section 7.2). While the decision to use this package in particular may be debated,
the inclusion of any another functionally-equivalent Wireless Intrusion Detector would be
equally straightforward.
A Kismet client may request to receive several types of Kismet messages from a Kismet
server/drone pair (client tra c, AP detection, suspicious activity alerts, etc.). In the case
of the alert sensor, we request notification of all wireless alerts supported by the current
stable build of Kismet (detailed in Table 7.1). Whenever the Kismet server detects an Alert
condition from its corresponding drone’s data feed, an alert is sent to the WifiAlertSensor
client which translates and bu↵ers the alert message. In addition to translating the Kismet
protocol, the WifiAlertSensor adds additional fields to alert message; a local timestamp to
measure bu↵er service delay, a sensor source to identify the physical sensor (drone) that
produced the message, and a severity field that indicates the relative threat of the particular
attack (this corresponds to the values we have specified as the danger column in Table 7.1).
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Name Danger Type Description
PROBENOJOIN none Trend A user is probing periodically without joining any AP
Windows XP clients cause this alert as normal behavior.
LUCENTTEST none Fingerprint A site survey package is in use
NETSTUMBLER low Fingerprint An attempt to discover the SSID of a hidden AP
WELLENREITER low Fingerprint Dictionary based attempt to discover hidden AP’s SSID
DISASSOCTRAFFIC medium Trend A user is transmitting data shortly after being disassociated
(likely an indication that this user is victim of an attack)
BSSTIMESTAMP medium Trend An AP’s timestamps are out of sequence and thus may
indicate a spoofing attempt
AIRJACKSSID high Fingerprint An AP is broadcasting an SSID that is the default of the
hijacking too Air-Jack
DEAUTHFLOOD high Trend Disassociate or deauthenticate are being repeatedly sent
(flooded) from a non-AP node
CHANCHANGE high Trend An AP is now advertising a di↵erent channel than
previously detected (likely man-in-the-middle attack)
BCASTDISCON high Fingerprint A disassociate or deauthenticate message has been
broadcast. May be used to disclose a hidden SSID,
perform a man-in-the-middle attack, or denial service
NOPROBERESP high Fingerprint A response to a probe containing a 0 length SSID, which
is an attempt to exploit a bug in some AP firmware
MSFBCOMSSID high Fingerprint A packet crafted to exploit a particular Windows
MSFDLINKRATE driver fault that allows arbitrary code injection
MSFNETGEARBEACON
DISCONCODEINVALID high Fingerprint A packet crafted to exploit a driver or AP firmware fault
DEAUTHCODEINVALID that might allow arbitrary code injection
LONGSSID
Table 7.1: Alert events detected by Kismet and reported to snBench
The WifiAlertSensor’s message bu↵er is configurable in length (where length is mea-
sured in either size or time) and alert messages are retrieved from the bu↵er by Opcodes
requesting data from this sensor. Implementation of the retrieval Opcode may impose a
blocking or nonblocking semantic, as needed. In our experimentation we implemented a
single Alert-centric Opcode, sxe.core.wifi.get, that performs a non-blocking read from
the alert sensor’s bu↵er to populate and return a WifiAlert. The WifiAlert data-type is a
subtype of snStruct, with tagged fields corresponding to the fields populated by the Wifi-
AlertSensor and thus accessing the data within a WifiAlert reuses the existing snStruct
manipulation opcodes. A Service Developer retrieves WifiAlerts via the high-level function
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DetectWifiAlert() that is compiled into a call to the Opcode sxe.core.wifi.get with a
WifiAlertSensor (or set of sensors) as a parameter. Complete examples of high-level service
logic are given in Section 7.5.
WifiActivitySensor
The Activity sensor provides data regarding wireless transmissions that have been detected
by a passive, promiscuous-mode wireless sensor. In particular we are interested in the
MAC address of a transmission, the observed signal strength (RSSI) and the mode of the
transmission (i.e., Access Points, Clients, Ad-hoc participants). While determining physical
location from RSSI is imperfect (as RSSI readings themselves may not be entirely accurate
depending on the driver implementation and other physical factors) the use of RSSI readings
can better pinpoint a MAC address’ physical location than the simple cell-of-origin data
alone. WifiActivitySensor maintains a hash-table of the detected wireless activity (keyed
by MAC address), which can be used to either report new/updated wireless activity similar
to the Alert sensor or to query the activity log to find information about a particular MAC
address. Like the alert sensor the activity sensor also communicates with a remote sensor
“server” process responsible for gathering data.
In practice we actually support two di↵erent physical implementations for the activity
sensor server as the Kismet drone/Server does not retrieve RSSI on our preferred target
platform. For Kismet RSSI supported hardware we use a client derived from the Wifi-
AlertSensor implementation that requests and parses NETWORK and CLIENT messages
from the Kismet server rather than ALERT messages. For the OpenWRT platform, we use
custom code that sends ioctl’s to the wireless device to put the device in passive, monitor
mode, accept frames, and retrieve data from the frames and device (including the RSSI).
Our program is based on code from the open source WiViz [Tru] package for OpenWRT,
which contains the ioctl codes needed to achieve the proper device state and interaction.
Like the Kismet server, this program provides notifications of activity messages which are
received and hashed by the WifiActivitySensor.
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The high-level Opcode DetectWifiActivity() is compiled into sxe.core.wifi.get with
a WifiActivitySensor as a parameter and blocks until a new activity message is available
from that sensor. Additionally QueryWifiActivity() (compiled into sxe.core.wifi.find)
searches the WifiActivitySensor’s hash table for the latest reading associated with the spec-
ified MAC address. As with the WifiAlertSensor, returned data is structured as a snStruct
derivative.
WifiResponder
In addition to the wireless network sensing described above, we have also implemented a
Layer-2 wireless actuator (i.e., output device) WifiResponder that may be used as a retal-
iatory action against a detected attacker. The WifiResponder invokes a script on a trusted
(whitelisted) device running Linux with a compatible 802.11 interface and the airreplay-ng
[Dev] tool. The Opcode APDeauth() takes as arguments a WifiResponder that will send
a flood of deauthenticate messages to a particular MAC address (the second argument)
from a particular MAC address (the third argument).2 An actuator is nearly identical to a
Sensor in its implementation within the snBench. The Handler for WifiResponder invokes
the remote common gateway interface (CGI) script to initiate the deauthenticate “attack”
against the specified host.
7.4 Deployment Environment
Our test-bed deployment contains several Linksys WRT54GLWireless Access Points (APs),
running the OpenWRT [The] Linux platform. On top of OpenWRT, the kismet-drone,
airreplay-ng, and signal strength monitor packages are installed. The APs are configured
to use their wireless interface in promiscuous client mode. To communicate the results of
their wireless monitoring, the APs are tethered to our Gigabit research LAN by their on
board 100Mbit Ethernet port.
2Readers may readily note that this opcode is a loaded weapon and may gasp or recoil in horror. In fact,
this is not the first Opcode that requires special user privileges to ensure correct use.
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To support the WifiAlertSensor, we run a Kismet drone process on each of the access
points while the Kismet Server process runs on the same host as the SXE. Although the
Kismet Server process could also be run directly on the AP, the RAM and CPU limitations
of these devices lead to a less responsive system than if the Kismet Server process is hosted
on a separate host. As the Kismet Server does not presently distinguish the results from
di↵erent Kismet Drones [Kera], we run one Kismet server per drone and each WifiAlert-
Sensor connects to a unique Kismet Server process thus allowing snBench to distinguish
which drone generated a wireless event. Running one Kismet Server per Drone also carries
the advantage of minimizing the impact of a Kismet server process hanging, or failing to
process updates from its drones (admittedly a fairly uncommon occurrence).
In our tests of the WifiAlertSensor we were able to simulate and detect all relevant
attacks detected by Kismet (Table 7.1) and were unable to measure any significant induced
delay on event detection in the snBench infrastructure. Analysis confirmed the expectation
that the amount of time a single Kismet message spent in the Sensor bu↵er was directly
related to the computation load on the SXE host and the alert generation rate. In general
the observed bu↵er service delay oscillated between 0 and 15ms per alert under moderate
load with unrealistically high message flooding arrival rates (in practice, Kismet can and
will throttle alert notification rates, however this was disabled for our performance tests).
Under heavy load conditions with alert message flooding we experienced queuing delay as
long as 300ms. This gives us a good indication as to the maximum acceptable workload for
an individual SXE before it is no longer a viable host for wireless sensing tasks. Ultimately
we believe that any response detection under 1 second is reasonable as it is unlikely that
the attacker would, say, flee the premises (or video frame) within that amount of time.
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7.5 Wireless Security Services
Simple Detection
An example SNAFU program that provides simple logging is given in Program 7.1. Its
representation in STEP is given in the appendix. A level trigger is used to assign an
event handler to the detection of a high severity wireless alert. The storage.append Opcode
modifies a named storage entity (i.e., table) specified by the first argument by inserting a
data object and its corresponding unique key. The storage table is keyed by timestamp and
includes entries for each detected violation containing the recorded MAC address, the sensor
from which the alert was detected, and the type of alert. Unlike the logging provided by
Kismet as an IDS, this service records which sensor has detected the event and is backed by
an SQL server. The logged data is available programmatically via storage access Opcodes
or direct SQL queries, or through a standard web browser via the SXE host’s web service
that performs XSL translations to render the local data storage.
Listing 7.1: Add an entry to a central log when a wireless alert is detected.
let_once ALERT = DetectWifiAlert(sensor(WifiAlert ,ALL)) in
level_trigger(
equals(ALERT."SEVERITY","HIGH"),
storageappend("ALERTLOG",concat(ALERT."TIMESTAMP",ALERT."SOURCE"),
ALERT)
)
This sample SNAFU program could easily be extended to establish a log of all ob-
served wireless activity (not just attacks) by adjusting the predicate of the trigger from
DetectWifiAlert to DetectWifiActivity and removing the severity check. Another simple
example service logic is given in Program 7.2; This program will automatically email an
administrator when a specific wireless attack is detected.
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Attack Response
The previous examples are essentially the status quo for a response to the detection of a
breach in a Wireless Network – an entry into a log file or an email alert. The advantage
of employing the snBench in the wireless security domain is the wider range of responses
possible. Nominally, the email operation in Program 7.2 could be replaced with any number
of response mechanisms including sending an explicit deauthorization to the detected MAC
address3 using the WifiResponder and APDeauth opcode described in Section 7.3. Instead
we explore the unique cross section of the network plane (e.g., wireless data frames) with the
physical plane (e.g., signal strength and signal loss of signal over distances). For example,
an embedded, cross-modal Sensor Network such as the Sensorium can utilize both wire-
less network sensors (i.e.network plane sensors) and a pan-tilt-zoom video camera network
(i.e.physical plane sensors) to catch an image of the attacker “in the act.”
Listing 7.2: E-mail an administrator whenever a specific wireless alert is detected.
let_once ALERT = DetectWifiAlert(sensor(WifiAlert ,ALL)) in
level_trigger(
equals(ALERT."TYPE","DEAUTHFLOOD"),
email("mocean@cs.bu.edu",
concat("$NOW$",
": Deauth flood detected from MAC ", ALERT."MAC",
" at time ", ALERT."TIMESTAMP",
" by sensor ", ALERT."SOURCE"
)
)
)
Logging Physical Evidence
Any user detected engaged in wireless network intrusion is clearly within a bounded distance
from the detecting sensor. This coarse, cell of origin based physical location of wireless users
3A MAC address is far from the best way to uniquely identify an attacker as the attacker will likely use
a fictitious MAC address or worse, clone a legitimate user’s MAC during an attack.
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is available, imprinted in all wireless data returned from the WifiSensors (determined by
which sensor has detected the user). A very simple wireless cell of origin location example
is specified in Program 7.3. The program’s content is very similar to the previous examples
and introduces some Pan-Tilt-Zoom sensor (PTZCamera) specific opcodes, the function
of which should be clear from context. This sample streams images of a region where an
attack has been detected. The location logic is explicit in the service logic, selecting an
image from the camera that best covers the physical space within the signal coverage of
the relevant Wifi sensor, using “hard coded” location logic that is specific to the sensor
configuration of the particular deployment. The case expression is used for readability
as syntactic sugar (shorthand) for nested conditionals and takes the same syntax as in
StandardML. Connecting this program fragment to either of the previous examples would
enable the logging or emailing of images that correspond to the attack location.
Listing 7.3: Point a PTZ camera and return an image when a wireless alert is detected.
def BestPTZForViewOf(alert) =
case APName(alert.SOURCE) of
‘‘CS Grad Lab West ’’ => List(45,0,0, sensor(PTZCamera ,"PTZ1")),
| ‘‘CS Grad Lab East ’’ => List(15,0,0, sensor(PTZCamera ,"PTZ1")),
| ‘‘CS Grad Lab Lounge ’’ => List(0,0,0,sensor(PTZCamera ,"PTZ3")),
| ‘‘CS UGrad Lab ’’ => List(0,0,0,sensor(PTZCamera ,"PTZ4"))
let_each ALERTSENSORS = sensor(WifiAlert ,"ALL") in
let_once ALERT = DetectWifiAlert(ALERTSENSORS) in
level_trigger( not(isNull(ALERT)),
PTZSnapshot(BestPTZForViewOf(ALERT))
)
Alternatively user location reconstruction could be implemented within an Opcode,
resulting in intrusion detection service logic that is agnostic to the particular location res-
olution mechanism used. Such an approach makes sense if the deployment environment
already contains a wireless location infrastructure (e.g., [Sys06], [Eka], all knowing ora-
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cle) that could be accessed from within an Opcode call. An example of this approach is
given in Program 7.4. WifiLocateMac encapsulates the physical location of MAC addresses
and (PTZLocate) determines the best PTZ Camera (and corresponding angle) to capture
an image of that location. The implementation of WifiLocateMac is functionally similar to
BestPTZForViewOf in the example in Program 7.3, yet uses a received signal strength from
multiple sensors to estimate the target’s location between the sensors.
Recall the snBench not only eases the composition of such alert services, it also eases
deployment by automated re-use of existing computation/deployments to improve resource
utility. All the examples given thus far share the same predicate logic and could share a
single instantiation of that portion of the logic.
Listing 7.4: Functionally equivalent to Program 7.3, but uses black-box opcodes.
let_each ACTSENSORS = sensor(WifiActivity ,ALL) in
let_each PTZSENSORS = sensor(ptz_image ,ALL) in
let_once ALERT = DetectWifiAlert(sensor(WifiAlert ,ALL)) in
level_trigger( not(isNull(ALERT)),
PTZSnapshot(PTZLocate(QueryWifiAlert(ALERT."MAC",ACTSENSORS)),
PTZSENSORS))
7.6 Future Work
As briefly touched on in the previous Section 7.5, computational complexity can either be
placed explicitly in the service logic or pushed into the Opcodes on which the service relies.
Naturally, there is a resource flexibility and performance trade-o↵ in this decision. In the
most degenerate case any program can be implemented as one giant Opcode that eliminates
any performance penalties incurred by the STEP interpreter. Such an approach yields a
complex Opcode implementation that eliminates snBench’s inherent resource management
benefits (i.e., computation and resource sharing becomes unlikely as there will be few com-
mon subgraphs between STEP programs, individual opcodes cannot be split across multiple
SXEs, and there may be few SXEs available to accommodate such a large computation).
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On the other extreme a program composed entirely of very basic STEP Opcodes may pay
a high overhead for the SXE interpreter, yet has maximum flexibility to be split across any
compatible partitioning of the SXE space. Finding the optimal balance between STEP and
Opcode complexity largely depends on the particular needs of the given service.
Advanced Location Reconstruction
Program 7.5 tries to find a balance between the extremes of the last two examples in
the prior section. This program also produces an image whenever an attack is detected,
but specifies much of the location logic within the STEP program while still leaving the
significant computation to Opcode implementations (e.g., rssiToDist, PTZFovCover).
Listing 7.5: Get an image from the camera with the best coverage of a wireless alert.
def BetterView(T,X,Y) =
let L = Pair(locate(T.SOURCE),rssiToDist(T.RSSI))
in cond(greater(PTZFovCover(X,L),PTZFovCover(Y,L)), X, Y)
let_once ALERT = DetectWifiAlert(sensor(WifiAlert ,"ALL")) in
let_once ALERTINFO = QueryWifiActivity(WifiActivity ,ALERT.SOURCE) in
level_trigger(
not(or(isNull(ALERT),isNull(ALERTINFO))),
PTZSnapshot(
Fold(
BetterView(ALERTINFO ,-),
sensor(PTZCamera ,"ALL")
)
)
)
The function Fold, commonly referred to as reduce in some languages, is a higher-order
function that applies a given function accumulatively across a given list. In this application,
the function BetterView is applied across the list of all Pan-Tilt-Zoom sensors to determine
which sensor has the best coverage of the area in which an attack was detected in order to
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take a snapshot from that sensor. In compilation Fold is syntactic sugar that is expanded by
the compiler via substitution; its implementation is an expression that uses a WhileTrigger,
the LAST TRIGGER EVAL token, lists and pairs to provide iterative application over the list of
elements.
Wireless Access Lists from Physical Data
The last example program (Program 7.6) also leverages the natural connection between
wireless network security and physical site surveillance, however does so in the other direc-
tion, using information detected on the physical plane to (re-)configure the wireless network.
An embedded camera network and face detection Opcodes are used to detect the identities
of individuals entering or leaving a secured space as a trigger to enable the detected user’s
wireless MAC address for service in that physical area. Put simply, when we see Jane enter
the lab we want to allow Jane’s MAC address to be used in the lab (placed in the whitelist),
and we want to remove her MAC address from the whitelist when she leaves the lab. The
goal is to make it slightly more di cult for a malicious user to find an unused, authorized
wireless MAC address to abuse for great lengths of time.
Listing 7.6: Enable only the MAC addresses of user’s whose faces have been recognized.
let_once SNAP = snapshot(sensor(Camera ,"Lab door in","Lab door out")) in
let_once WLAN_MAC_ADDR = storage.lookup("MACMAP",FaceDetect(SNAP)) in
level_trigger( not(isNull(WLAN_MAC_ADDR)),
case SNAP.SOURCE of
"Lab door in" => WifiWhitelist(WLAN_MAC_ADDR , sensor(AP ,"CS Lab
*")),
| "Lab door out" => WifiBlacklist(WLAN_MAC_ADDR , sensor(AP ,"CS Lab
*"))
)
Modification of the WLAN’s access control list in this example is performed by as-
suming the presence of a WifiWhitelist; This implementation would be straightforward on
OpenWRT enabled Access Points, requiring a CGI script to modify the device’s maclist con-
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figuration file. One may easily imagine other sensors that may be used in tandem with face
detection as the trigger predicate in this expression (e.g., magnetic card or RFID reader).
snBench as a Turn-Key Network Security Solution
There is no reason to limit snBench’s Network Security to Wireless attacks. Other In-
trusion Detection Tools and Network interfaces could easily be added to further improve
the snBench as a complete, cross-layer Network Intrusion Detection System. Integrating
Layer-3 detection (e.g., Snort) as a sensor would enable the detection of misuse from IP
contents that could be used to drive isolation or removal responses at Layer-2. Additionally
including port scanning and other fingerprinting tools would greatly increase confidence in
user identification enabling more confident automated response.
In our vision of snBench we view the Sensor Task Execution Plan (STEP) as a thin-
waist language that may be a compilation target from other domain specific languages
(e.g., a Structured Query Language). Ideally we would like to move our own campus IT
department to the use of snBench over their current Network Security and Intrusion tools.
As such we might consider the development of a STEP compiler for a declarative/rule-
oriented language that is similar to existing network rule specification languages to ease the
sta↵’s transition to snBench.
Related to this goal, our work on a lightweight SXE for embedded devices will be used to
explore deployment of the Sensor eXecution Environment directly on OpenWRT enabled
access points to provide snBench as a turn-key solution for Wireless Network Security
services.
7.7 Conclusions
Many excellent Wireless Intrusion Detection tools exist and they achieve their specialized
goals well. These tools should not (and rarely attempt to) provide complete Network Secu-
rity Systems as they are generally focused on detecting a particular kind of attack (denial-
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of-service, intrusion, etc) at a particular scope (Layer-2 or Layer-3). A complete Network
Security solution should integrate multiple tools to cover a superset of possible attacks at
all possible layers and should bridge the divide between cyber and physical identities. In
practice this allows NID tools to focus on what they do best (i.e., detection) and yet be
woven into a comprehensive Network Security solution. Network Security (specifically, wire-
less security) is not a problem that exists in a vacuum detached from the physical space in
which the network is deployed. We promote an approach to unify physical site surveillance
and network security security under the umbrella of snBench— a general purpose sensing
infrastructure we have developed. In that regard, we have demonstrated how snBench
enables the rapid development and deployment of cross-modal security services. We have
shown that with snBench (1) detection of wireless anomalies can be correlated with other
sensory inputs providing reciprocal benefit to merging security on the physical and cyber
planes, (2) detection and response services may be easily composed and modified without
technical knowledge of the specific protocols or implementations of the underlying sensory
tools, and (3) adding additional intrusion detection tools as input or other devices for re-
sponse is straightforward given snBench’s modular architecture. The illustrative example
programs provided in this paper range from the status quo (simple logging and email alerts)
to beyond (enabling MAC addresses based on face detection) in a hope to spark the reader’s
imagination to more elaborate services and responses that are currently possible with the
snBench platform (e.g., locking doors, turning on a siren, ...).
Listing 7.7: The STEP representation of SNAFU Program 7.1.
<?xml version=”1.0 ”?>
< !   generated with SNAFU compi ler 0.8   >
<stepgraph id=”WIFI EXAMPLE 1”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<exp id=”exp 3” opcode=”sxe . core . equals”>
<exp id=”struct . get” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<exp id=”ALERT” opcode=”sxe . core . wifi . get”>
<s enso r id=”WifiAlert ALL”>
<dev i ce id=”ALL” type=”WifiAlert”/>
</ senso r>
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</exp>
<value id=”value”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”SEVERITY” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<value id=”value 7”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”HIGH” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<exp id=”exp 6” opcode=”sxe . core . storage . append”>
<value id=”value 1”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”ALERTLOG” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<exp id=”exp 1” opcode=”sxe . core . string . concat”>
<exp id=”struct . get 1” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 3”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 3 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value 12”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”TIMESTAMP” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<exp id=”struct . get 0” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 0”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 6 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value 8”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”SOURCE” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
</exp>
<const id=”const 7”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 2 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
</exp>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ stepgraph>
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Figure 7.1: The graphical representation of STEP Program 7.7
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Listing 7.8: The STEP representation of SNAFU Program 7.2.
<?xml version=”1.0 ”?>
< !   generated with SNAFU compi ler 0.8   >
<stepgraph id=”WIFI EXAMPLE 2”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<exp id=”exp 3” opcode=”sxe . core . equals”>
<exp id=”struct . get” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<exp id=”ALERT” opcode=”sxe . core . wifi . get”>
<s enso r id=”WifiAlert ALL”>
<dev i ce id=”ALL” type=”WifiAlert”/>
</ senso r>
</exp>
<value id=”value”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”TYPE” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<value id=”value 5”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”DEAUTHFLOOD” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<exp id=”exp 8” opcode=”sxe . core . contact . email”>
<value id=”value 2”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ” mocean@cs . bu . edu” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<exp id=”exp 7” opcode=”sxe . core . string . concat”>
<value id=”value 4”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”$NOW$” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<value id=”value 7”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>
< ! [CDATA[ ” : Deauth f l o od detec ted from MAC ” ] ]>
</ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<exp id=”struct . get 8” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 9”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 9 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value 0”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”MAC” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
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</exp>
<value id=”value 6”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ” at time ” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<exp id=”struct . get 5” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 8”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 5 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value 9”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”TIMESTAMP” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<value id=”value 18”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ” by senso r ” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
<exp id=”struct . get 1” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 16”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 4 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value 11”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”SOURCE” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
</exp>
</exp>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ stepgraph>
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Figure 7.2: The graphical representation of STEP Program 7.8
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Listing 7.9: The STEP representation of SNAFU Program 7.3.
<?xml version=”1.0 ”?>
< !   generated with SNAFU compi ler 0.8   >
<stepgraph id=”WIFI EXAMPLE 4”>
< l e v e l t r i g g e r id=”level trigger”>
<exp id=”exp 5” opcode=”sxe . core . not”>
<exp id=”exp 0” opcode=”sxe . core . i s n i l ”>
<exp id=”ALERT” opcode=”sxe . core . wifi . get”>
<s enso r id=”WifiAlert ALL”>
<dev i ce id=”ALL” type=”WifiAlert”/>
</ senso r>
</exp>
</exp>
</exp>
<exp id=”exp 2” opcode=”sxe . core . ptz . get”>
<exp id=”exp 1” opcode=”sxe . core . ptz . locate”>
<exp id=”exp 3” opcode=”sxe . core . wifi . find”>
<exp id=”struct . get” opcode=”sxe . core . struct . get”>
<const id=”const 8”>
<s p l i c e id=” spl ice 7 ” t a r g e t=”ALERT”/>
</ const>
<value id=”value”>
<snob j e c t type=”snbench/string”>< ! [CDATA[ ”MAC” ] ]></ snob j e c t>
</ value>
</exp>
<s enso r id=”ACTSENSORS”>
<dev i ce id=”ALL” type=”WifiActivity”/>
</exp>
</exp>
<s enso r id=”PTZSENSORS”>
<dev i ce id=”ALL” type=”ptz image”/>
</exp>
</ l e v e l t r i g g e r>
</ stepgraph>
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Chapter 8
Case Study: snBench as a Teaching Aide
Software and safety risks are greatly magnified in a society in which Sensor Networks (SNs)
common place and nearly all computers are remotely accessible. Sensor Network applica-
tions are more distributed, concurrent, modular and interactive – in very significant degrees
– than the traditional execution environment of stand-alone applications. Development en-
vironments for such applications are also undergoing great changes, frequently calling for
new compatible ways to develop software to accommodate these new needs, yet typically
lagging behind the enormous and relentless hardware innovations and emergent networking
concepts. The development challenges inherent to distributed sensory programming place
stringent demands on the software developer who must often approach novel and unique
problems ill-equipped with traditional tools and approaches.
Software Engineering (SE), in as much as it tries to be an established area of the CS
curriculum with well defined topics, tends to be even more conservative. This conservatism
is reflected in current SE books and in the organization of SE courses, which tend to tackle
software-development problems of the traditional programming environment very well, but
not so well those of the new networked and embedded environments.
At BU, we are trying to realize a SE course which can adapt to this fast-changing reality.
There are limits, of course, the result of tension between the goal to adapt quickly and the
need to teach well-established principles, unavoidably more suitable to the traditional pro-
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gramming environment than the new emerging one. Regardless, it is necessary to attempt
to find such a balance, to the benefit of the students such that they may be best prepared
for the future of software engineering work.
Toward this goal, this chapter details our experience piloting the use of the snBench
as the foundation for a semester-long final project for a 500-level Software Engineering
class here at Boston University. There is obvious reciprocal benefit to such a collaboration;
The curriculum benefits from the integration of the new paradigm of programming sensor
networks, the research and development agenda of the snBench benefit from both exposure
and potential additions to the code base, and students benefit from exposure to an exciting
domain in which their work is not merely intellectual exercise to be discarded.
In this Chapter we first provide an overview of the goals of the snBench project and
describe its architecture and relevant components. In section 8.1 we discus in detail our
goals for the use of snBench within the Software Engineering course. In section 8.2 we
discus the projects o↵ered to students as well as some of the project submissions. Finally
we conclude in section 8.3 with closing thoughts and lessons learned for future e↵orts.
snBench has been developed as a research project within Boston University to support
and accelerate other research that will be developed either on top of the snBench infras-
tructure (i.e., research that leverages the snBench to advance the state-of-the-art in other
areas such as Computer Vision, Network Security, etc) or to improve future generations of
the snBench infrastructure (e.g., resource management, allocation, negotiation, schedul-
ing, etc). snBench has already been used successfully in an extrinsic capacity in support
of a Graduate course in Artificial Intelligence during the 2005 and 2007 Fall semesters. This
report focuses on the integration of the snBench into a graduate-level software engineering
course during the Spring semesters from 2006 to 2008.
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8.1 Software Engineering Goals
The Graduate Software Engineering course is o↵ered by the Boston University Computer
Science Department with an enrollment of roughly thirty students who are a mix of un-
dergraduates, masters and PhD candidates. Throughout the semester students are taught
software engineering principles including (but not limited to) design patterns, software life-
cycle testing, type-safety, object-oriented programming principles and the use of concurrent
versions system. Students are expected to complete a semester-long final project that aims
to provide a realistic corporate development experience in which students work in small
groups to develop modular software components that operate either within or on top of
some larger work. Rather than use a contrived and static textbook project as the founda-
tion for this work, beginning in the Spring 2006 semester we elected to leverage the Sensor
Network WorkBench (snBench) research project as a platform for these student projects.
Working within the snBench students are given the opportunity to work in an active
project in a new domain (SNs) with expertise and support readily available on campus.
Our goal is to expose the students to engineering issues surrounding large-scale distributed
sensory systems as well as the traditional topics associated with a SE curriculum. Within
the domain of SNs students face concrete manifestations of what are largely theoretical
concerns to most Undergraduate students (e.g., Security, Safety, Error Checking, Space and
Time Complexity).
The student projects represent a significant part of their final grade for the course and
easily comprise the bulk of the student’s e↵ort for the semester. Rather than a series of
smaller assignments, the students are expected to work (as a group) on the same project
throughout the semester. As this class integrates graduate and undergraduate students,
expectations for undergraduates are adjusted appropriately, however the exposure to the
graduate students helps give the undergrads a di↵erent perspective on their work. It should
be stressed that students projects are non-competitive; Collaboration and discussion be-
tween groups is strongly encouraged.
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To help orient students within snBench students are provided a variety of documenta-
tion including high level motivation, functional descriptions and implementation details of
existing snBench software components and details of the relevant interfaces/specifications
of snBench modules required for the student projects. These resources are available in a
single, publicly available, well organized web page for the students [OK]. Students have ac-
cess to the snBench codebase as well as the project submissions of students from previous
semesters.
In addition to the static documentation, students are given access to the lead developer
on the snBench project; this access includes two lectures, one providing an overview of the
snBench vision and the other detailing each of the projects tasks in detail, meeting with
each group individually at least once per semester, and continued email support throughout
the semester.
Toward ensuring student e↵orts do not fall o↵ track, each group gives a mid-semester
project status presentation (also attended by the lead snBench developer and other “guest”
panelists) in which comments and criticisms are given to the students. In the following
section we describe the individual recommended project assignments that we have o↵ered
to the students over the course of this integration.
8.2 Projects
To provide students with some initial direction, we provide up to five “suggested” project
topics that ranged in complexity, e↵ort, integration and concreteness. Suggested topics
break down into two larger categories; those that enhance the snBench infrastructure (i.e.,
those that are internal to the snBench) and those that are enhanced by the infrastructure
(i.e., those that rely on, run atop the snBench). Given the multi-modal nature of the SNs
targeted by snBench, student projects are not limited to any single concentration/research
area within CS. The breadth of project topics allow students to learn proper Software
Engineering principles while implementing working in areas that they might be familiar
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with or have some external interest in (e.g., Computer Vision, Databases, Networking,
Distributed Systems, Human Computer Interaction).
The project topic suggestions (and some notable results) from past semesters are listed
below. They are presented in order of increasing complexity and e↵ort.
When discussing results of student work, it must be emphasized that all groups have
completed this work in very little time; project work occurs over approximately twelve
weeks of the semester in addition to other work required for this course (in addition to a
student’s other course load and responsibilities). As such any omissions, flaws, or other
negative assessments are largely assumed to be due to this severe time constraint.
Students are not permitted to work directly in the snBench CVS repository. Instead,
students received a CVS snapshot of the code-base, and (as part of their grade) their mod-
ifications are subject to an audit and review process compared against that snapshot. The
submissions whose contribution are deemed most valuable are merged into the snBench
code-base. Naturally, not all projects are selected to be reused in the snBench project.
This does not speak to the quality of the work in all cases, as the selection also reflects the
cost-benefit analysis (the amount of time and e↵ort required to port the student work into
the code base relative to the benefit of these modifications to the snBench project overall).
8.2.1 STEP Programming GUI
This project tasks students with the goal of generating a graphical user interface (GUI)
with which users can compose new snBench programs. The Sensor Task Execution Plan
(STEP) language is human readable and we (developers) are able to compose programs
directly in STEP using a regular text editor. As STEP is a direct representation of the
abstract syntax tree of a program, one can imagine a more accessible graphical programming
interface in which a palette of nodes may be o↵ered and wired into a flow of execution that
is saved directly into STEP (XML). The details of this project asked the group to build a
tool that allows a user to specify a STEP program graphically (from an extensible palette
of functionalities) and save the generated program as a properly formatted STEP.
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As a stand-alone component, this project was intentionally crafted to be external to the
bulk of the snBench code base and requires no deep integration into the existing snBench
components. It is, however, highly recommended that students reuse the existing internal
data structures to save time and avoid redundant work. The only required integration was
understanding the syntax and semantics of the STEP graph. Although a group may take
this work to be as simple as developing any graphical interactive development environment
and in no way special to the Sensor Network domain, students are expected to consider the
needs of a novice SN developer and o↵er an easy and intuitive interface to the capabilities of
the STEP programming language that would provide graphical access to task the resources
of the Sensor Network.
In the first semester this project was o↵ered, the work completed by [CSP06] was the
best work submitted under this topic, o↵ering a graphical STEP programming environment
that supports the loading and saving STEP files, tabbed editing and an XML based pallet
of capabilities. This group had clearly considered what user’s may want from their editing
tool as they o↵er tabbed editing, a (cleverly integrated) basic STEP validation engine and
an option to post STEP programs for deployment directly from the editor. In addition, the
layout of the editor they provided was straight-forward and e↵ective.
This work stood out as a good basis for future development of a complete STEP graphi-
cal development environment, and this has ultimately been the case for successive semesters.
The submitted work was somewhat incomplete from a usability point of view, unarguably
due to time constraints. This included some operational flaws discovered during our own
testing and a lack of descriptive messages/prompting leading to weak in-program commu-
nication with the user.
Although this project assignment is, by design, intended to be only nominally integrated
to the existing code base (it’s usage is outside of the run-time scope of the snBench), a
surprising problem occurred when attempting to integrate this work. This work separates
the graphical construction and the STEP graph validation into two distinct operations. As
such, during the composition of a STEP graph, the user is allowed to construct incomplete
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or erroneous STEP graphs, presumably on the way to a final, complete STEP graph. Thus,
many of the operations that this work allows the user to graphically perform on a STEP
graph may be entirely safe/normal in this o↵-line and transient context, however some of
those intermediate STEP graphs violate data structure invariants that, in an online (e.g.,
interpretation and evaluation) context guard against data corruption or other undesirable
behavior. Since the methods of the existing STEP data structures operate under the as-
sumption that the graph is in a structurally complete or sane state, naturally there are
“assertions” in the methods of the STEP data structure to ensure this is the case. As such,
running this project “o↵-the-shelf” with assertions enabled results in premature termination
due to otherwise irrelevant assertion failures.
As such the integration work for this project almost entirely entailed changes to allow
the GUI to coexist with the existing STEP data structures. This included replacing and
updating some of work’s interfaces to the snBench objects, adding real-time checks in the
GUI to prevent the construction of nonsensical STEP programs before they could be passed
to the STEP data structures, and many other assorted small reliability and performance
improvements.
There was little doubt that given more time this work could be polished into a superior
interface. Unfortunately due to other constraints, the resources required to perfect this work
were unavailable and the benefits of this work easily outweighed its flaws. Thus beyond the
small corrections indicated above we had included this work otherwise “as-is”, repairing bugs
that were discovered during integration but otherwise documenting its benign shortcomings
with the intent that improvements will be added as an ongoing e↵ort, by future semesters
of Software Engineering students.
In successive semesters, students groups were given this submission as a basis for their
work on this project topics and with this added help, the project was o↵ered only to
undergraduate students in the 2007 and 2008 semesters. The e↵orts of those students (in
refining and extending this interface) have been extracted and reintegrated and have come
to form the STEP IDE that is part of the project code-base today. Some of the most
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notable additional contributions have included an XML Schema and document instance
that defines the Opcode library and their corresponding type signatures, an interface that
allows the user to search the Opcode library when composing a STEP graph, the ability
to collapse STEP nodes into a black box, and a battery of UI refinements, bug fixes, and
other niceities.
8.2.2 Expanding SXE Capabilities
This project suggestion is by far the most open-ended and domain specific, asking students
to take the perspective of “snBench users” and help build support infrastructure to enable
interesting, useful or otherwise desirable applications on the SN framework. A successful
project in our eyes is one in which the students enable some useful and well motivated
application to run on the snBench, adding any lacking sensor functionalities (opcodes)
to support those applications. The snBench Sensor eXecution Environment has been
designed with opcode extensibility in mind such that the code to integrate the opcode is
trivial, yet students must understand the big picture of the snBench, the provided SXE
Opcode interface, and the syntax and semantics of STEP such that they can build up STEP
programs that utilize their new functionalities. The modularity of Opcode development also
serves to aid the snBench insofar as newly developed Opcodes are easily be added to the
main code base without modification.
This project has been o↵ered for all three semesters and has been fine-tuned over this
time period. This project’s open-ended nature proved to be quite seductive; in the first
semester o↵ered more groups chose this project than any other. For the next two semesters
we capped the number of student groups working on any single project to discourage this.
Additionally the open-ended nature provided a wide range of submissions, running the
gamut from barely any work at all, to those students who put their other work in jeopardy to
work on their projects. A recurring theme in student submissions for this project has been a
di culty in keeping the larger vision of the snBench in focus while working on “lower-level”
functionalities (i.e., Opcodes). Students are encouraged to implement any new opcodes they
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are inspired to provide, however are recommended to “justify” the need for their opcodes
by explaining their use in the overall system before proceeding with development.
In the first year the topic description gave suggestions for new opcodes from two di↵erent
topics: Image Manipulation and Persistent Storage (distributed hash tables, database/SQL
integration, etc.). We observed that, in general, undergraduate groups tended to submit
only those opcodes that were directly suggested. Specifically most groups turned in little
more than the suggested distributed storage opcodes. In that first year, few groups tackled
the suggestions of image manipulation opcodes (e.g., image di↵erencing, motion detection,
average image intensity, face detection).
One group that stood out was the work of three undergraduate students ([CFB06]) that
was clearly the product of a group that had seriously considered the goals and domain of
the snBench. They clearly enjoyed the novelties of SN programming, as illustrated by
their demonstration, which provided motion sensitive triggers to email notification (using
their database connectivity to compute image di↵erences).
This work is a clear asset to the snBench; The submission includes over 30 useful new
Opcodes for use within the STEP programming language including logical, mathematic,
image manipulation, e-mail and distributed storage operations. To support distributed
storage, this group implemented a stand-alone centralized hash server, a client for the indi-
vidual SXEs, distributed hash-table Opcodes for the SXE client and finally a web interface
for users/administrators to inspect the hash-table state.
Given snBenchs´ modular Opcode architecture, after testing the new Opcodes were
literally copied and pasted directly into the code-base. Integrating the hash-table opcodes
was just as simple but their proper operation relies on the SXE-side hash client and hash
server. Merging changes for the hash client into the SXE were straight forward due to
some thoughtful design decisions and to properly fold the centralized hash server into the
snBench architecture it has been ported to a threaded task that is launched, controlled
and monitored by the Sensorium Service Dispatcher. Closer inspection of the client and
server code revealed some synchronization issues that were trivially corrected by wrapping
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their data storage structure with reentrant locks. We discus some general issues involving
teaching synchronization details in a software engineering class in section 8.3.
In the second year, a group of graduate students who happened to be working in the
Image and Video Computing group managed to provide much of the desired image process-
ing functionality that is available in the snBench opcode library today. In its third year,
some interesting and novel opcodes were submitted that fell clearly outside of the suggested
Opcodes; specifically Layer-2 network analysis opcodes.
8.2.3 STEP Compilation
This project tasked a group to re-develop, from scratch, the SNAFU (high-level SN pro-
gramming language) compiler. We forgo the complete details of the project description
as they are largely irrelevant. While this project was o↵ered twice, it was only ever se-
lected once, and never o↵ered again for a number of reasons. First, this project o↵ering is
extremely challenging for a group with no compiler experience. Second, it is not obvious
to students how work on a compiler for a small language can be broken up across group
members and hence it is di cult for multiple students to work on in parallel. This latter
challenge was evident in the group’s submission and presentation which reflected a strong
disparity between the contributions of the group’s members. Unfortunately, the particular
submission was so lacking in internal and external documentation that it could not be used.
Despite this, the project was not a wasted e↵ort; the updated SNAFU grammar (BNF)
that was established during this project (between the snBench development lead and the
student group) was a very valuable outcome.
8.2.4 SXE Scheduler Modification
This project was only o↵ered in the first semester of this integration work. This project
topic recommended students make changes to the current task scheduler to improve the
execution of STEP programs within the Sensor eXecution Environment (SXE). This is an
inherently di cult task and had been considered to be the most involved project, by far.
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Changes to a scheduler are di cult to test and synchronization issues are easily introduced.
Thus, this project was available to graduate students only on a “by permission only” basis.
Students who selected this project (and hoped to achieve a positive result) needed to
be familiar with scheduling and systems topics and must acquire a deep understanding of
the existing SXE’s scheduling and evaluation operations as well as the runtime semantic of
the Sensorium Task Execution Plan (STEP).
To better understand the work involved in this task, we illustrate the SXE’s basic mode
of operation: Each SXE accepts a partial STEP graph which indicates the exact tasks
(nodes) it is expected to execute and the dependency between the tasks (edges). As the
STEP graph is directed (computations percolate upward) a STEP node higher in the graph
cannot be evaluated until the lower nodes have been evaluated. Thus leaves are evaluated
first and so on, upward, until a result reaches the root. Some branches of the graph may not
need to be evaluated at all (e.g., they are one branch on a conditional) such that checking
if a node should be evaluated depends on state of both children and parents (i.e., if this
nodes’ children have produced “fresh” values and if the result of this node is wanted farther
up the tree).
Rather than traverse the graph repeatedly, the initial SXE’s scheduler is a simple round
robin scheduler that checks for enabled nodes “anywhere” in the graph. Enabled nodes are
moved to a queue and are separately executed by a single thread of execution . Suggested
optimizations for this project included using multiple threads to execute multiple enabled
nodes simultaneously (e.g., nodes of independent branches) and/or adding di↵erent schedul-
ing algorithms that ensure the nodes get a either a fair or explicitly desired share of the
SXE’s cycles. Both of the groups that selected this project topic achieved a fantastic result
(which is why this project was only o↵ered once).
The scheduling work of [PZB06] adds true hierarchical scheduling to the Sensor Exe-
cution Environment and does so with absolutely minimal changes required to the existing
SXE code-base (only two methods of one class have been modified). The scheduling code
is quite complete and o↵ers the construction of a hierarchy of schedulers including Round
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Robin, Fixed Priority and Proportional Share scheduling. The integration to the SXE is
very clean and simple yet the integration is in somewhat incomplete and ine cient due to a
lack of time. Although the work supports a variety of schedulers, code augmenting the SXE
to enable reading scheduler Flow-types (i.e., scheduler directives) from the STEP graph
was not provided, causing much of the project’s benefit to not be utilized from the SXE.
The scheduling work of [MLH06] on the other hand is considerably more ambitious with
respect to integration with the existing SXE. Although the scheduling o↵ered lacks a true
hierarchical scheduler, this work o↵ers a hybrid scheduler and the deep integration into the
existing SXE implementation enables access to all their provided schedulers from within
an active SXE. To support this, the group has added parsing for scheduler flow-types and
modifies the scheduler to enable scheduler annotated STEP nodes to be enqueued to the
correct queue. This work is exceptional in its completeness and scope (e.g., excellent design,
an automated regression test-suite is provided, and synchronization has been added around
some existing STEP data structures.).
Unfortunately, this scheduler has an intricate enqueueing mechanism that makes its
integration into the SXE more intrusive. This new approach annotates some nodes with
new mechanisms for enqueueing based on partial STEP graph traversals, and flow types for
unannotated nodes are rediscovered by each node re-traversing part of the graph every time
this node is enabled for execution making flow-type annotations a necessity to avoid this
penalty. In addition small issues surrounded this work’s STEP synchronization approach,
which uses a sporadic lock/release/repeat that potentially allows two simultaneous clients
to manipulate data based on transient/expired data views. It is clear that these particular
synchronization flaws result from an attempt to minimize changes to the admittedly complex
and involved existing STEP Graph data structure. In our integration e↵ort we have added
proper synchronization that is based on our in-depth knowledge of the underpinnings of the
STEP Graph data structure.
Given two excellent projects we were able to adopt the best aspects of both works into
the snBench code base. The scheduler of [PZB06] has been integrated as the scheduler,
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adapted with [MLH06]’s flow-type parsing and support to support programmatic access to
hierarchical schedules. The new resulting SXE scheduler gives every STEP program its own
proportional share of the SXE and, by default, each STEP is evaluated with its own Round
Robin scheduler within its share. Scheduler flow-type specifications within a STEP graph
allow the nodes within a STEP program to override their default Round Robin scheduling
behavior as needed, substituting Fixed Priority, Proportional Share or a true hierarchy of
schedulers with the aforementioned schedulers. When a new STEP graph or fragment is
added to the SXE, flow-types are discovered for the new nodes by traversing the entire graph
exactly once. From every “root” node in this SXE’s STEP graph, we perform a breadth
first traversal assigning new Opcodes (tasks) to their closest assigned scheduler and creating
new schedulers within the hierarchy if flow-type directives are present.
8.3 Conclusions
The snBench project has always been conceived as a foundation for accelerating various
research initiatives and its use within a Software Engineering class stands as a testament to
our progress toward that goal. Integrating the snBench into a SE curriculum has provided
the students with exposure to concrete instances of new and well established design and
engineering challenges in the SN domain. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of our
achievements and areas for improvement for future semesters.
From the point of view of the snBench its successful use to support this Software
Engineering class is an important milestone on the path to maturity. In addition to the
intrinsic stability benchmark associated with having a large experimental user base, it is
clearly beneficial to have a large group of students fluent in snBench programming and
use. Those students are now more likely to use the snBench in the future or to recommend
its use to others. The project submissions described in this report have provided important
and beneficial contributions to the snBench framework and the e↵ort of their authors is
greatly appreciated.
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From the student’s perspective, this collaborative e↵ort was well received. Students
reported interest and excitement being able to work on an active project in a still evolving
domain. Indeed the participation in the project became quite consuming to many of the
students, some of whom petitioned for the project to be worth a greater portion of their
grade and a larger part of the class over all. Those students who were informed that their
work would be reused in the snBench project expressed pleasure in the idea that their
e↵orts were legitimately useful. Although not every project that was turned in was able to
be absorbed into the code base, all of the students have provided useful contributions to
the snBench framework. Every student project has taught us valuable lessons as to how
we might adjust the project assignments and student development in future semesters.
Lessons Learned and Future Adjustments
Although the collaboration was a clear success, we view this e↵ort as ongoing and strive to
improve future iterations and detail some lessons learned in this section.
Material
Adding the snBench to the curriculum of the class brought many systems-centric engineer-
ing issues (e.g., synchronization and resource allocation) to the forefront of the students’
SE projects. Generally this material is not covered deeply in SE classes despite the clear in-
creasing trend toward shared and distributed architectures in modern software. This trend
must be reflected in the SE curriculum and as such design principles for concurrency and
synchronization should become a larger part of this course.
Some students had expressed a preference for the project work as opposed to the other
requirements associated with the class (e.g., textbook readings, quizzes and exams). Al-
though the textbook readings and exams cannot be replaced, it may be beneficial to inte-
grate the project material into some of the lessons more closely or to replace quizzes with
small snBench integrated assignments (e.g., a selection of objects from the existing source
may be selected to illustrate use of various design patterns).
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Student Guidance
Although each group met with the lead snBench developer in person once, it seems benefi-
cial for students to discus their projects and plans more often throughout the semester. The
best work done in this class tended to be that of the groups who met with the lead devel-
oper more than once during the semester. Although such meetings may be time consuming,
there is little doubt that the benefit of such meetings far exceed the time investment. These
meetings may also help groups stay on track and keep the big (SN) picture in mind during
their development cycle.
Similarly, students present a mid-semester progress report as well as an end of semester
progress report. The mid-semester report is useful to determine if groups are headed in
the right direction. These presentations have a length that balances consumed lecture time
and the time required to be useful. In this semester the 12 minutes per group does not
shed enough light on what a group is doing and as the semester is already half over by the
time of the mid-semester report, it is generally too late to recommend any drastic changes
if they are needed. It may make sense to require groups to meet with faculty individually
outside of class both one-quarter and half-way into the semester for a more in-depth review
(in addition to the mid-semester presentation).
Student Collaboration
Despite urgings from the faculty, groups did not collaborate across groups as much as we
had hoped. Although there is certainly a sense of competition that is natural when multiple
groups are working on the same topic/project, there is room for groups to discus their work
with one another for help. While student groups maintained public web pages that were
visible by all, very few students looked at each other’s web pages, and had little idea what
the other groups were doing or how they were doing it. This problem is di cult to fix, but
it may be the case that providing incentives for collaboration may solve this problem.
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Time Limitations
Another di culty is that once the semester ends students’ work on projects ends as well.
Given the short semester and the ambition of some groups this has the undesirable conse-
quence of incomplete work. Although this may be corrected with better advise regarding
expectation and time allotments, for particularly promising work we may wish to o↵er an
arrangement that would allow select groups to continue, polish and integrate their work into
the snBench code base for credit. It might also be nice to be able to give students detailed
feedback about their work after the semester has ended and the code has been thoroughly
reviewed. Even if this information is too late to benefit them for the current semester, such
feedback may be useful for the rest of their academic careers and beyond.
Suggested Projects
We found that while providing an assortment of projects was beneficial to the groups,
a careful balance must be struck to maintain requirements of a proper academic exercise.
Allowing more students to work particular project resulted in greater discussion of the issues
and challenges in that project and ultimately better submissions. This e↵ect is strengthened
even when some students are disinclined to ask for help, as they will still benefit from the
answers to questions asked by others. Additionally time/e↵ort spent answering questions
for a project that has a large number of students in turn benefits a large number of students.
O↵ering too many projects has lead to a situation in which some projects are selected by
only one group, thus increasing the overhead and decreasing the utility of support and
documentation e↵orts. Reducing the total number of projects limits the options provided
to students, however it guarantees that there will be multiple groups working on the same
project which leads to multiple submissions on the same project, and an increased likelihood
of a strong result being adopted into the code base (either from either a single work or a
composite of submissions).
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we summarize the contributions of the work, reflect on several design deci-
sions that would be made di↵erently with the knowledge that we have presently, and suggest
several possible areas for additional research in this domain.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
The snBench project o↵ers the a Sensor Network programming and execution framework
that supports the entire life-cycle of Sense-and-Respond Services. The framework revolves
around a single (i.e., common) tasking language that is the target of multiple high-level pro-
gramming languages and may be re-translated for execution on severely constrained devices.
The use of this common tasking language enables the use of a variety of high-level program-
ming languages (and interfaces) such that users are not bound to a programmatic single
interface. All run-time components provided (including resource allocation, task assignment
and task execution) are capable of processing this common tasking language. In providing
su ciently insular constructs within these high-level languages, snBench achieves its goal
of enabling novice users to task and ultimately deploy SN services. As the library of func-
tionalities and datatypes available for manipulation by the common tasking language are
extensible, snBench can be updated to support new sensors, actuators, and computations
for new deployment scenarios, as needed.
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snBench includes static verification of newly submitted services toward the goals of
safety verification and providing static-time resource bounds. This contribution is particu-
larly valuable in the context of image manipulation services, wherein treating images as first
class datatypes yields the ability to bound the image resolution range required for specific
computations. Tracking these resolution bounds provides constraints on physical sensory
resources (i.e., image sensors) to preserve functional correctness, while simultaneously con-
sidering impact to execution time or other run-time constraints (i.e., Flowtypes).
9.2 Future Directions
9.2.1 Resource Allocation
Expressive Naming and Name Resolution
At present we support two extremes of sensor naming: completely agnostic (i.e., ANY or
ALL sensor of a specific type) or specific (e.g., give the URI of the physical SXE (host)
and the ID of the sensor). The use of URIs requires the Resource Manager to maintain
knowledge of all sensors connected to each host and perform computation at the time of
task submission to resolve resources to compute and reserve physical sensor resources. We
wish to generalize sensor naming to support a middle ground of naming based on potentially
dynamic attributes (the type of the sensor is a static attribute). Examples include location
(e.g. “The webcam in Azer’s O ce”), naming by property (e.g. “Any two cameras aimed
at Michael’s chair by 90 degrees apart”), naming by performance characteristics (e.g. “Any
processing element within 2msec from WebCam1 and WebCam2”), and naming by content
(e.g. “Any webcam which sees Assaf right now”). Such naming conventions will require
persistent, prioritized STEP queries to be running as the basis for these results, however
it is unknown which such persistent queries should be instantiated, the resource cost of
allocating sensors for these tasks, and how we can express these tasks as more commonly
used expressions such that we produce the highest odds of potential computational reuse
in tandem with the most valuable property detection.
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Performance Profiling/Benchmarking
Our present performance monitoring uses stub code to represent the free computational re-
sources an SXE has and the computational cost of each opcode. It is clear that an accurate
characterization of the computational availability of resources and each opcodes computa-
tional requirements will be needed to enable the SSD to accurately allocate resources and
dispatch programs. We envision a solution in which SXEs generate simple performance
statistics about each opcode as it is run, and these statistics are reported to the local SRM
to build opcode performance profiles. Such an approach allows new opcodes to be developed
with their profiles dynamically built and probabilistically refined.
This is extremely important to ensure operational correctness of the type system, which
is contingent on the presence of accurate size, cost and constraint data for Opcodes (prim-
itive operators). snBench provides a facility by which new Opcodes may be added to a
service library quickly and easily, through the implementation of a simple Java interface.
At present the type system maintains an embedded definition for the latent costs and size
constraints of the current Opcode library, however for the sustainability of the type system,
it is essential that these definitions are provided by the Opcode authors and automatically
extracted directly from the Opcode definitions. Beside changing the Opcode implemen-
tation interface, the type system must also change to import the rules from the Opcode
library directly. There is also a concern that Opcode authors might specify very weak size
constraints and very high costs (possibly lacking the knowledge to do so correctly) and that
the end result is a type system that is only as strong as its weakest link. Any future work
that would automatically extract this information from an Opcode implementation would
be a fantastic solution to this problem (and others).
Fairness and Resource Cost
With multiple users tasking SN resources, some notion of fairness must be provided to
prevent any user(s) from monopolizing the system. While several approaches exist in the
Distributed Computing domain (e.g., fair share, virtual currency, auctions) the solution and
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infrastructure to provide fairness must minimize bandwidth, CPU overhead and the latency
between job submission and execution. In keeping with the modularity of snBench this
solution should be as modular as possible, allowing di↵erent solutions to be “swapped-in”
depending on the needs of the deployment.
Graph Partitioning and Optimality
From the perspective of communication cost, there is performance pressure to generate
STEP schedules (STEP graph partitions) in which contiguous regions are scheduled to the
same SXE, to minimize communication between SXEs. Although we can use the size-
annotated datatypes as an indication of the communication cost, it may be the case that
those expressions that receive large amounts of data as input may have computation costs
which dwarf their communication cost (e.g., pattern matching, face-finding, etc). The
deployment of such resource intensive expressions may generate graphs in which we have
many small regions and high communication cost. As the task assignment strategy is
highly dependent on the particular SN deployment (and to the extent to which we intend
to leverage snBench as a framework for ongoing SN research) the SSD provides a simple
interface that allows SN engineers to use their own, custom task allocation implementation.
That said, unlike Grid computing environments (e.g., Emulab), a SN user may have a
short, one-time SN service that, given some external deadline, requires immediate deploy-
ment and thus cannot wait for an optimal resource allocation (e.g., observing an event that
is going to occur imminently, but only once). Quick and dirty resource allocation algorithms
may exhibit extreme service fragmentation (excessive communication due to low availability
on every node) or resource a nity (most services are assigned to the same nodes); these
limitations may be easily overlooked if the cost (e.g., time required) of “optimal” resource
allocation exceeds the total cost of the new service itself.
By providing resource allocation as a customizable module, it would be beneficial to have
a way to automatically characterize a particular resource allocation (i.e., graph partitioning)
algorithm across a variety of metrics (e.g., response time, fragmentation, fairness).
182
9.2.2 Extending snBench to Other Domains
Applications to Cloud Computing
The distributed sensing and responding systems targeted by snBench are, in principle,
distributed systems. Extending snBench to additionally support a more traditional dis-
tributed system architecture (e.g., the Google Cloud, PlanetLab) requires more than en-
suring that the Sensor eXecution Environment will run on the nodes in this space (they
will). Rather, supporting execution in these environments requires adjustments the Op-
code library to (1) better support (or essentially, wrap) traditional and potentially external
“batch” processing jobs with an opcode and (2) to enable arbitrary fragmentation/parti-
tioning of these jobs within snBench to enjoy the modularity and resource assignment
benefits that snBench provides in the large-scale, cloud computing domain. Addition-
ally, the high-level languages to compose such large-scale computations should be designed
particularly for this target deployment.
Distributed, Dynamic Robotics Applications
The benefits of extending snBench to include robotic devices are significant. The tasks
executed on a robotic device may be adjusted from local sensory input (e.g., proximity
sensors) as well as from sensors that are connected to other, remote devices (e.g., neighboring
devices). The ability to access both local and remote sensory inputs, logically, extends the
“sensory perception” of a robotic device to cover the entire space monitored by a VSN.
As a concrete example, consider a multi-modal application that detects a spill on an
embedded video network, and dispatches the closest robot to the spill location to clean it
up. A robot will use its local proximity sensors to ensure that a collision is not imminent,
but it may also use input from external video sensors to indicate that a pathway has been
blocked, a new destination is required, or that its services are no longer required.
Additionally the actuation (response) capabilites of these devices motivate the need
for new abstractions and constructs to deal with the challenges inherent to sharing mobile
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devices; a careful balance must be reached when defining the atomicity of actuation tasks to
ensure that multiple users can “simultaneously” use the device, without actively disrupting
the tasks of other users.
The infrastructure provided by snBench is well suited to address these challenges in
a number of ways: (1) the native SXE is ideal for such constrained target devices, (2) our
static analysis techniques can be used to bound the processing delay (i.e., responsiveness)
of a robotics task, and this delay can be used to determine the likelihood of collision in the
event of sudden changes in the environment, and (3) the extensible task allocation module
of the Service Dispatcher makes it easy to “drop in” new task allocation approaches that
include custom logic for task assignment to robotic devices.
Scalability of Networked SSDs
As mentioned earlier, the SSD and SRM maintain a resource view for a “local-area” Sen-
sorium. Although this hierarchal division seems rather natural, the number of resources
to be monitored by an SSD must be “within reason”. As more Sensoria come on-line,
there will inevitably be demand for computations that involve resources of disjoint Sensoria
(e.g., nodes on the periphery between two SSD regions). Such “elastic SNs” require po-
tentially specialized addressing, resource allocation, and program composition approaches;
these approaches must be implemented, verified, and evaluated for scalability.
Comparing Programming Granularities
A multitude of programming languages exist today with di↵erent aims (e.g., scripting,
printing and reporting) and all of which leverage the API provided by the Operating System.
Similarly we expect multiple, high-level SN languages to emerge targeting di↵erent types of
applications that are all compiled to the SNDP’s API. As defining a “best” API is impossible
given the inherent qualitative nature of such a discussion, some metrics must be defined to
quantitatively compare SN APIs.
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9.2.3 Security and Privacy
Security and Safety
The emergence of embedded SNs in public spaces produces a clear and urgent need for
well-planned, safe and secure infrastructure as security and safety risks are magnified. For
example, a hacker gaining access to private emails or crashing a mail server is certainly bad,
however it is clearly worse if that same hacker can virtually case an o ce via stolen video
feed, disable the security system, remotely unlock the door, and steal both the physical mail
server and the data it contains. In any remotely programmable system it is imperative that
only authorized users task resources and that data cannot be intercepted by unauthorized
third-parties. Similarly there is a need to ensure that the SN computation correctness is
not compromised by malicious entities spoofing legitimate SN components.
snBench provides an ideal infrastructure to experiment with the inherent security issues
in this novel domain; easing the incorporation of mechanisms that provide authentication
support for privacy, constraints, and trust. Traditional security approaches may prove too
heavy weight for the highly-constrained SN domain. At present, most works underscore the
importance of security concerns yet fail to address them in any concrete way.
9.2.4 Safety and Verification
Additional Type Annotations
Other useful type annotations (beyond upper and lower size bounds) and can be integrated
into the type system of the snBench. In Chapter 5 we gave the examples of image quality,
numerical quality, color-depth for images, frame rates for video, and so on.
Verification of Other Properties
Determining SN program faults statically (i.e., static type-checking) has established value
in the domain of desktop machines, and our work has begun to illustrate the value of ex-
tending static verification techniques to SN programs. In addition to the existing static
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type-checking provided by snBench, one could easily imagine extending further safety and
analysis techniques into this domain (e.g., run-time verification, deadlock detection/preven-
tion, race condition detection on shared state).
Software/Sensor Fault Isolation
The Sensor eXecution Environments (SXEs) of snBench may be executing portions of
multiple unrelated services simultaneously. As such it is essential that any a single erroneous
computation or task does not expose the data of other private or privileged computations
that happen to be located on the same resource.
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depending on semester (the largest section was 130 students, and the smallest was
six) student reviews were consistently overwhelmingly positive.
Professional Experience
Research Scientist, Telcordia Technologies 1998 - 2003
Multimedia Research Group Morristown, NJ
Working in Applied Research I pursued a wide range of research projects including
automated software testing, distributed workplace collaboration and video confer-
encing, wireless applications and technology, video multicasting, and data over cable
networks.
Software Engineer, Bellcore 1998
Rapid Applications Group Piscataway, NJ
As lead engineer for subsystem enhancement and product support of a large-scale,
actively deployed service provisioning system for regional Bell operating carriers,
my responsibilities included drafting requirements and documentation, development
and build management, and acting as client liaison for an assortment of support and
enhancement issues.
System Sta↵, Rutgers University 1996 - 1998
NASA Grant for AXAF Educational Outreach New Brunswick, NJ
As per a grant awarded to the Physics department at Rutgers University, I helped
create an educational website providing information about NASA’s Advanced X-Ray
Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) targeting students grades K-12.
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Honors / Awards
- National Science Foundation Award – Co-authored proposal that builds on my re-
search.
Title: Leveraging Type Systems for High-Assurance Cyber-Physical Systems# 0720604
Program: CISE/CNS Computing Systems Research, 2007.
Award: $99,999
- Research fellowship, Boston University, 2006 - 2008.
- US DoEd Graduate Assistance in Areas of National Need Fellowship, awarded (de-
clined), 2006.
- High Honors in Computer Science, Rutgers College, 1994 - 1998.
- General High Honors, Rutgers College, 1994 - 1998.
- Dean’s List, Rutgers College, 1994 - 1998.
- Golden Key National Honor Society, 1998.
Patents
- Michael Long. Methods and Systems for Monitoring Quality Assurance.(Patent #6,754,847;
Issued June 22, 2004), Co-Inventors: S.R. Dalal, A. Jain, G. Patton, M. Rathi, J. Ap-
penzeller.
- Michael Long. A Method and System for Providing Secure, Instantaneous, Direc-
tory Integrated, Multiparty, Communications Services. (Provisional filed 2001), Co-
Inventors: S.R. Dalal, G. Patton, R. Graveman, C. Chung, G. Di Crescenzo, H. Shim.
Publications
Book Chapters
[HRTES07] Azer Bestavros and Michael Ocean. Programming and Virtualization of
Distributed Multitasking Sensor Networks. Insup Lee, Joseph Leung, and Sang Son,
editors, Handbook of Real-Time and Embedded Systems, chapter 23. CRC Press,
2007.
Refereed Conference Proceedings
[WISEC08] Michael Ocean and Azer Bestavros. Wireless and Physical Security via
Embedded Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless
Network Security (WiSec 2008), Pages 131-139, Best Paper Award, Alexandria, VA,
April 2008.
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[VEE06] Michael Ocean, Azer Bestavros, and Assaf Kfoury.SNBENCH: Programming
and Virtualization Framework for Distributed Multitasking Sensor Networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd ACM International Conference on Virtual Execution Environ-
ments (VEE 2006), pages 89-99, New York, NY, USA, June 2006.
[BN05] Azer Bestavros, Adam Bradley, Assaf Kfoury, and Michael Ocean. SNBENCH:
A Development and Run-Time Platform for Rapid Deployment of Sensor Network
Applications. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Workshop on Broadband
Advanced Sensor Networks (Basenets 2005), Boston, MA, October 2005.
[IPTEL01] Hyong Sop Shim, Chit Chung, Michael Long, Gardner Patton, and Sid-
dhartha Dalal.An Example of Using Presence and Availability in an Enterprise for
Spontaneous, Multiparty, Multimedia Communications. 2nd IP-Telephony Workshop
(IPTEL2001), pages. 138-148, April 2001.
Technical Reports
[TR0802] Michael Ocean, and Azer Bestavros. Extending the SNBENCH to Support
Wireless Network Intrusion Detection. Technical Report BUCS-TR-2008-002, CS
Department, Boston University, January 15 2008.
[TR0616] Michael Ocean, Assaf Kfoury, and Azer Bestavros. Integrating Sensor-
Network Research and Development into a Software Engineering Curriculum. Tech-
nical Report BUCS-TR-2006-016, CS Department, Boston University, July 14 2006.
[TR0601] Yarom Gabay, Michael Ocean, Assaf Kfoury, and Likai Liu. Computational
Properties of SNAFU. Technical Report BUCS-TR-2006-001, CS Department, Boston
University, February 6 2006.
Presentations
- ACM Wireless Network Security (WiSec), April 2008.
- ACM Virtual Execution Environments (VEE), June 2006.
- BU Operating Systems and Services (BOSS), January 2006.
- BU Sensorium Research Group, May 2005.
Posters and Abstracts
- National Science Foundation (NSF), Computer and Information Science and Engineer-
ing (CISE) Directorate, Computing Research Infrastructure (CRI) program meeting
(NSF CRI’07 PI meeting), June 2007.
- BU Center for Information and Systems Engineering (CISE) Sensor Network Consor-
tium (SNC), November 2006.
- Boston University Industrial A liates Program (IAP) Research Open House, March
2006, March 2007.
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Editorial Services
Reviewer for:
- ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
(SIGMETRICS) 2006, 2007, 2008.
- ACM Virtual Execution Environments (VEE) 2006.
- IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) 2007.
Research Interests
Systems and Networks
Operating Systems, Distributed Systems, Sensor Networks/Embedded Systems, Real-
Time Systems; Architecture and Implementation.
Applied Programming Languages
Type Theory, Domain Specific Languages, Software Design, Automated Verification.
Teaching / Advising Activities
- Software Engineering 2006 - 2008; Advising of undergraduate students for research
projects and Technical Report publication in their names.
- Image and Video Computing 2005, 2007; Provided and supported my research project
as a platform for students to implement Computer Vision projects.
Extracurricular Activities
Outside the o ce I enjoy snowboarding, rock-climbing, hiking and collecting/repairing pin-
ball machines.
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